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Abstract
Multinational enterprises from developing economies have been reshaping the 
global investment landscape since the early 2000s. In particular, companies from 
China have become increasingly significant outward investors. In fact China is 
currently the third largest outward investor in the world (UNCTAD 2013). As a 
relatively new phenomenon the outward investment of Chinese multinationals has 
not been researched comprehensively. This is especially true of Chinese 
multinationals undertaking investment activities in advanced economies.
Therefore the aim of this research is to extend our knowledge of the investment 
behaviour of Chinese multinationals in advanced economies. This is achieved 
through the examination of their reasons for investment, selected entry modes and 
effects on British business partners. This research takes a multiple case study 
approach consisting of nine Chinese multinationals from the automotive, 
manufacturing, IT, telecommunications and medical device sectors. As a 
qualitative study it is principally based on interview data but also draws on 
quantitative evidence where appropriate.
The findings of this research suggest that the examined firms had diverse 
competitive advantages and investment motives. The effects of their investments 
were also varied because they were determined by the MNEs’ investment motives 
and modes of entry. The strategic asset-seeking investors significantly improved 
the companies they acquired. They also intensified research and development 
activities in external partner organisations. Meanwhile the asset-exploiting 
investors improved consumer welfare, intensified competition in their sectors and 
generated high value-added business opportunities for British partners at home 
and abroad.
The generally positive effects of Chinese FDI imply that UK policy-makers may 
wish to step up their efforts to attract further investment from China. The diverse 
nature of Chinese companies indicates that investment promotion agencies could 
develop a differentiated strategy to encourage Chinese investors. In addition the 
benefits derived from collaborating with Chinese multinationals suggest that British 
firms could be more proactive in forging relationships with them.
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1. Introduction
Initially the international expansion of firms was dominated by multinational 
enterprises from the most advanced countries in the world. The origins of the 
modern multinational enterprise (MNE) date back to the late 19th century when 
companies from Britain, North America and continental Europe began to extend 
their activities beyond national borders (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 2009). Their pre-
eminence continued until the 1970s when the existing population of multinationals 
was joined by firms from Japan.
The domination of developed country multinationals continued into the 1990s 
when the advanced economies of Europe, the US and East Asia were key sources 
and recipients of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 1990 and 2000 
these regions accounted for 65%-70% of all FDI flows (Hirst, Thompson &
Bromley 2009). Unsurprisingly, most of the globally renowned multinational 
enterprises such as Sony, Siemens and McDonalds originated from the advanced 
economies of Japan, Germany and the US respectively.
FJowever the global investment environment began to change during the 2000s 
with the increasing significance of emerging markets. Initially emerging markets 
rose to prominence as investment destinations for advanced economy MNEs.
Many multinationals from developed countries set up operations in one of the 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). For example Japanese 
electronics companies set up production lines in China, US software companies 
established research and development (R&D) facilities in India, while British banks 
acquired financial institutions in Brazil.
Developing countries have become increasingly important investment destinations 
for foreign investors in the last decade. In 2005 they hosted 36% of total global 
inward FDI (UNCTAD 2006) while the latest figures show that they now host 45% 
(UNCTAD 2012). In particular China’s position as a host country for FDI has 
changed dramatically since the late 1970s when the country’s economic reforms 
began. In the last 40 years China has evolved from being a modest recipient of 
FDI to being the largest recipient of FDI amongst developing and transitional 
economies, and the second largest recipient of FDI in the world (UNCTAD 2013).
Developing countries are not only key destinations for foreign investment but they 
are also becoming increasingly significant sources of FDI. In 2005 outward 
investment from developing economies represented 15% of total global outward 
flows (UNCTAD 2006) but in 2012 they accounted for 31% (UNCTAD 2013). 
China’s outward investment was limited until the early 2000s. The introduction of 
the ‘Going Out’ policy by the Chinese government in 1999 encouraged and 
supported successful Chinese enterprises to internationalise. By this time Chinese 
companies had accumulated sufficient capital to invest overseas as a result of the 
sweeping economic reforms that had taken effect.
The rapid growth of China’s outward investment is illustrated by increases in both 
outward investment stock and flows. Its outward FDI stock grew from USD 29.9 
billion in 2002 to USD 317.21 billion in 2010. Similarly, China’s outward FDI flows 
increased from USD 2.7 billion in 2002 to USD 68.81 billion in 2010 (Ministry of 
Commerce, People's Republic of China 2011a). Chinese outward investment is 
mostly directed towards developing countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa 
(Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 2010). Although overall levels 
of Chinese investment in Europe are comparatively lower, they have increased 
significantly since 2005. FDI flows into the European Union (EU) increased from 
USD 189.54 million in 2005 to USD 5,963.06 million in 2010 (Ministry of 
Commerce, People's Republic of China 2011a).
Most Chinese investment in Europe is hosted by Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom (Hanemann, Rosen 2012). Germany and the UK were the leading 
European destinations for Chinese investors in 2009. During that year Germany 
received 29% while the UK received 27% of Chinese investment in Europe 
(Knoerich 2012). Given the rapid increase in Chinese investment in Europe and 
the significance of the UK as one of the leading destinations for Chinese investors, 
this research focuses on the investment behaviour of Chinese multinationals and 
its implications. In particular it investigates the extent to which the investment 
motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence the effects 
of their investments on British business partners. As the presence of Chinese 
multinationals in the UK is a relatively recent phenomenon our understanding of 
the effects of their investments has been limited. This study develops an in-depth
understanding of these effects so that policy-makers and businesses in the UK 
can maximise the opportunities provided by Chinese investors.
1.1. Conceptual framework
This research relies upon a conceptual framework developed on the basis of links 
that exist between investment motives, modes and effects of Chinese 
multinationals. Their internationalisation motives can be explained by combining 
two opposing perspectives.
The first perspective proposes that firms internationalise on the basis of ownership 
(Dunning 1993, 2000) or firm-specific advantages (Rugman 2008b). Dunning’s OLI 
theory was developed to explain the internationalisation behaviour of firms from 
advanced economies. According to Dunning a firm will internationalise if: it has 
superior ownership advantages compared to competitors in the host country; the 
host country offers advantages that are unavailable in the firm’s home country; 
and it is more cost-effective for the international activities to be conducted 
internally rather than outsourcing them to a third party organisation.
Similarly Rugman suggests that North American, European and Japanese MNEs 
expand internationally on the basis of firm-specific advantages (FSAs). A firm 
specific advantage is a unique proprietary capability which can be based on 
technology, knowledge, managerial or marketing skills (Rugman 2007). According 
to Rugman firms that wish to internationalise need to have one of more of these 
firm-specific advantages. On the other hand firms may also expand abroad on the 
basis of country-specific advantages (CSAs). A country-specific advantage is 
unique to the business in each country and can be based on natural resources, 
labour or cultural factors. Firms that internationalise on the basis of country factors 
instead of firm factors are not considered to be “truly internationalized" (Rugman 
2007): P.12. Although the perspective based on competitive advantages was 
developed with advanced economy MNEs in mind, it is used in this research to 
explain the internationalisation behaviour of Chinese MNEs which have such 
advantages.
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The second perspective argues that firms internationalise in order to acquire new 
competitive advantages (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 2009, Luo, Tung 2007, Mathews 
2006b). The Linkage, Leverage and Learning (LLL) framework was developed by 
Mathews to explain the internationalisation behaviour of firms from emerging 
markets (Mathews 2006b). According to Mathews, firms internationalise in order to 
absorb new skills and knowledge from advanced multinationals. The main 
assumption of this perspective is that emerging market firms internationalise in 
order to compensate for their competitive disadvantages (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 
2009, Luo, Tung 2007). This research uses the perspective based on competitive 
disadvantages to explain the internationalisation behaviour of Chinese MNEs that 
lack such advantages.
This study combines both viewpoints to provide an understanding of the 
motivational aspects of their investment activities in the UK. The first perspective 
explains the investment behaviour of the Chinese companies that already possess 
strong competitive advantages, while the second underpins the investment 
behaviour of those that lack these advantages.
Empirical evidence points to a link between investment motives and investment 
modes. Namely investment motives play a significant role in determining the type 
of entry mode selected by Chinese multinationals when investing overseas (Cui, 
Jiang 2009, Deng 2007). Hence this research argues that the investment 
motivations and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs significantly 
influence the effects of their investments on British business partners.
1.2. Research problem
Gaps in existing research relate to two aspects of Chinese multinationals: their 
competitive advantages and the effects of their investments on advanced host 
economies.
The two leading theoretical perspectives described in the previous section have 
one major issue -  they assume that firms from emerging markets either possess 
or lack competitive advantages. Namely the first perspective assumes that they 
already possess certain competitive advantages (Dunning 1993, Rugman 2008a),
while the second perspective assumes that they lack them (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 
2009, Luo, Tung 2007, Mathews 2006b). The first contribution of this thesis is 
therefore to provide an in-depth examination of the competitive advantages and 
investment motives of Chinese multinationals. In doing so it contributes to the 
wider theoretical literature on the internationalisation of emerging market 
multinationals.
Existing research on the effects of foreign investment focuses on investments in 
developing countries. Some of the studies examine involuntary knowledge transfer 
from advanced economy MNEs to domestic firms (Buckley, Clegg & Wang 2002, 
Chuang, Lin 1999, Guo, Veugelers 2006), while others concentrate on voluntary 
knowledge transfer through technological (Fang et al. 2002) and supplier 
relationships (Duanmu, Fai 2007, Guerrieri, lammarino & Pietrobelli 2001,
Ivarsson, Alvstam 2009, Ivarsson, Alvstam 2011).
Flowever the availability of empirical studies focused on the effects of emerging 
market MNEs on advanced economies is limited. Existing research considers 
general economic implications such as capital inflows (Hanemann, Rosen 2012, 
Tiwari, Herstatt 2009); employment (Flanemann, Rosen 2012, Xu, Petersen & 
Wang 2012); competition (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010) and consumer welfare (Pradhan 
2007, Charlie 2012). In addition several studies on Chinese acquisitions in Europe 
have been undertaken (Nicolas 2012, Knoerich 2010, Gentile-Ludecke 2013) but 
overall the research conducted to date is unable to provide comprehensive 
understanding of this new phenomenon. The same is true of the effects of Chinese 
investment in the UK which have not yet been researched.
Therefore the second contribution of this thesis is to provide detailed insight into 
the investment effects of Chinese enterprises in the UK through the use of firm- 
level data. This is achieved by examining the extent to which the investment 
motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence the effects 
of their investments on British business partners.
The present study seeks to address theoretical gaps relating to competitive 
advantages and investment motives of Chinese multinationals in the UK. A deeper 
understanding of the companies’ investment motives together with their
investment modes helps to advance our knowledge of the effects of their 
investments. In doing so, this study also fills empirical gaps in existing literature on 
the effects of Chinese investment on developed host countries.
1.3. Research question, aim and objectives
This thesis is guided by the following research question:
To what extent do the investment motives and investment modes displayed by 
Chinese MNEs influence the effects of their investments on British business 
partners?’
Thus the overall aim of this thesis is to understand the degree to which the 
investment motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence 
the effects of their investments on British business partners. The study seeks to 
achieve this aim by addressing the following research objectives:
1. To examine the investment motives of Chinese multinationals in the UK. The 
findings will be analysed in the context of existing theoretical and empirical 
research on Chinese outward investment motives.
2. To understand their investment modes and the challenges encountered. This 
study seeks to build an understanding of the forms of investment employed by 
Chinese multinationals in order to achieve their aims. It also examines the 
difficulties they face in the process.
3. To identify the effects of Chinese investment on acquired companies, partner 
organisations, competitors and customers. This research seeks to identify
business partners that are most affected and to ascertain the extent to which these 
effects are beneficial.
1.4. Method
This thesis employs a multiple case study approach using principally qualitative 
data. The case study method is useful for investigating a phenomenon in a real-life 
context when the distinction between the observed phenomenon and its context
are unclear (Yin 2003). The multiple case study is a version of the case study 
method that includes two or more observations or cases. The case study method 
is particularly useful for the development of inductive theory. Its key strength is the 
ability to provide a detailed understanding of a certain phenomenon in a specific 
context (Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Liao 2004).
This research is based on nine case studies of Chinese knowledge intensive 
enterprises that have undertaken investment activities in the UK, three of which 
are in-depth. The companies come from a range of sectors including 
manufacturing, automotive, IT, medical devices and telecommunications. The 
case study companies vary in size and ownership structure. Their sizes range 
from medium to large, while their ownership structure varies between private, 
public and state-owned. The process of selecting individual cases was based on 
their availability and willingness to participate. The data used for the purpose of 
this research draws on both primary and secondary sources.
Primary data was collected mainly from participating Chinese multinationals. It is 
supplemented by data from British companies that have partnered with Chinese 
firms and therefore have insight into their investment activities. The study also 
includes primary data from UK government agencies responsible for attracting and 
supporting inward investment from China. A total of 23 in-depth interviews were 
carried out during the course of 2012. The interviews were conducted in English 
because many of the employees were native English speakers. Interviewees who 
spoke English as a second language were proficient English speakers so it was 
unnecessary to use an interpreter. The interviews were guided by a semi- 
structured interview schedule because of the explorative nature of the study.
The primary data gathered by means of interviews was complemented by the use
of secondary data. Secondary data was collected from a combination of freely
available public resources and subscription-based databases. This data was
collated from a variety of sources including company websites, annual reports,
newsletters and presentations; economic publications such as the Economist and
the Financial Times; specialised trade magazines; and British and Chinese news 
portals.
The data was analysed using thematic analysis which involves the categorisation 
of qualitative data into themes. Initially the data was coded or organised into 
categories. The coding was then used as a basis for identifying themes and theory 
building. The process of coding and theme identification was conducted using the 
NVIVO software package which enabled tasks to be completed efficiently and 
accurately. Thematic analysis was carried out within and across the case study 
firms as well as across the remainder of non-Chinese organisations included in 
this study.
1.5. Thesis outline
The introductory chapter is followed by the literature review, chapter two, which 
introduces fundamental definitions and types of FDI. It highlights the globalised 
nature of cross-border investment and the increasing significance of developing 
and transitional economies in international FDI flows. This chapter provides an 
overview of FDI in China and shows how foreign MNEs contributed towards the 
modernisation and development of the domestic sector. This chapter also 
discusses outward investment from China through an examination of the 
investment motives, modes and effects on host economies. Finally, it introduces 
the conceptual framework underpinning this research.
Chapter three discusses the methodological aspects of this study. It outlines the 
philosophical assumptions of this research as well as the ways in which the data 
was collected and analysed. This chapter presents the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological and methodological positions of this study. It also 
explains how the research was carried out by describing the techniques used for 
data collection and analysis.
Chapter four provides an in-depth examination of the case of SAIC (Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation) and its acquisition of MG Rover’s legacy.
Chapter five investigates in detail the case of Chongqing Machinery and Electric 
(CQME) and its acquisition of PTG, while chapter six explores the case of 
Zhuzhou CSR Times and its acquisition of Dynex. Chapter seven examines 
another six Chinese firms (Changan, Weigao, Mindray, TP Link, Hytera and 
Vanceinfo). All four of the case study chapters investigate the investment motives
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of the Chinese companies, their chosen investment modes and the challenges 
they encountered. These chapters also explore the effects of Chinese investments 
on acquired firms, local partner organisations, competitors and customers.
Chapter eight discusses the findings of this study in light of existing theory and 
empirical research. The chapter presents findings across three main themes: 
investment motivations, investment modes and investment effects. Chapter eight 
links these three themes together to clarify the degree to which the investment 
motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence the effects 
of their investments on British partner organisations.
Chapter nine brings together the conclusions of this study. It restates its relevance 
in light of the latest developments in Chinese outward investment. The chapter 
also reiterates the aims and objectives of this research. It emphasises the study’s 
contribution to knowledge and outlines the implications of its findings for 
policymakers, investment promotion agencies as well as British firms.
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2. Literature review
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to outward investment 
of Chinese multinationals in advanced economies and it is divided into five 
sections. The first section on foreign direct investment introduces fundamental 
definitions and types of FDI. It highlights the globalised nature of cross-border 
investment and increasing significance of developing and transitional economies in 
international FDI flows.
The second section focuses on FDI in China. It provides an overview of current 
investment trends and shows how foreign investment in China contributed towards 
the development of the domestic sector. Spillovers and linkages facilitated 
knowledge transfer from foreign MNEs to local enterprises. Flowever the ability of 
Chinese enterprises to exploit available knowledge depended on their absorptive 
capacity. This section highlights the role FDI in the development of domestic 
enterprises up to a point where they could undertake international investment 
activities themselves.
The third section discusses outward investment from China. It outlines key trends 
in Chinese investment in both developed and developing countries. This section 
examines existing literature on motives, modes and effects of Chinese investment 
on host countries. The discussion of literature around these themes is aligned with 
the three research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter. It creates a 
framework for understanding the role of investment motives and modes in 
determining the effects of Chinese FDI on advanced host economies.
The fourth section develops the conceptual framework on the basis of the 
literature reviewed in the previous section. It uncovers links between investment 
motives, modes and effects of Chinese multinationals to form the basis of this 
research. The conceptual framework enables analysis of case study data 
according to the identified themes, with the overall aim of providing an answer to
the main research question. The chapter closes with a concluding remarks section 
which summarises its key points.
2.1. Foreign direct investment
2.1.1. Definition
According to the OECD foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs when the resident 
of one economy (the direct investor) establishes a lasting interest in an enterprise 
(the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of 
the direct investor. A strategic long-term relationship is formed between the two 
enterprises whereby the direct investor has a significant degree of influence over 
the management of the direct investment enterprise (OECD 2008). The direct 
investor needs to have at least 10% of the voting power in the direct investment 
enterprise in order to demonstrate a lasting interest.
FDI differs from indirect or portfolio investment in the degree of management 
influence exercised by the investor. In the case of indirect investment, the investor 
does not participate in the management of the investment enterprise. This type of 
investment is motivated solely by financial gain and is undertaken through 
acquisition of company shares or bonds.
2.1.2. Types of FDI
There are two main types of FDI (FHill 2007). The first is greenfield investment 
which represents the establishment of a new operation in a foreign country. The 
second is sometimes referred to as brownfield investment and involves the 
acquisition or merging with an existing company in a foreign country. Although 
mergers and acquisitions have high failure rates they are often the entry strategy 
of choice for MNEs. They take less time to execute and are considered to carry 
less risk than greenfield investments.
2.1.3. FDI in a globalised economy
The environment in which FDI takes place today is highly globalised. This means 
that the interdependence among people from around the world is increasing.
World economies have become increasingly integrated because barriers to the 
movement of people, capital, technology and trade have been reduced (Daniels, 
Radebaugh & Sullivan 2011). It is not unusual for a company to be headquartered 
in one country, for its products to be made in a number of different countries and
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for the final product to be sold to customers all over the world. A good illustration 
of a typically globalised company is that of Kia, a Korean car manufacturer. Its cd 
players are made by a Japanese company. Parts of the cd player are made in 
China while others are made in Thailand. Assembly is done in Mexico and finished 
cd players are then transported to the US. They are then shipped to Korea where 
they are fitted into new vehicles and sold all around the world.
The intensification of cross-border investment means that local companies are 
facing intense competition from domestic and foreign rivals in their home markets. 
Consequently domestic companies are increasingly looking to foreign markets with 
the intention of defending market share at home or increasing market share in 
overseas markets.
2.1.4. Current FDI trends
Historically FDI was dominated by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Europe. 
US and East Asia. Between 1990 and 2000 these regions accounted for between 
65% and 70% of all FDI flows (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley 2009).
Although advanced economies still play a significant part in global FDI flows, 
developing countries are taking an increasingly prominent role. In 2005 developing 
countries accounted for 36% of total global inward FDI (UNCTAD 2006) while the 
latest figures show they accounted for 52% in 2012 (UNCTAD 2013). The graph 
below illustrates the growing significance of developing countries in total global 
FDI inflows. This is particularly relevant from 2003 to 2012 when the share of 
developing countries in global FDI flows grew steadily.
Figure 1 - FDI inflows, global and by group of economies 1995-2012 (USD bill.)
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Source: (UNCTAD 2013)
Developing countries are not only major recipients but are also major sources of 
FDI. In 2005 outward investment from developing economies and transitional 
economies represented 15% of total global outward investment flows (UNCTAD 
2006), while in 2012 they accounted for 31% (UNCTAD 2013). The figure below 
illustrates the growing significance of developing and transitional economies in 
total global FDI outflows. This is particularly relevant for the period between 2003 
and 2012 which shows a steady increase in FDI outflows from these countries. In 
contrast the share of outward investment from developed economies has 
experienced a decline during this period.
Figure 2 - Share of major economic groups in FDI outflows 2000-2011 (%)
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2.2. FDI in China
China has undertaken a remarkable journey from a position of isolation to a 
position of economic superpower. The rapid pace of China’s economic 
development makes its story all the more interesting. Foreign investment in China 
has gone through extraordinary changes from 1978 until the present. Between the 
establishment of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949 and the beginning of the 
economic reforms in 1978 there was hardly any inward investment at all. Today 
China is the second largest recipient of FDI in the world (UNCTAD 2013).
With the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978, the Chinese government 
undertook extensive measures to attract FDI into China. In 1979 a Joint Venture 
Law was adopted and four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces were established (Luo 2000). Several years later, in 1984, 14 coastal 
cities were opened to FDI which attracted more investors to other coastal regions 
In 1986 the government issued ‘Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment’ followed by numerous central and municipal regulations to ensure 
their implementation.
The effects of the reforms are reflected in the country’s rapid economic growth and
increased levels of FDI. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by an
average of 9% between 1978 and 2000 while inward FDI also showed a significant
increase accounting for an average of 9.35% of the country’s GDP between 1984
and 2000 (Phelps, Raines 2003). During the 1990s the Chinese government
continued to encourage FDI through a series of commercial laws and regulations.
Consequently FDI levels increased reaching 11 billion in 1992 and have continued
to rise steadily ever since. From 2000 to 2009 FDI flows were higher than in any
other developing or transitional economy reaching a record 108 billion in 2008 
(Davies 2012).
Today, according to the world investment report, China is the world’s second 
largest recipient of FDI after the USA and the top host economy amongst 
developing and transitional economies (UNCTAD 2013).
Figure 3 - Top 20 host economies 2012 (USD bill.)
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The Chinese government encourages international trade and investment as key 
drivers of economic development. It was especially keen to attract FDI during the 
period of economic reforms as this was seen as an effective way of importing 
modern technology, management and marketing skills into the country.
2.2.1. Effects of FDI on domestic enterprises
Widespread FDI in China during the last two decades has generated a great deal 
of academic interest. Researchers have been particularly interested in the role of 
FDI in the development of domestic enterprises. The effects of foreign investment 
have been widely studied through literature on voluntary and involuntary 
knowledge transfer from foreign multinationals to Chinese firms. Knowledge can 
be transferred intentionally through the formation of linkages between foreign 
multinationals and domestic enterprises in the form of technological or supplier 
relationships It can also be transferred unintentionally when foreign multinationals 
are unable to restrict knowledge from diffusing to local firms. This form of 
knowledge transfer is known as a spillover or an externality.
2.2.1.1. Spillovers
There are two types of spillovers - productivity and market access spillovers 
(Blomstrom, Kokko & Zejan 2000). Positive productivity spillovers occur when local
firms raise their productivity levels as a result of foreign MNE presence. This 
happens when domestic firms forge buyer or supplier relationships with foreign 
MNEs; imitate MNE technologies; hire former MNE employees or become more 
innovative and raise their game in response to competitive pressures from foreign 
companies. Productivity spillovers that affect domestic competitors are known as 
horizontal spillovers while those that affect domestic suppliers and customers are 
referred to as vertical spillovers (Liebscher et al. 2007).
The presence of foreign investors does not always have positive effects however. 
Negative productivity spillovers occur when the presence of foreign MNEs has 
adverse effects on domestic firms’ productivity levels. This may occur when skilled 
employees are hired away from domestic firms. Another reason for lower 
productivity is loss of market share to foreign competitors. If demand is reduced 
local firms are forced to reduce production levels. This will increase their fixed 
costs thus resulting in lower levels of productivity (Aitken, Harrison 1999).
Market access spillovers occur when domestic firms benefit from the knowledge 
and experience of international markets embedded in MNEs. This may be in the 
form of expertise in international marketing or simply sharing information about a 
particular overseas market. An example of this is a Chinese firm that uses a 
foreign MNE's already established distribution channels to sell its products in a 
foreign market Development of its own distribution channels requires significant 
investment and local market knowledge which may take years to develop.
There is evidence that FDI generates technological and market access spillovers 
for domestic firms in China. An investigation into the effects of FDI on Chinese 
manufacturing companies finds support for both types of spillovers. Domestic 
enterprises acquired the ability to develop new products and to access 
international markets through their relationships with foreign MNEs (Buckley,
Clegg & Wang 2002). A further study using firm level data from Taiwan has similar 
findings. It shows that FDI positively influences domestic firm productivity in 
Taiwanese companies (Chuang, Lin 1999).
However not all researchers agree that higher levels of productivity are achieved 
through the presence of foreign MNEs. Empirical findings show that high
technology FDI does not have strong positive effects on productivity of local firms. 
Instead firms’ own R&D efforts are shown to be more important for raising 
productivity (Guo, Veugelers 2006).
2.2.1.2. Linkages
Knowledge can also be transferred to local enterprises through the formation of 
relationships with foreign multinationals. Technological and supplier relationships 
have in particular shown to be effective mechanisms for transferring knowledge 
from foreign multinationals to domestic enterprises. Evidence from Taiwan 
demonstrates that technological collaboration between foreign R&D centres and 
Taiwanese research institutes led to increased knowledge flows towards the local 
research organisations (Fang et al. 2002).
Although it has been argued that Chinese firms entering into supplier relationships 
with foreign MNEs are less likely to derive technological benefits than those 
involved in technological relationships (Sun, Du 2011), numerous studies have 
demonstrated that foreign MNEs are in fact valuable sources of knowledge for 
Chinese suppliers.
A case study examining the relationship between MNEs and Chinese suppliers 
shows that both tangible and intangible technology can be transferred through this 
type of interaction (Duanmu, Fai 2007). During the initial stages of the relationship 
the MNE transfers explicit and relatively simple technical knowledge to the supplier 
in the form of blueprints and manuals so that production can begin. But as time 
goes on more intangible forms of technology are transferred such as skills, 
techniques and managerial practices.
Further evidence of knowledge transfer is seen in the interaction between 
Japanese multinationals and their Taiwanese suppliers in the electronics industry 
(Guerrieri, lammarino & Pietrobelli 2001). The relationship exposed Taiwanese 
workers and managers to new organisational practices which were quite different 
to existing traditional authoritarian management practices. In addition the 
introduction of international quality standards spurred widespread learning across 
a range of domestic firms.
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Moreover a firm-level study of the interaction between Swedish MNEs and their 
local suppliers in China, India, Brazil and Mexico finds positive evidence of 
knowledge transfer. The technological assistance provided by the MNEs facilitated 
the diffusion of product and process technology to local suppliers (Ivarsson, 
Alvstam 2009).
IKEA was found to be a source of technological knowledge for its suppliers in 
China and Southeast Asia. The suppliers improved their “operational” capability by 
using new raw materials, equipment, machinery and management techniques. 
They also improved their “duplicative” capability by learning to expand and 
rationalise production. Their “adaptive” capability was also enhanced by learning 
to make new products and by IKEA’s process requirements. Finally the suppliers’ 
“innovative" capability was enhanced by developing and designing their own new 
products (Ivarsson, Alvstam 2011).
2.2.1.3. Limiting factors
The presence of foreign multinationals in China does not automatically lead to the 
transfer of knowledge to domestic enterprises. The extent to which local firms are 
able to capture knowledge from MNEs depends on their ability to recognise, 
assimilate and apply new knowledge. This capability is referred to as “absorptive 
capacity” and suggests that a sufficient knowledge base is required before an 
organisation is able to absorb new knowledge (Cohen, Levinthal 1990). A 
sufficient knowledge base can be developed by investing in internal R&D activities.
Evidence from the Chinese manufacturing sector demonstrates the importance of 
internal R&D activities for local firms intending to assimilate advanced knowledge 
from foreign MNEs. Existing studies show that internal R&D activities enable 
Chinese firms to utilise and apply knowledge from foreign MNEs more effectively 
(Li, Chen & Shapiro 2010; Sun 2002). Thus the ability of domestic companies to 
exploit knowledge from foreign multinationals is directly determined by their 
internal knowledge base. A Chinese firm with an active R&D department is more
likely to capture knowledge benefits than a firm that is less focused on knowledge 
generating activities.
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Foreign multinationals can also improve the innovative capacity of Chinese firms. 
However the strength of this influence depends on the absorptive capacity of 
domestic firms. For instance China’s coastal regions receive knowledge intensive 
FDI and have a high concentration of highly skilled labour, universities and 
research institutes (Fu 2008). The strong knowledge base of domestic firms 
ensures their innovative capacity can be further improved through interaction with 
foreign MNEs. On the other hand, the situation is quite different in inland China 
where the absorptive capacity of Chinese firms is lower. Consequently local firms 
in this region are unable to maximise their relationships with foreign MNEs.
The presence of FDI can improve the ability of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to innovate. But these benefits appear to be restricted to SOEs that 
engage in export, invest in human resources and undertake in-house R&D (Girma, 
Gong & Gorg 2009). In contrast SOEs that do not undertake in-house R&D have 
insufficient knowledge bases and low absorptive capacity levels. They are 
therefore unable to absorb new knowledge from foreign MNEs. Further evidence 
from Chinese high-industries suggests that the presence of foreign MNEs can 
significantly improve innovation performance of domestic enterprises (Liu, Zou 
2008). However this is only possible for companies that have high levels of 
absorptive capacity as a result of deliberate learning efforts (Liu, Buck 2007).
2.2.2. Alternative approach
Despite widespread evidence pointing to positive knowledge transfer effects 
generated by FDI there are alternative views which emphasise the importance of 
internal efforts. According to the alternative approach, the development of Chinese 
firms is determined not by knowledge transfer from FDI but by internal R&D 
efforts. One such study finds that FDI does not have strong positive effects on 
productivity of local firms. Instead firms’ own R&D efforts are shown to be more 
important for raising productivity (Guo, Veugelers 2006).
Moreover a study of four Chinese telecommunications companies argues that 
local firms should concentrate on self-developed technologies in order to catch up 
with leading MNEs (Fan 2006). The role of linkages with foreign MNEs is 
considered to be supplementary. This view finds further support in a study of
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Chinese high-technology enterprises which advocates development through 
indigenous innovation rather than acquisition of Western technology (Guan et al. 
2006). Evidence from ICT companies across Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
finds internal development to be the main source of technology rather than FDI 
(Lin et al. 2011).
2.3. Outward Investment from China
According to the 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, China’s outward investment flows reached 68 81 billion USD in 2010 
which represents a 21.7% increase compared to 2009. Approximately 16,000 
enterprises were set up across 178 countries worldwide by the end of 2010 
(Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 2011a). Meanwhile total 
outward FDI stock amounted to 317.21 billion USD. Both outward FDI flows and 
FDI stock have shown a steady increase from 2002 to 2010 as illustrated by the 
table below.
Figure 4 - China's FDI flows and stock 2002-2010 (USD bill.)
Source: (Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China 2011a)
Chinese overseas investments increased significantly between 2009 and 2010. 
Chinese companies invested in 3125 companies across 129 countries and regions 
in 2010. The value of their investments was 59 billion USD, representing a 36.3% 
increase compared to 2009 (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 
2011a). The most recent official statistical report suggests that outward FDI has 
continued to increase at a slower pace after 2010. Chinese companies invested in
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3,391 companies across 132 countries and regions in 2011. The value of their 
investments was 60.07 billion USD representing a 1.8% increase compared to 
2010 (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 2011b).
The majority of Chinese investment abroad is directed towards developing and 
emerging countries. Chinese investments in Europe represent a small proportion 
of total Chinese OFDI (Outward Foreign Direct Investment) and total FDI into 
Europe. According to EUROSTAT data, investment from China accounts for a 
mere 0.03% of total FDI into EU member states as a whole (Clegg, Voss 2012). 
Investment from China presently accounts for 3.5% of total foreign direct 
investment in the European Union (Wheatley 2012). The chart below shows that 
Chinese investment in Asia, Latin America and more recently in Africa is 
substantially higher than in the European region.
Figure 5 - Chinese outbound investment flows by region 2003-2009 (USD mill.)
Source: adapted from (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 2010)
Despite the regional differences there has recently been a rapid increase in 
Chinese investment in Europe. Annual inward flows tripled from 2006 to 2009 and 
then tripled once more by 2011 amounting to 7.4 billion Euros (Hanemann, Rosen 
2012). A steady increase in Chinese investment in Europe is illustrated by official 
statistics published by the Chinese government:
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Table 1- Chinese FDI flows into the EU 2005-2010 (USD mill.)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Value 189.54 128.73 1044.12 466.62 2966.43 5963.06
Source: (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 2011a)
Chinese investment in the EU is concentrated in the three largest states Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom (Hanemann, Rosen 2012). Germany and the UK 
were the leading European destinations for Chinese investors in 2009. During that 
year Germany received 29% while the UK received 27% of Chinese investment in 
Europe (Knoerich 2012). Other large European states such as Spain and Italy also 
attract a significant amount of Chinese investment whereas Eastern European 
member states attract less.
Chinese investments in Europe, however, are not confined to the EU. A study of 
Chinese investment into a group of non-EU countries shows that Chinese firms 
are making noteworthy investments outside the EU region (Apoteker 2012). The 
study examines Chinese investment in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and Turkey. The CIS states include Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgystan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
According to the findings Chinese investment in this region is driven by China’s 
need for energy resources and is undertaken largely by SOEs. Russia is the 
leading recipient, followed by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The majority of 
investments are directed towards the energy sector (67%), followed by the car and 
transport sector (9%) and the commodities and materials sector (8%). The range 
of locations selected by Chinese investors shows their versatility and openness 
towards very different investment environments.
There are indications that Chinese enterprises are investing across a wide range 
of industries rather than concentrating on a small group of strategic sectors 
(Flanemann, Rosen 2012). Sectors currently targeted by Chinese investors across 
Europe include electronics, metal products, machinery, automobile, textile- 
garment and banking/insurance (Milelli, Fiay & Shi 2010).
Although the majority of companies from China are MNEs or SOEs there are also
a significant number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in Europe.
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A case study by Anja Fladrich examines the phenomenon of Chinese SMEs in 
Europe. Prato in Italy is a textile industrial district which has attracted a significant 
number of Chinese SMEs. There are currently 3,000 Chinese SMEs based in 
Prato. They are driven primarily by a desire to set up their own business and 
receive no support from the Chinese or Italian governments (Fladrich 2012). Their 
path to foreign investment is very different to that of SOEs and MNEs. They often 
arrive in Europe as migrant workers and fund their start-up business with loans 
from friends and family.
The phenomenon of Chinese overseas investment has recently attracted a great 
deal of attention in both Chinese and Western media. Chinese sources report on 
the acceleration of Chinese investment abroad, highlighting increasing levels of 
M&As in developed regions such as Europe and the US (Xinhuanet 2012c, 2012a, 
2012b). Meanwhile Western sources have also written extensively on the subject 
(Backaler 2012, The Guardian 2012). Despite the popularity of this topic in 
mainstream media, there has not been a great deal of academic research on 
Chinese investment in the UK.
An early study on Chinese investment in the UK provides insight into the activities 
of Chinese SOEs in the late 1990s. At the time Chinese enterprises carried out 
small-scale operations in trading and financial services and were far from being 
major competitors in their respective industries (Young, Flood & Lu 1998). The 
development of enterprises was significantly influenced by the state. This is 
unsurprising given that the study was conducted prior to the implementation of the 
‘Going Out’ policy when most Chinese outward investment was undertaken by 
state-owned enterprises.
The volume and structure of Chinese investment in the UK has changed 
somewhat since the late 1990s. Between 2000 and 2011, the UK was the second 
largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe according to investment value. It 
received a total of USD 3,684 million, behind France with USD 5,722 million and 
ahead of Germany with USD 2,543 million over the ten year period (Flanemann, 
Rosen 2012). Chinese companies invested in 59 new investment projects in the 
UK, creating 1,500 jobs in the 2010/2011 financial year (Clegg, Voss 2011).
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According to research conducted by Chatham House Chinese investment in the 
UK is mainly located in London and the North East (Burghart, Rossi 2009). More 
than half of Chinese investors are located in London while the rest are relatively 
equally spread across the North West, Yorkshire and Humber, East and West 
Midlands and the East (Clegg, Voss 2011). Most of the investments are 
concentrated in the manufacturing, financial and business service sectors 
(Burghart, Rossi 2009).
2.3.1. Investment motives
International business literature identifies four key motives which drive companies 
to invest abroad: resources, markets, efficiency and strategic assets (Dunning 
1993). Resource seeking MNEs invest abroad to acquire resources that are not 
available in the home market or are available at a higher cost e.g. raw materials or 
unskilled low cost labour. Market seeking MNEs invest abroad to expand or 
defend their foreign market position. They may do this to: follow customers and 
suppliers; adapt goods/services to local preferences; avoid costs associated with 
serving a market from a distance or have a presence in the foreign market with the 
aim of discouraging potential competitors.
Efficiency seeking MNEs invest abroad to reduce overall production costs by 
reducing costs or increasing productivity. They do this by taking advantage of the 
availability and lower costs of inputs; economies of scale and scope; differences in 
consumer tastes and supply capabilities. Meanwhile strategic asset seeking MNEs 
invest abroad to acquire access to strategic assets such as technology, brands 
and distribution channels.
Similarly existing literature suggests that Chinese companies pursue a wide range 
of motives when investing overseas. A review of literature on investment motives 
suggests that Chinese firms can be natural asset-seeking, market-seeking, 
strategic asset-seeking, efficiency-seeking or diversification-seeking. The decision 
to invest overseas is influenced by one or more of these motives. A study by 
Buckley et al demonstrates how motivations of Chinese OFDI have changed over 
time (Buckley 2010). In the early stages Chinese firms were motivated by a need 
for natural resources and this driver still remains important. More recently they
36
have been motivated by market access in response to growing competitive 
pressure in the domestic market and the need to increase market share abroad. 
Chinese outward investment activities are also driven by strategic asset-seeking 
which involves gaining access to advanced technology, established brands, 
distribution channels and sources of foreign capital.
It appears that Chinese companies have moved on from investing abroad for the 
purpose of information gathering, supporting export or learning from joint venture 
partners. Today they seem to be pursuing a combination of natural assets, market 
access and strategic assets when investing abroad. Buckley et al believe that 
Chinese firms are unlikely to be motivated by efficiency-seeking gains abroad as 
they already benefit from relatively low production costs in their home market 
(Buckley 2010).
An exploration of Chinese and Indian firms, suggests that their investments abroad
are motivated by access to natural resources, markets, strategic assets as well as
efficiency gains (Athreye, Kapur 2009). The majority of these firms are motivated
by access to overseas markets. Investing abroad rather than exporting provides
improves market access and ensures avoidance of protectionist barriers in host 
countries.
They are also motivated by access to natural resources and raw materials. This is 
especially true of Chinese SOEs investing in energy and mining sectors overseas 
e g. China National Petrol Corporation and China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation. Access to strategic assets is also an important driver for Chinese and 
Indian firms. Their investments abroad are fuelled by a need for technology, 
brands and distribution networks to improve their overall competitiveness. Finally
some overseas investments are driven by economies of scope and scale which 
means that they are efficiency seeking.
Deng proposes that Chinese MNEs are driven by a combination of resource-
seeking, market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking and diversification-seeking 
strategies (Deng 2003). Chinese MNEs are making significant resource seeking 
investments in both developed and developing countries. For example China 
Metallurgical Import and Export Corporation invested in the Channar Mine in
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Australia is providing 200 tonnes of iron and ore for use in China. Chinese 
companies such as China Ocean Fishing Company also make significant 
investments in the fishing industry abroad. This company has established 
numerous business units in nearly twenty countries around the world such as the 
US, Iran and Argentina. Chinese resource-based investments are generally active 
in oil, minerals, forestry and fishing. Chinese companies also invest abroad for 
proprietary technology. A good example of this is China Bicycles Corporation in 
Shenzhen which bought a US bicycle company to gain access to its technology. 
The company is now a leading exporter of high specification bicycles for the US 
and European markets.
Many firms from China invest abroad to gain access to markets (Deng 2004). This 
is because some segments of the domestic market are already saturated and they 
are looking abroad for sales opportunities. Another reason for marketing-seeking 
investments is the existence of trade barriers for Chinese goods. Chinese 
companies are compelled to invest abroad when exporting is hindered by 
protectionist trade barriers imposed by countries such as the US. For example 
Haier, a Chinese domestic appliance company set up manufacturing facilities in 
the US to avoid quota restrictions and potential anti-dumping law suits. The plant 
mainly assembles appliances manufactured in China.
Some Chinese companies invest abroad for the purpose of diversification. This 
applies mostly to SOEs which are assisted by the government. One such example 
is Sinochem which successfully diversified by investing overseas. Initially its core 
business was petroleum and chemical fertilizers but now it has a presence in other- 
sectors such as tourism, finance and consultancy in markets around the world 
Finally some Chinese companies invest abroad to acquire strategic assets. They 
do this to acquire new knowledge and skills which will assist in enhancing their 
competitiveness. Again an example of this is Haier, a Chinese domestic 
appliances company which established numerous research institutes,
development centres, advanced labs and design centres across the world in order 
to improve its competitiveness (Deng 2004).
Several case studies usefully illustrate the range of investment motives displayed 
by Chinese firms The cases of Lenovo and BOE suggest that Chinese MNEs are
motivated by access to new markets, technologies and building strategic linkages 
(Liu, Buck 2009). Meanwhile Haier, China’s largest producer of domestic 
appliances, was prompted to invest in the US for two main reasons. Firstly its CEO 
Zhang Ruimin wanted to develop Haier into a truly international company which 
required an international presence. Secondly, a US subsidiary would allow it to 
avoid trade barriers and escape the saturation and intensifying competition of the 
domestic home appliances market (Liu, Li 2002).
Further research observes that Chinese companies invest abroad in order to: 
access natural resources; foreign technology and know-how; and to avoid the 
saturation and competitiveness of their home market (Teagarden, Cai 2009). 
Meanwhile others highlight the need to defend and expand market share, secure 
natural resources, acquire advanced technology and management skills and 
exploit international opportunities (Zhang 2009).
The reviewed literature points to the striking range of investment motives 
displayed by Chinese investors. Some are interested in accessing natural and 
strategic resources while others are interested in accessing foreign markets, 
diversification or achieving greater efficiencies. Their decisions to internationalise
are also driven by external factors such as host/home country environments or 
state interventionism.
A number of host and home country factors are identified using a regression 
model based on data from 1984 to 2001 (Buckley 2010). The size of the host 
country market was found to be important to Chinese firms. Many of their 
investments abroad were significantly influenced by the Chinese government. 
Investment from China was positively influenced by cultural proximity. The 
presence of Chinese diaspora and market familiarity were shown to attract 
Chinese investors. Interestingly, investment from China was not deterred by 
political instability in host countries.
While the factors identified by Buckley consider host and home country 
environments, Ren et al highlight the role of the state in shaping outward 
investment from China (Ren, Liang & Zheng 2012). The state influences OFDI 
through formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions consist of policy,
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bureaucratic administration and state ownership. State policies went through three 
key stages: initiating OFDI, strengthening the institutional framework and ‘going 
global’ which encourages Chinese companies to invest abroad.
The bureaucratic administration is complex and multi-layered. The first layer is the 
State Council which plans overall OFDI. The second layer is the State 
Development and Reform Commission responsible for strategies and plans for 
OFDI. The third layer is the Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas 
Investment which provides guidance for foreign investment industries and 
approves OFDI projects. The Ministry of Commerce is in charge of investment and 
trade treaties, while the Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation drafts regulations and supervises OFDI.
Government ownership of firms also influences their OFDI activities through 
funding and defining objectives. This is especially relevant since 69.2% of Chinese 
OFDI stock is owned by SOEs. The informal institutions shown to influence OFDI 
from China are state ideology and pride, both of which are integrated into Chinese 
firms’ outward investment strategies (Ren, Liang & Zheng 2012). In addition 
factors such as China’s impressive foreign currency reserves, a highly competitive 
domestic market following China’s WTO accession and the government’s desire to 
create globally competitive companies also influenced the internationalisation of 
Chinese firms (Kim 2009).
2.3.1.1. Investment motives in developed economies
Existing studies suggest that Chinese companies have different motives when 
investing in developed and developing countries (Cheung, Suny 2009).
A recent quantitative study finds that Chinese OFDI is mainly driven by large 
markets in developed countries while abundant natural resources and weak 
institutional environments seem to attract Chinese investors to developing 
countries (Kolstad, Wiig 2012). Taiwanese firms were found to invest in developed 
countries for the purpose of accessing markets and strategic assets. Whereas 
their investments in less developed economies were driven by low-cost labour or 
efficiency seeking motives (Makino, Lau & Yeh 2002). Thus most Chinese
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investors in developed economies are motivated by access to markets and/or 
strategic assets.
Many emphasise access to strategic assets as a key motive for Chinese outward 
investment. Assets such as advanced technology and brands are used to enhance 
the competitive edge of Chinese investors (Child, Rodrigues 2005). Child argues 
that efficiency-seeking is not a likely driver of OFDI for Chinese firms. They 
already have a low cost base in their home market and therefore do not need to go 
abroad to reduce their productions costs. However competing solely on costs is 
not sustainable in the long term.
Access to strategic assets is particularly relevant for companies investing in 
developed economies. Deng’s position is that Chinese investment in developed 
countries is driven by a need for strategic resources that are not readily available 
in China. Chinese MNEs require strategic assets to compete more effectively with 
mature MNEs (Deng 2007). Some scholars believe that Chinese firms invest 
abroad in order to access knowledge embedded within developed economies 
(Rugman, Li 2007).
The springboard perspective proposes that Chinese MNEs invest overseas to 
acquire strategic assets. They buy critical assets from established MNEs to 
counteract their competitive weaknesses and raise their competitiveness levels 
(Luo, Tung 2007). This view is further supported from a strategic perspective by 
Wright et al who argue that the central motivation for emerging market firms to 
enter developed economies is exploration rather than exploitation. By this they 
mean that emerging market firms are investing to acquire competitive advantages 
not utilise those they already possess. These firms are likely to be at a 
disadvantage and their entry into developed economies is motivated by a need for 
developing new resources and capabilities (Wright et al. 2005).
A case study of Zhejiang Geely Holding Group provides an illustrative example of 
a Chinese company investing in a developed economy for the purpose of 
accessing strategic assets. The company’s acquisition of Volvo highlights the 
importance of strategic assets such as brands and technology to Geely. The 
acquisition of the Volvo brand is helping Geely to improve its brand awareness,
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image and perception in international markets (Fetscherin, Beuttenmuller 2012). It 
is hoped that creating a positive corporate brand will counteract negative country 
of origin effects among international consumers. Aside from the brand, the 
acquisition also has technological benefits. Geely will be upgrading its 
technological base enabling it to enter the lucrative Chinese luxury car market 
currently dominated by Western MNEs like BMW and Audi.
Further case studies provide evidence of strategic asset-seeking behaviour. A 
case study of Lenovo, Nanjing Automobile and Fluawei maintains that Chinese 
MNEs invest abroad to acquire various strategic assets in order to develop 
sustainable competitive advantages. Chinese companies need to do this to 
overcome their existing competitive disadvantages (Fluaichuan, Yip 2008). 
Moreover a case study of six Chinese telecommunication equipment 
manufacturers shows that their investments abroad are driven by access to 
strategic resources which are used to strengthen their competitiveness 
(Parmentola 2011).
2.3.1.2. Investment motives in Europe
The previous section shows that Chinese investments in developed economies 
are mainly motivated by access to markets and strategic assets. It appears that 
their investment activities in Europe are driven by the same motives. Strategic 
asset-seeking companies are interested in accessing advanced technology and 
established brand names, whiie the market assess-seeking companies are 
attracted to the large EU market (Schuller-Zhou, Schuller & Brod 2012).
A further study also finds Chinese companies in Europe to be mostly market and 
strategic asset-seeking (Knoerich 2012). Those investing for market access have 
a preference for large, centrally located countries such as Germany because of 
their market potential and proximity to neighbouring markets such as France. 
Companies investing for access to strategic assets often choose investment 
locations based on their strengths in a particular sector or activity. For instance 
Germany has a good reputation in machinery and equipment, while Sweden and 
Finland are well known for research and development.
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Meanwhile another study suggests that Chinese companies in Europe are not 
driven by these two motives in equal measure. It argues that market-seeking 
motives take precedence over asset-seeking ones (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010). Aside 
from the two key motives, Chinese OFDI decisions are also influenced by 
investment incentives, activities of Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and 
other non-economic factors such as personal recommendations, personal 
relations with people in the host country, previous experience of a country or the 
existence of a Chinese community (Knoerich 2012).
Much like the research findings from Europe, studies examining the motives of 
Chinese investors in the UK have found them to be predominantly strategic asset-
seeking and market access-seeking. A study of Chinese companies in the UK 
uses survey data to show that respondents were mainly motivated to invest in the 
UK by access to EU markets, expansion opportunities, local talents, R&D 
capabilities and established brands (Liu, Tian 2008).
A study by Cross and Voss has similar results. Their study examines motivations 
and sources of competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in the UK. It finds that 
Chinese companies enter the UK to develop foreign markets and to gain access to 
foreign technology and know-how (Cross, Voss 2007). Based on these findings it 
can be concluded that Chinese investment in the UK is predominantly market and 
strategic asset-seeking, as is the case in Europe.
2.3.2. Investment modes
Existing research on the modes of investment selected by Chinese companies 
abroad suggests a high degree of versatility. Some studies find that they mostly 
use greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions to enter foreign markets, 
while others indicate that Chinese companies are likely to combine the two entry 
modes rather than using a single one.
Research findings presented by Child suggest that Chinese companies tend to 
invest abroad via international acquisitions and organic expansion (Child,
Rodrigues 2005). The number of international acquisitions by Chinese firms has 
increased over the last decade. Their main motive is to enhance competitiveness
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by gaining access to foreign technology, R&D skills and reputable brands. Access 
to technology has been a prominent motive and is illustrated by the case of Holly 
Group which produces energy meter equipment. In 2001 it acquired the hand-set 
reference design business from Philips Semiconductors in the US, giving Holly 
access to equipment, assets, know-how and intellectual property developed by 
Philips. These new skills and assets would enable Holly to compete more 
effectively abroad. A further example of an international acquisition for similar 
reasons is the case of Lenovo which acquired IBM’s PC division in 2004. The 
transaction provided Lenovo with access to IBM’s laptop production lines, product 
developers and distribution networks.
Meanwhile the organic expansion route involves setting up subsidiaries and 
facilities in international settings. Chinese companies utilise this entry mode to 
adapt their products to local markets or raise international brand awareness.
Haier, the Chinese white goods manufacturer is a good example. The company 
set up a manufacturing, design and trade centre in the US for several reasons. 
Firstly, to avoid US export barriers. Secondly, to raise the profile of the Haier brand 
and lastly because it believed that success in developed markets would give the 
company a better chance of entering other international markets (Child, Rodrigues 
2005).
When entering developed economies the literature indicates that Chinese
companies are likely to use greenfield investment or acquisitions. Evidence
suggests that they prefer to use greenfield investment and acquisitions when
investing in Germany (Klossek, Linke & Nippa 2012). An increase in investment by
Chinese firms in Germany has encouraged questions about their entry modes and
strategies. A recent study using qualitative data from a range of Chinese
enterprises in Germany examines their entry modes and different strategies for
managing institutional barriers and the liability of foreignness (Klossek, Linke &
Nippa 2012). Two entry modes are identified: greenfield investment and
acquisitions. Lenovo, Beijing No.One and the Shanggong Group used acquisitions
to enter the German market while BoC, Baosteel Minmetals and Haier entered via 
greenfield investment.
Meanwhile some researchers argue that Chinese firms prefer to enter developed 
markets via acquisitions. Thilo shows that Chinese companies are likely to enter 
developed markets via acquisitions (Hanemann, Rosen 2012) while Clegg and 
Voss find that the same is true of companies investing in Europe (Clegg, Voss 
2012). This is a plausible argument because Chinese M&A activity in Europe is on 
the rise in terms of value and volume. Most M&As take place in France, Germany 
and the UK. Since 2010 Germany has been Europe’s leading destination for 
Chinese M&As. There has been a continued increase in the number of Chinese 
M&A in Europe, from 11 in 2006 to 61 in 2011 (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2012). 
Chinese M&A activities have been encouraged by the relatively weak Euro and 
declining values of European firms.
When it comes to investment modes in the UK, the few studies that have been 
conducted suggest that the dominant entry modes are greenfield investment and 
mergers and acquisitions. Burghart and Rossi show that greenfield investment and 
expansion of existing sites are the main entry modes, followed by mergers and 
acquisitions (Burghart, Rossi 2009). Chinese enterprises largely undertake sales 
and marketing activities or establish headquarters in the UK. The choice of sectors 
reflects their motives which are expanding market presence and developing 
knowledge. Similarly survey data suggests that most companies enter the UK 
through greenfield investment. According to the results the modes of entry are 
sector dependent (Liu, Tian 2008). For example all the banking and trading 
affiliates were wholly-owned subsidiaries while affiliates in other sectors used 
other entry modes such as partnerships and acquisitions.
Other researchers contend that some Chinese companies pursue multiple entry 
strategies (Liu, Buck 2009). A case in point is the Chinese company BOE. It 
established several subsidiaries and branches in Europe, North America and Asia. 
The company also acquired two companies abroad -  Hynix, a Korean LCD maker 
and Hong Kong based TPV Technology Ltd. Thus BOE combined greenfield 
investment with M&As. The wholly-owned subsidiaries ensured proximity to and 
effective communication with its customer base, while the international acquisition 
provided access to technology, human capital, networks, market share and 
international distribution systems.
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Chinese companies have increasingly been using M&As to enter international 
markets. Numbers of Chinese overseas M&As have risen steadily between 2007 
and 2012. In 2007 Chinese MNEs completed 107 transactions valued at USD 
13.58 billion while in 2012 the number of transactions increased to 208 valued at 
USD 93.09 billion (Xinhuanet 2012c). According to the Ministry of Commerce, 
M&As form a substantial part of OFDI by Chinese firms. In 2011 the value of 
Chinese M&A activity was USD 27.2 billion accounting for 36.4% of the total 
outbound investment for that year. M&As are concentrated in the mining, 
manufacturing and power industries (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of 
China 2012).
Despite their rise in popularity acquisitions by Chinese companies have had mixed 
outcomes. Haier’s international merger and acquisition efforts over the last decade 
have lead to the company’s success especially in the United States where it holds 
50% market share in the compact refrigerator market and also has a strong 
presence in other markets (Kim 2009). However there are other examples of 
Chinese merger and acquisition efforts that have been less successful. Some of 
the M&As were abandoned during the negotiations stage. For example China 
Mobile’s attempt to acquire Millicom, or Huawei’s attempt to acquire Marconi and 
3Com. Meanwhile other M&As ran into difficulties once the transaction had been 
completed. For instance the Universal Automotive Industry (UAI) from the US went 
bankrupt after it had been acquired by the Chinese parts supplier, Wanxiang 
Group. Similarly SSangyong Motor went into administration once it had been taken 
over by SAIC (Kim 2009).
A case study of The China Qianjiang Group’s acquisition of the Italian motorbike 
manufacturer Benelli demonstrates the problems encountered by Chinese M&As 
(Spigarelli, Wei & Man 2012). The acquisition was envisaged to integrate Benelli’s 
brand, professionalism and knowledge with Qianjiang’s efficiency and low cost 
production. However a series of problems emerged as a result of differences in 
culture and working environments between China and Italy which strained the 
relationship between management and the employees.
Entry mode decisions are a key part of a firm’s internationalisation strategy and 
require careful consideration at a strategic level. In the context of Chinese
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enterprises extant literature identifies eight factors which influence firms’ entry 
mode decisions. The first group of factors are external to the investing company 
and relate to the host country environment. This group includes the following 
factors: cultural distance, country risk, host country opportunities and host country 
competition.
The first factor, cultural distance, refers to the differences in behavioural norms 
between the home and host countries. Most existing research finds cultural 
distance to be a significant factor in entry mode decisions. Empirical evidence 
suggests that cultural barriers encourage Chinese firms to invest via joint venture 
partnerships rather than setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries (Cui, Jiang 2009, 
Cui, Jiang & Sterling 2011). Forming a joint venture enables the investing firm to 
reduce cultural distance by learning about local culture and accessing local 
networks through its local partner (Yiu, Makino 2002). Further evidence shows that 
increased cultural distance encourages Chinese firms to invest via non-ownership 
based entry modes such as trade and licensing (Xu, Hu & Fan 2011). Evidence on 
the significance of cultural distance is, however, not unanimous. A study 
contradicting existing findings suggests that cultural distance does not affect entry 
mode decisions in Chinese multinationals (Quer, Claver & Rienda 2012).
Country risk relates to the level of predictability in the host country’s political and 
economic environment. Evidence on the significance of country risk to entry mode 
choice is mixed. One study finds that country risk is not significant to FDI mode 
choices in Chinese firms (Cui, Jiang 2009). Similarly another study shows that 
political risk does not have an effect on firms’ entry mode decisions (Quer, Claver 
& Rienda 2012). In contrast other studies suggest that the regulatory environment 
in the host country significantly influences entry mode choice. Thus Chinese firms 
are likely to invest via acquisitions and wholly-owned subsidiaries in host countries 
which have stable laws and policies (Wu, Liu & Huang 2012). Moreover if a host 
country has regulatory restrictions Chinese enterprises are likely to opt for joint 
ventures so that part of the risk is absorbed by the local joint venture partner (Cui, 
Jiang & Stening 2011).
Learning opportunities in the form of technology, marketing or managerial 
expertise found in the host country can influence entry mode choice in Chinese
multinationals. If the investing firm perceives that there are significant learning 
opportunities in the host country it is likely to invest via wholly-owned subsidiary 
(Cui, Jiang & Stening 2011). Having full ownership of its operations in the host 
country enables Chinese firms to have unrestricted access to newly acquired 
resources. It also allows a high level of integration between the subsidiary and 
company’s headquarters which facilitates knowledge-sharing between the two 
locations. A joint venture arrangement may limit learning opportunities because it 
involves sharing resources and control with two or more parties.
The host country competitive environment also appears to have an impact on the 
entry mode decision process in Chinese firms. When faced with a highly 
competitive host country environment investing companies are inclined to set up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries so that they can strengthen their position by exploiting 
their competitive advantage effectively (Bell 1996). Wholly-owned subsidiaries give 
investors full control of their foreign operations whilst enabling a high degree of 
intra-firm integration (Hill, Hwang & Kim 1990). Research findings indicate that the 
same logic applies to Chinese firms. When entering a very competitive foreign 
market they are likely to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary for the above stated 
reasons (Cui, Jiang 2009).
The second group of factors are internal to the investing companies and relate to 
some of their key features. It includes the following factors: strategic motivation, 
international experience, firm size and ownership. Strategic motivation defines the 
key reasons why companies undertake investment activities abroad. A firm’s 
strategic motivation determines the way in which it conducts investment activities 
including choice of entry mode. Existing research suggests that entry modes are 
indeed influenced by a firm’s strategic motivation. Thus Chinese companies 
seeking strategic assets were found to invest via wholly-owned subsidiaries rather 
than joint ventures (Cui, Jiang 2009). Whole ownership of the foreign business unit 
gives Chinese companies full control over the newly-acquired assets which can be 
exploited effectively and subsequently shared with other parts of the organisation.
Market-seeking firms from China tend to enter foreign markets using the greenfield 
investment mode while technology-seeking ones prefer to acquire existing 
companies (Wu, Liu & Huang 2012). Acquisition of local companies enables
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Chinese technology-seeking investors to rapidly acquire existing technologies and 
more importantly to access know-how required for the development of new 
technologies. Meanwhile evidence on Chinese firms seeking natural assets 
indicates that there is no significant relationship between strategic motivation and 
entry mode choice (Quer, Claver & Rienda 2012). Evidence on natural resource-
seeking firms is not conclusive because further findings show that a deterministic 
link does in fact exist. Namely the results demonstrate that Chinese natural 
resource-seeking companies are unlikely to enter international markets via wholly- 
owned subsidiaries (Quer, Claver & Rienda 2012). This may be due to 
government restrictions which do not allow foreign investors to have sole 
ownership of natural resource exploiting ventures. Instead host governments 
compel investors to form joint ventures with local partners.
Although international experience is considered to be an integral part of the firm 
internationalisation process (Johanson, Vahlne 1977, 2009), its significance in the 
context of Chinese enterprises in unclear. Existing research highlights that general 
international experience has no effect on entry mode choice in Chinese 
enterprises (Quer, Claver & Rienda 2012, Wu, Liu & Huang 2012). It may be that 
general international experience does not make a difference. But if we considered 
more specific kinds of international experience e g. expertise in a particular entry 
mode or experience of entering the same industry elsewhere, then the results may 
well be different. Another possible explanation could be that international 
experience does not matter because this is something that Chinese firms 
inherently lack.
Based on evidence from existing studies it appears that ownership plays a 
significant role in entry mode choice in Chinese firms. However the nature of this 
influence remains unclear. Many have written about the privileges enjoyed by 
Chinese state-owned enterprises such as access to financial and other resources 
(Williamson, Zeng 2007). Researchers have found that Chinese state-owned firms 
tend to enter foreign markets via high risk and high involvement entry modes such 
as greenfield investments or acquisitions (Warner, Ng Sek & Xu 2004, Bai, Jin &
Qi 2013) because of the support they receive from the state. In contrast others 
have found that state-owned enterprises are likely to enter foreign markets using
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low involvement entry modes, while private enterprises are more inclined to adopt 
high involvement entry modes (Xu, Hu & Fan 2011).
2.3.3. Investment effects on advanced host economies
As we have seen in section 2.2 there is an abundance of literature on the effects 
of FDI on host country firms. The vast majority of these studies are concerned with 
effects on domestic firms in developing countries. The interest in China, in 
particular, is a reflection of the country’s position as the largest recipient of FDI 
amongst developing and transitional economies. It also reflects the widespread 
view that the influx of foreign investors played a vital role in the development of 
domestic enterprises in China. Existing literature examines the impact of FDI on 
Chinese firms through spillovers and relationships between MNEs and domestic 
firms.
On the other hand there is a lack of research on the effects of FDI from emerging 
economies. Although FDI from developing countries has risen rapidly in the last 
decade it is still a relatively new and under-researched area. The need for more 
research is especially necessary when it comes to the effects of emerging 
multinationals on domestic firms in advanced host economies. Few existing 
studies look at the effects of these multinationals on developed host economies. 
Even fewer still focus on multinationals from China.
Some researchers observe that it is too early to ascertain the true effects of 
Chinese FDI on the European economy because it is still a relatively new 
phenomenon (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010). Others notice that aggregate levels of 
Chinese FDI in Europe are still quite low compared to other countries (Milelli, Hay 
& Shi 2010, Clegg, Voss 2012), and therefore assume that the effects of such 
investments are not likely to be significant. Evidence from individual European 
countries such as France (Nicolas 2012) and Germany (Xu, Petersen & Wang 
2012) reinforces this view.
Several existing studies look into the economic implications of investment from 
emerging markets. They highlight the importance of new capital from China 
(Hanemann, Rosen 2012) and India (Charlie 2012) especially during the recession
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when FDI from developed countries had decreased (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010). 
Indian multinationals were welcomed in Germany because of the prospect of 
additional investment (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009). French firms in financial difficulties 
managed to survive as a result of being taken over by the Chinese (Nicolas 2012), 
while some German firms actively sought Chinese investors because of the 
associated financial benefits (Gentile-Ludecke 2013).
Evidence on the employment effects of emerging market investment is mixed. 
Chinese investment in France led to the loss of some jobs but it also created new 
ones (Nicolas 2012), whilst in Germany Chinese companies appeared to 
employee significantly fewer people compared to other foreign investors (Xu, 
Petersen & Wang 2012). Meanwhile other research suggests that investors from 
emerging markets were instrumental to the preservation and creation of jobs in 
Europe. Approximately 15,000 new jobs were created in Europe by Chinese 
investors between 2000 and 2011, while 16,000 jobs were preserved at Volvo 
when it was acquired by Geely from China (Hanemann, Rosen 2012). Indian firms 
had an overall positive net effect on jobs in Germany (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009) and 
some successful acquisitions which led to significant job creation e.g. Tata’s 
takeover of Jaguar Land Rover (Charlie 2012).
The competitive effects caused by investors from emerging markets can provide a 
useful stimulus for rival firms to be more efficient in terms of lowering their prices, 
providing enhanced service agreements or innovating to a greater extent. Equally 
new entrants from developing countries can also be a threat to existing players in 
the market (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010) which could lead to job losses or even 
company closures.
The presence of multinationals from developing countries has visibly improved 
consumer welfare in advanced economies in areas such as telecommunications 
and pharmaceuticals. Companies like Huawei and ZTE from China have reduced 
the costs of telecommunications equipment in Europe thereby increasing speeds 
and making it more accessible for consumers (Hanemann, Rosen 2012). Similarly 
the production of generic medicines by Indian pharmaceutical has provided US 
consumers with more choice and products at significantly lower prices (Charlie 
2012, Greene 2007).
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Emerging evidence of Chinese acquisitions in Europe indicates that the effects are 
largely positive. The prospect of expanding into the Chinese market was a key 
benefit for German investors because they would receive support and advice from 
their parent companies (Gentile-Ludecke 2013). They were able to take advantage 
of established networks and local knowledge of their acquirers which improved 
their chances of succeeding in the Chinese market (Knoerich 2010). Overall 
existing research suggests that German and French companies became more 
competitive once they were acquired by Chinese multinationals (Nicolas 2012, 
Knoerich 2010). It appears that Chinese acquirers have a tendency to grant 
German companies with a high degree of independence (Knoerich 2010, Gentile- 
Ludecke 2013) but more research is required to verify whether this finding applies 
in other European countries too.
2.4. Firm internationalisation theory
One of the leading mainstream theories of firm internationalisation was developed 
by Johanson and Vahlne in 1977 and is known as the Uppsala Model. This theory 
was devised to explain internationalisation patterns of firms based on empirical 
evidence from Swedish firms. The process of firm internationalisation is viewed as 
incremental whereby firms’ entry into foreign markets follows a gradual, step-by- 
step approach. Gradual acquisition of experiential knowledge leads to increasing 
commitment to foreign markets. Thus a company’s own learning about a certain 
market is a key part of its decision to invest abroad.
A firm’s entry into a foreign market is incremental and follows an ‘establishment 
chain’ (Johanson, Vahlne 1977). The first step is ad-hoc exporting followed by sale 
through intermediaries such as agents. Next, companies are likely to set up their 
own sales units in the international market. Finally, once firms have sufficient 
knowledge and experience of the market, they will take the biggest step and set up 
manufacturing overseas. According to this theory firms are likely to enter foreign 
markets which are similar in terms of culture, education, language, industrial 
development and business practice. This concept was named ‘psychic distance’ 
as an indication of the level of similarity between the host and home country 
(Johanson, Vahlne 1977).
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Though its core arguments relating to the dynamic but gradual nature of 
internationalisation remain the same, the Uppsala Model was updated in 2009 to 
reflect the changes in the international business environment that had taken place 
in the meantime. The updated version incorporates a business network view 
whereby internationalisation is seen as a web of interrelated firms, suppliers and 
customers (Johanson, Vahlne 2009). Key concepts such as the ‘establishment 
chain’, ‘psychic distance’ and ‘experiential knowledge’ are complemented by the 
introduction of trust as a key component in relationship-building. The newer 
version also recognises that experiential knowledge is not only about acquiring 
and exchanging existing knowledge, but also includes generation of new 
knowledge (Johanson, Vahlne 2009).
Ideas relating to the gradual nature of firm internationalisation are inextricably 
linked with Swedish national culture. National culture influences organisations in 
numerous ways including ways in which they are managed. For example the 
American management style is quite different to that of Sweden. National culture 
may also influence the ways in which training is conducted in firms (Denny 1999) 
or ways in which they internationalise. The gradual internationalisation behaviour 
of Swedish firms is influenced by the national culture of this country. Namely 
Swedes do not favour ‘‘personal dynamism and outstanding individual 
advancement” (Lawrence, Edwards 2000) instead they prefer individuals to be 
quiet and unassuming. Swedes are moderate and do not approve of radical 
behaviour when it comes to people or organisations. Such cultural values are 
embodied in the internationalisation behaviour of Swedish firms which is portrayed 
as moderate and gradual by the Uppsala School.
The Uppsala Model contributes to our understanding of the firm 
internationalisation process by highlighting its dynamic nature and the roles of 
market knowledge and psychic distance. It is undoubtedly a powerful explanatory 
tool and its updated version successfully captures the relational structure of the 
firm internationalisation process. Whilst the merits of this theoretical model are 
clear some elements appear to be at odds with internationalisation behaviour in 
practice. The gradual process of firm internationalisation and the key stages 
identified do not fit the behaviour of ‘born globals’ i.e. firms that enter overseas 
markets as soon as they are established. They do not start by operating
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domestically and then gradually expanding overseas to similar countries once they 
have sufficient market knowledge as suggested by the Uppsala Model.
The next point of contention is that firms do not always follow the 
internationalisation stages identified in the model. They may go straight to the 
manufacturing stage in the host country if they have, for example, acquired a local 
company that already has a manufacturing base. The widespread use of mergers 
and acquisitions as an entry strategy enables firms to gain market knowledge 
rapidly without going through the slow stages of experiential learning. Thus 
leapfrogging some of the stages allows firms to internationalise faster than 
envisaged by the Uppsala Model.
Further research from Sweden points out that the concept of ‘psychic distance’ is 
not as important as was first thought by Johanson and Vahlne. Namely Forsgren 
argues that a firm is more likely to expand its operations to a foreign market on the 
basis of market-related factors rather than psychic factors (Forsgren, Flagstrom 
2007). For example internet-related companies from Sweden decided which 
foreign markets to enter on the basis of internet usage and market size rather than 
factors such as culture, language and business practice as suggested by the 
Uppsala Model.
In addition to the theoretical contributions offered by the Uppsala Model, the 
internationalisation of firms is contemplated through several other theories centred 
on the concept of firm-specific advantages. The following section introduces two 
key theoretical perspectives which explain the internationalisation process in light 
of firms having or lacking certain firm-specific advantages. The explanations 
offered by these theories have a secondary purpose which is to provide a 
conceptual framework for this study.
2.5. Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework combines theoretical and empirical evidence to 
establish links between investment motives, modes and effects of Chinese 
multinationals in the UK. Existing empirical studies suggest that Chinese 
multinationals invest in the UK with the intention of accessing strategic assets or
markets. The behaviour of market access-seeking and strategic asset-seeking 
MNEs can be explained by two theoretical perspectives. The first perspective 
proposes that firms internationalise on the basis of ownership (Dunning 1993, 
2000) or firm-specific advantages (Rugman 2007, 2008a).
The OLI paradigm is also known as the eclectic paradigm and was published by 
Dunning in 1980. It is an extension of internalisation theory which states that 
transactions should be made within a firm if the transaction costs on the free 
market are higher than internal costs. Internalisation theory focuses on the 
organisational aspects of foreign investment while Dunning offers two additional 
factors for consideration -  ownership and locational advantages. Although the OLI 
paradigm was developed over three decades ago it still remains a powerful tool for 
explaining FDI.
The paradigm consists of three independent variables which together determine 
the nature of FDI undertaken by MNEs (Dunning 1981,2001, Dunning; Lundan 
2009). The first component is ownership advantage (O) which refers to competitive 
advantages specific to the investing MNE. According to the theory an MNE is likely 
to invest abroad if its ownership advantages are greater than those of host country 
firms. The second component is locational advantage (L) which refers to the 
locational advantages offered by host countries. According to the theory an MNE 
is likely to invest abroad if the host country has a range of immobile resources 
which are not available in its home country.
The third component is internalisation (I) which refers to the way an MNE 
organises its foreign operations. The eclectic paradigm suggests that the greater 
the benefits of internalising immediate product markets the more likely the MNE is 
to engage in foreign production itself rather than engaging a foreign firm. Dunning 
argues that the exact configuration of OLI variables facing any firm is highly 
contextual. It will depend on factors such as the political and economic 
environments of the home and host country, the type of industry and the 
characteristics of the firm itself e.g. objectives and strategies.
Thus according to the OLI paradigm a company will invest abroad if the following
three conditions are met (Dunning 1993):
1. The company has ownership advantages such as advanced technology 
and brands
2. It wishes to exploit locational advantages in the host country (e.g. low cost 
natural resources)
3. If the cross-border integration of business activities leads to high efficiency 
gains
Similarly Rugman’s view is that North American, European and Japanese MNEs 
expanded internationally on the basis of strong firm-specific advantages (FSAa). 
FSAs are unique capabilities owned by firms and can be based on technology, 
knowledge, managerial or marketing skills (Rugman 2007). However companies 
can also internationalise on the basis of country-specific advantages (CSAs). 
CSAs arise from unique home country factors and can occur in the form of natural 
resources, labour or cultural factors in the home country. Rugman argues that the 
success of truly internationalised MNEs is down to sustainable FSAs such as 
“sophisticated managerial skills in knowledge and system integration” (Rugman 
2008a): P.12.
Although the theories based on ownership (Dunning 1993, 2000) or firm-specific 
advantages (Rugman 2007, 2008a) were initially developed to explain the 
internationalisation of MNEs from advanced economies, they can also be useful in 
explaining the overseas investment behaviour of Chinese multinationals that 
possess strong competitive advantages. These companies are capable of 
competing internationally and therefore their investments in the UK are driven by 
the desire to access local and regional markets.
The second perspective argues that companies from emerging markets lack 
competitive advantages and internationalise in order to obtain them (Luo, Tung 
2007, Mathews 2006b). The LLL framework, developed by Mathews as a 
response to the OLI paradigm, stands for Linkage, Leverage and Learning. It was 
created to explain the development of firms from developing countries. Mathews’ 
main argument is that emerging market MNEs lack the ownership specific 
advantages or superior resources which developed country MNEs have. When 
emerging MNEs invest abroad they do so in order to access the resources they 
lack (Mathews 2006b).
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MNEs from emerging markets are said to use international expansion to obtain the 
ownership advantages they need to compete against global rivals at home and 
abroad. Thus investments abroad are intended to compensate for their competitive 
disadvantages. These companies are keen to acquire advanced technology, or 
manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies that have such 
ownership advantages (Luo, Tung 2007). They lack the resources and capabilities 
owned by MNEs from advanced economies and tend to internationalise through 
global alliances and acquisitions In doing so they reduce their competitive 
disadvantages by upgrading their own resources and capabilities (Guillen, Garcia- 
Canal 2009). An illustration of this is the Chinese computer company Lenovo. The 
company started out as a manufacturer of computer equipment under the name of 
Legend. It became proficient at manufacturing computer hardware and was quite 
successful in its home market. However it lacked two strategic assets -  advanced 
technology and branding -  both of which were crucial for further growth. In order to 
secure the assets it lacked, the company acquired the US computer company 
IBM. The company gained access to IBM’s proprietary technology and reputable 
brand. It changed its name to Lenovo and now markets its products under two 
brands -  IBM and Lenovo.
The LLL framework describes the development process of emerging economy 
MNEs in three stages (Mathews 2002). In the initial stage they identify resources 
they lack but can be found in advanced MNEs. Developing country firms then link 
up with individual advanced MNEs or their value chains and forge relationships 
with them. Through this interaction developing country MNEs are able to leverage 
the advantages they need such as knowledge, technology and market access.
The learning process that occurs enables them to acquire and adapt new skills 
and competencies needed for further development.
Latecomer firms from East Asian economies such as Taiwan provide an illustrative 
example. Many of these firms started out as local electronic manufacturers with 
limited technological capabilities. By inserting themselves into global value chains 
of production they forged relationships with well-known companies and began to 
produce components for them (linkage). This interaction provided domestic 
manufacturers with access to technologies and know-how they lacked (leverage). 
The learning that occurred through these supplier relationships was vital to the
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upgrading of the developing country MNEs. It enabled their progression from 
simple own equipment manufacturing (OEM) to own brand manufacturing (OBM) 
based on designs developed by themselves (Mathews 2006a).
The perspective based on competitive disadvantage is supported by many other 
scholars. Some observe that developing country MNEs invest abroad despite the 
lack of ownership advantages such as technology, established brand names, or 
marketing and organisational expertise (Zhang 2009). The absence of firm-specific 
advantages was noted as early as the 1980s by Lall in his discussion of MNEs 
from the third world. He observed that they have smaller “proprietary assets” to 
protect when investing abroad and are eager to form relationships with developed 
country firms with the objective of accessing advanced technologies and 
established brands (Lall 1983). Some have argued that Chinese companies invest 
abroad not to exploit competitive advantages but to address competitive 
disadvantages (Child, Rodrigues 2005, Huaichuan, Yip 2008, Moon, Roehl 2001) 
by gaining access to strategic assets (Luo, Tung 2007).
The second perspective was developed to explain the international investment 
behaviour of firms from developing economies. But is also provides a useful 
explanation for the investment activities of Chinese multinationals that lack 
competitive advantages. These companies are unable to compete effectively in 
international markets and therefore their investments in the UK are primarily 
motivated by the need to acquire strategic assets.
The link between investment motivations and investment modes is made through 
empirical evidence on entry mode selection in Chinese firms. Some studies 
suggest that the investment modes selected by Chinese multinationals are 
influenced by host country factors such as competition, demand (Cui, Jiang 2009), 
country risk and cultural distance (Xu, Hu & Fan 2011). The choice of entry mode 
is also affected by internal factors for example the company’s asset-seeking 
strategy, global strategic motivation (Cui, Jiang 2009) or investment motivation 
(Deng 2007). Therefore the investment motivations of Chinese firms play a 
significant role in determining the type of entry mode selected by a Chinese 
multinational when investing overseas. Furthermore it can be assumed that
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different investment motivations may lead to different entry mode choices by 
Chinese firms when entering international markets.
Whilst it is likely that different investment motives will result in different entry 
modes, it is also logical to assume that they will impact the host country in different 
ways. Thus an asset-seeking multinational from China is likely to choose a 
different entry mode and to have different effects on the host economy compared 
to a market access-seeking one. The links between investment motives, modes 
and effects of Chinese multinationals on host countries form the conceptual basis 
of this research. Given the limited availability of research on the effects of Chinese 
investors on developed host countries, the aim of this research is to use the 
conceptual framework to understand the extent to which the investment motives 
and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence the effects of their 
investments on British business partners.
2.6. Concluding remarks
Today cross border investment is a highly globalised phenomenon. The historical
dominance of multinationals from advanced economies is being disrupted by the
rise of multinationals from emerging economies. China’s rapid economic
development is partly owed to the influx of FDI into the country over the last two
decades or so. The presence of foreign multinationals was significant to the
development of the domestic sector in China. In particular the role of knowledge
transfer through spillovers and relationships with foreign MNEs was instrumental
to the expansion of local firms. The presence of foreign investors, together with
significant accumulation of capital contributed towards the growth of domestic
enterprises up to a point where they could consider undertaking investments 
abroad.
As a result of rapid economic growth, China has since evolved into a significant 
outward investor. Chinese companies are increasingly undertaking investment 
activities overseas and in doing so display a range of investment motives. Their 
primary motives when investing in advanced economies such as the UK are 
access to markets and strategic assets. Companies from China tend to enter new
59
international markets via greenfield investments or mergers and acquisitions. Their 
choice of investment modes appears to be closely associated with their investment 
motives.
Chinese firms have only recently started to invest in advanced economies and this 
is reflected in the limited research available. The deficit of research applies 
especially to the effects of Chinese investment activities on advanced host 
economies which have been examined by several studies. Some investigate the 
aggregate effects of Chinese investment in the EU, while a few others examine the 
effects of Chinese acquisitions on European firms. At present no research has 
been undertaken to examine the effects of Chinese multinationals in the UK. The 
present research aims to do this by focusing on the effects of Chinese 
multinationals on British business partners.
A conceptual framework has been developed to serve as a guide for this research. 
The framework links together the three main concepts relating to Chinese outward 
investment -  the motives of their investments, the modes they choose and the 
effects of their investment on the host country. The main assumption is that the 
investment motives determine the choice of entry modes, which in turn lead to 
diverse investment effects on the host country. Thus it is anticipated that Chinese 
firms with strategic asset-seeking motives are likely to have different effects to 
those with market access-seeking ones.
The conceptual framework is designed to assist data analysis by providing three 
distinctive themes. The examined companies will be analysed according to the 
motives of their investments, the modes they choose and the effects of their 
investment on the host country. In addition the framework helps to establish 
relationships between the three themes. The aim of this is to uncover the role of 
the investment motives and investment modes in influencing the effects of 
Chinese MNEs on British business partners.
A conceptual model has been devised to provide an overview of existing literature 
on the internationalisation process of Chinese firms in Europe. The diagram 
consists of individual research contributions and provides a useful summary of 
what we know about Chinese firms investing in Europe. It consists of four main
components which are presented in separate columns. They are: theoretical basis, 
investment motives, investment modes and host country effects. These key 
elements are presented in individual columns to show that they have been 
examined separately in existing literature. The model will be revised to reflect the 
findings of this study in chapter nine. The results are expected to contribute to our 
understanding of Chinese internationalisation in Britain.
Figure 6 - Conceptual model of Chinese investment in Europe
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3. Methodology
Having reviewed the relevant literature associated with Chinese outward 
investment in the previous chapter, this chapter outlines the methodology used to 
carry out the present study. Chapter three is divided into two parts, the first part 
focuses on philosophical assumptions by highlighting the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological and methodological positions of this study. The 
second part is more practical and it concentrates on the method of the study i.e. 
the ways in which data was gathered and analysed. This chapter explains the 
philosophical underpinnings of the study and shows how the research was actually 
carried out to achieve the overall aim of the thesis which is to understand the 
extent to which the investment motives and investment modes displayed by 
Chinese MNEs influence the effects of their investments on British business 
partners.
3.1. Philosophical assumptions
This study takes a qualitative approach towards achieving its overall aim. The 
qualitative research paradigm was developed as a reaction to the positivist 
paradigm and it is concerned with understanding human behaviour from the 
participant’s point of view (Collis, Hussey 2003). It is well-suited to capturing the 
complexities and idiosyncrasies of business situations which are a function of a 
particular set of circumstances and individuals (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2000). 
The qualitative approach is useful for uncovering details which help us to build an 
understanding of the reality of a particular situation.
The positivist approach towards research opposes the assumptions of the 
qualitative view. Positivism in social sciences is based on the approach used in 
natural sciences. It is rooted in the notion that research into human behaviour 
should be conducted in the same way as research in natural sciences (Collis, 
Hussey 2003). Positivists believe that the role of the researcher is largely objective 
and that he or she is capable of interpreting the data in a value-free manner. They 
place emphasis on highly structured methodology and quantifiable observations 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2000). The positivist and qualitative research 
paradigms represent polar opposites of a continuum with numerous alternative
research paradigms in between. Like most studies in business and management, 
this study lies somewhere between the two extremes.
This research fits well with the qualitative paradigm because of the nature of the 
study and what it sets out to achieve. The study seeks to develop an 
understanding of the investment motives, modes and effects of Chinese 
multinationals. The complexity of their outward investment behaviour and the need 
for detailed data necessitated the use of qualitative data gathered from study 
participants. A positivist approach characterised by quantifiable observations and 
rigid methodologies would not be able to achieve the level of detail required to 
capture the behavioural complexity of Chinese firms. In addition the subjective 
nature of the data used in this study is not aligned to the principles of objectivity 
that lie at the heart of positivist research approaches.
3.1.1. Ontological assumptions
As this study is conducted in the qualitative tradition its ontological position is 
largely constructivist whereby reality is viewed as subjective and multiple as seen 
by the study’s participants (Collis, Hussey 2003). The constructivist view 
recognises that the concept of subjective reality not only applies to participants but 
also to the researcher and the readers of the study (Creswell 2013). Thus the 
examination of Chinese investment behaviour and its effects on the UK business 
sector is based on the individual realities of each of the interviewees and on that of 
the researcher. This view is in contrast with the objectivist assumption that social 
reality is objective and independent of the researcher (Collis, Hussey 2003).
3.1.2. Epistemological assumptions
Like other qualitative studies the epistemological position of this study is 
predominantly interpretivist whereby interaction occurs between the researcher 
and the observed phenomenon (Collis, Hussey 2003). The interpretivist view 
encourages researchers to get as close as possible to the subject under study with 
the aim of collecting subjective evidence based on individual views (Creswell 
2013). For the purposes of this study the researcher had frequent telephone and 
email contact with the employees of the Chinese firms and carried out one or more 
in-person visits. The rationale behind this interaction was to gain as much
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familiarity with the firms and their employees as possible so that they would be 
willing to provide their views and opinions in the interviews that ensued. Thus the 
interaction between the researcher and the observed firms formed an important 
part of the study. The interpretivist epistemological position taken by this research 
contradicts the more positivist assumptions that require the researcher to be 
5 independent from that which is being researched (Collis, Hussey 2003).
3.1.3. Axiological assumptions
This study acknowledges that the values held by its participants and indeed by the 
researcher form an inseparable part of the research process. Qualitative 
researchers support the idea that research is value-laden (Creswell 2013). They 
actively report their own values and biases as well as those originating from 
information gathered in the field. More positivist research traditions, on the other 
hand, claim to exclude the values embedded in participants and researchers. 
Positivists are of the axiological assumption that personal values diminish the 
objectivity of scientific research and as such should not be allowed to influence the 
research process. In the context of this research, the values and opinions 
expressed by the participants represent an integral part of the data. Similarly the 
values and biases held by the researcher have undoubtedly influenced the data 
analysis process.
3.1.4. Methodological assumptions
So far this section has demonstrated that positivist and qualitative research 
approaches have their own assumptions about: the nature of reality; what 
constitutes knowledge and how it can be justified; and the role of values in 
scientific research. Scientific studies also have methodological assumptions which 
refer to the general approach towards studying a research topic. Methodology is 
the overall approach of the research process which includes theoretical 
assumptions, data collection and analysis (Collis, Hussey 2003). Qualitative 
research is based on certain methodological assumptions (Collis, Hussey 2003). 
These types of studies seek to develop an understanding of a particular situation 
and tend to generalise from one setting to another. They use small samples and a 
range of research methods to ensure that different perspectives are included. 
Qualitative studies usually produce rich and subjective qualitative data and are
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concerned with generating theories. They are usually conducted in natural settings 
and are characterised by low reliability and high validity.
The methodological assumptions which form the basis of qualitative studies also 
apply to this thesis which seeks to develop an in-depth understanding of 
investment behaviour of Chinese multinationals in the UK context using a case 
study approach. Data was collected at the firms’ business premises using 
interviews to generate rich, subjective data from different perspectives. This 
research is geared towards theory building whereby data is collected and a theory 
is developed as a result of data analysis (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2000). This 
approach is often described as inductive.
The general approach taken by this research is typical of the qualitative paradigm 
and as such it differs significantly from the positivist paradigm. Research 
conducted within the positivist tradition seeks to measure concepts and establish 
associations and causality (Collis, Hussey 2003). These studies generalise from 
sample to population. They use large samples and tend to produce quantitative 
data which is specific and precise. Positivist studies are associated with 
hypothesis testing whereby a theory and a hypothesis (or hypotheses) is 
developed and then tested based on data analysis (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2000). This process is frequently described as deductive.
The overall methodological approach used in this study is inductive because of the 
nascency of the research area. There is a deficit of empirical and theoretical 
knowledge on the outward investment of Chinese firms in advanced host 
economies. With hypothesis testing it would have been necessary to develop 
hypotheses based on existing theory. A review of the literature revealed that 
extant theories such as the OLI and LLL frameworks do not fully explain the 
investment behaviour of Chinese firms in advanced economies. Thus it would 
have been difficult to form meaningful hypotheses in a field that is not mature 
enough to have solid theoretical foundations.
Given the lack of knowledge on Chinese firms in the UK it was necessary to 
undertake exploratory research. This study uses an inductive approach that builds 
theory on the basis of data collected from interviews and various other sources. Its
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purpose is to advance of our knowledge of Chinese multinationals in the UK and to 
develop a theory capable of fully explaining their investment behaviour. The 
accumulation of knowledge in this research area will enable the application of 
deductive methods involving hypothesis testing. Further studies can make use of 
the growing body of literature to develop well-informed assumptions which can 
then be tested.
3.2. Research method
Aside from a number of philosophical assumptions scientific research also 
includes a more practical component which defines the way in which data is 
collected and analysed (Collis, Hussey 2003). This is referred to as the research 
method. Given the differences between positivist and qualitative research 
paradigms, research methods are frequently associated with either one of these 
approaches. For example research methods such as surveys, experiments, cross- 
sectional and longitudinal studies are often used in positivistic research 
approaches. Meanwhile qualitative studies tend to use a more diverse range of 
research methods such as action research; case study; ethnography; feminist 
perspective; grounded theory; hermeneutics and participative enquiry (Collis, 
Hussey 2003). The types of research methods associated with the qualitative 
paradigm differ according to authors. For instance the research approaches cited 
by Creswell differ to those listed by Collis and Hussey. They are: narrative, 
phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnography and case study (Creswell 
2013).
The research method employed by this research is the case study. Its overall 
approach is inductive as it seeks to generate theory based on case study data.
The present study uses qualitative evidence from interviews as well as a range of 
quantitative evidence where appropriate.
3.2.1. Case study definition
As a research method, the case study has numerous definitions all of which vary 
slightly. However most definitions have two key features in common -  the ability of 
case studies to provide detailed understanding of a particular phenomenon, and 
the importance of context. Yin for instance defines the case study as:
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“An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin 2014) p.16.
While Yin appreciates the in-depth nature of case studies and the importance of 
context, he also emphasises the contemporary element of case studies. Case 
studies are designed to examine a technically distinctive situation. They rely on 
multiple sources of evidence and existing theoretical assumptions to guide data 
collection and analysis (Yin 2014). Case studies are not a data collection 
technique but a research method which includes research design, data collection 
techniques and specific approaches towards data analysis.
Meanwhile another authority on the case study as a research method, Stake, 
views the case study as a means of gaining a greater understanding of the case, 
appreciating its uniqueness and complexity, its embeddedness and interaction 
with its context (Stake 1995). Stake emphasises the ability of the case study to 
capture the complexity of a particular phenomenon.
The term case study usually refers to research that investigates few cases in 
considerable depth (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000). Case study researchers 
construct cases in naturally occurring situations instead of taking direct control of 
the variables as is the case in experimental research methods. Case studies aim 
to capture cases in their uniqueness rather than using them as a basis for 
generalisation or theoretical inference.
Creswell views the case study as a qualitative methodology in which the 
researcher explores a real-life contemporary bounded system or multiple bounded 
cases over time through detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple 
sources of information such as observations, interviews, audiovisual material, 
documents and reports (Creswell 2013). Case studies can involve single or 
multiple units of analysis and they generate case descriptions and case themes.
According to Collis and Hussey the case study is an extensive examination of a 
single instance of a phenomenon of interest. Like Creswell, Collis and Hussey 
perceive the case study to be a qualitative methodology. This approach involves a
single unit of analysis such as a company, group of employees, an event or 
individual. It requires gathering detailed data about the unit of analysis over a 
prolonged period of time with the intention of obtaining in-depth understanding 
(Collis, Hussey 2003).
Although the case study has been categorised by some authors as a qualitative 
research method (Collis, Hussey 2003, Creswell 2013), it is viewed as a more 
flexible research approach by others (Collis, Hussey 2003, Yin 2014). Yin and 
Collis and Hussey believe that case studies can be conducted within qualitative 
and quantitative paradigms. The flexibility of case studies is in fact considered to 
be one of their key strengths. For example a qualitative case study would be 
exploratory and would seek to develop understanding of a particular phenomenon. 
It would be inductive and would use quantitative or qualitative data collection 
methods. In contrast a positivist case study would have a strong theoretical 
foundation and specific research questions from the outset.
Case studies are also flexible when it comes to epistemological, ontological, 
methodological assumptions and research methods. They can be based on both 
objectivist and constructivist epistemological assumptions, and can use 
quantitative and/or quantitative evidence. A range of data collection methods such 
as documents, artefacts, interviews and observations can be applied (Yin 2014). 
Despite their flexibility and ability to provide an in-depth understanding of a
phenomenon, case studies have their limitations which will be addressed later in 
the chapter.
3.2.2. Types of case studies
The case study method is a helpful tool for answering questions such as “why”, 
“what" and “how”. It is well-suited to exploring existing theory and can be a useful 
way of challenging existing theories (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2000). This 
method is also suitable for observing contemporary events over which the 
researcher has no control (Yin 2014).
Case studies can vary significantly according to purpose. They can be exploratory, 
descriptive, illustrative, experimental or explanatory (Collis, Hussey 2003).
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Exploratory case studies are useful in instances where there is limited knowledge
of a particular phenomenon. Descriptive case studies can be used to describe
current practices in a company, while illustrative case studies may be used to
illustrate new 01 innovative practices developed by a particular firm. Experimental
cases are helpful when examining the implementation of new procedures in an
organisation and evaluating the benefits. Explanatory cases studies are
appropriate when existing theory is used to understand and explain a particular 
phenomenon.
Others categorise them as either intrinsic or instrumental whereby the purpose of 
intrinsic case studies is to learn about a particular case, and the purpose of an 
instrumental case is to gain insight into a question by studying a particular case 
(Stake 1995). Intrinsic case studies are undertaken because the researcher needs 
to develop an understanding about a particular case. The aim is not to learn about 
other cases or about some other general problem. It is more about the researcher 
having an inherent or intrinsic interest in the case. In contrast the instrumental 
case study has different motives. It is driven by a research question or lack of 
general understanding about a certain phenomenon. The examination of a single 
case helps to develop our understanding of the phenomenon or find an answer to 
a question. Thus developing knowledge about the examined case is instrumental 
to our understanding other cases or a general problem.
According to Yin there are three different types of studies depending on what they 
set out to achieve. They are exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (Yin 2014). 
The type of case study selected is determined by the research question and the 
overall purpose of the study. In this respect the present thesis can be categorised 
as an exploratory case study because of its overall purpose which is to explore the 
investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs and its implications.
Case studies can also vary according to the unit of analysis. Some case studies
focus on one particular unit and are known as single case studies, while others
focus on several cases and are known as multiple case studies. Single case
studies can be critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal (Yin 2014). A
critical case study design is appropriate when a single case is used to determine
whether existing theoretical propositions are correct or not. An unusual case is one
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that deviates from existing theories or regular occurrences, while a common case 
is useful for capturing the circumstances and conditions of an everyday situation.
A revelatory case provides the researcher with an opportunity to analyse a 
phenomenon that was previously inaccessible. Meanwhile a longitudinal case 
study enables the examination of a single case at different points in time.
Single case studies can also be holistic or embedded. Holistic case studies involve 
analysis on one level, while embedded case studies involve units of analysis on 
more than one level. For example an embedded case study can be about a single 
organisation such as a company but the analysis may include outcomes about its 
employees and customers. On the other hand a holistic case study would seek to 
understand the global nature of the firm. The single case study design is 
appropriate when the case under examination is unusual, critical or revelatory. It is 
also a reasonable choice when resources are limited and the study needs to be 
undertaken within a short period of time.
3.2.3. Justification
The case study was selected for this thesis because it was the most appropriate 
research method for answering the posed research question “To what extent do 
the investment motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs 
influence the effects of their investments on British business partners?” This 
research question calls for a contemporary study of Chinese multinationals 
undertaking investment activities abroad. Unlike historical research which is 
focused on the past, case studies are designed for the present. One of their key 
features is the ability to provide insight into current events which is what this 
research sets out to do.
The intention of this research is to develop detailed knowledge about a particular 
group of companies. Specifically its aim is to gain an in-depth understanding of 
their reasons for investing in the UK, the ways in which they choose to do so and 
the effects this has on British business partners in the UK. The need for detail in 
this research led to the selection of the case study because of its strong capability 
to provide in-depth understanding of the subject of analysis.
The research question posed requires the examination of a specific group of 
Chinese companies in their natural environment so that their behaviour in the UK 
can be assessed accurately. Unlike other research methods such as experiments 
which are conducted in a carefully controlled environment, case studies facilitate 
the study of a phenomenon in a real-life context. The case study was therefore a 
suitable choice because it enables the study of Chinese multinationals in a 
naturally occurring situation without external intervention.
The nature of this research is context specific in that a group of Chinese 
multinationals is being studied in a particular context. Namely the purpose of the 
study is to examine their investment behaviour and the effects of their investments 
in the UK. The case study was chosen because of the central role of context in this 
research method. The interaction between the unit of analysis and its context is a
significant feature of this method of inquiry which makes it a suitable choice for this 
thesis.
In order to develop in-depth knowledge about investment motives, modes and 
effects of Chinese multinationals in the UK, it was necessary to combine 
qualitative data gathered via interviews with quantitative data from secondary 
sources. Most of the data collected about the companies was qualitative and it 
was supplemented by quantitative evidence where appropriate. In this respect the 
case study was a good fit because of its capacity to facilitate research in 
qualitative, quantitative or mixed traditions.
Although the single case study design can be the best option in some situations, it 
is preferable to employ the multiple case study design where possible and 
appropriate. The analytic benefits of using more than one case study can be 
significant. With two or more case studies the researcher benefits from a 
replication effect. Replication logic suggests that conclusions replicated in several 
cases are more powerful than conclusions made on the basis of a single case (Yin 
2014). This research is designed as a multiple case study of nine Chinese 
multinationals because of the robustness and analytical strengths of this approach 
compared to the single case study.
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3.3. Research design
This section provides a detailed account of the how the case study was designed.
It explains how the unit of analysis was defined and also describes the techniques 
used to collect and analyse the data.
3.3.1. Unit of analysis
Once the multiple case study method was chosen, the next step was to define the 
unit of analysis which meant deciding which firms would be included in the study. It 
was decided that the research would be conducted on Chinese knowledge 
intensive multinationals because potential spillover effects generated by this kind 
of investment are greater than those generated by labour intensive FDI (Buckley 
2010). Knowledge intensive investors are a valuable source of knowledge for host 
countries. They often provide innovative, high value goods and services and tend 
to form relationships with local knowledge intensive organisations.
The investigation of this particular group of Chinese multinationals was also policy 
driven. The lack of knowledge about Chinese knowledge intensive FDI means that 
current UK policies may not be in the best position to capture the potential benefits 
of this type of investment. Thus an in-depth investigation of their investment 
behaviour and potential effects may help the fine-tuning of UK policies to ensure 
that the potential benefits brought about by this type of investment are maximised.
Participating case studies were selected from a range of sectors to ensure that 
sector bias was minimal. The table below shows the names of the companies 
selected and the sectors they belong to:
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Table 2 - Participating firms according to sectors
Company name Sector
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation Automotive 
(SAIC); Changan Automobile Group
Chongqing Machinery and Electric (CQME); Manufacturing 
Zhuzhou CSR Times
TP Link, Vanceinfo \ j
Hytera Telecommunications
ivnnaray, vveigao Medical devices and
equipment
Source: Author’s database
The selection of individual firms depended largely on their willingness to 
participate. Most of the companies that were asked to take part were reluctant to 
do so. Very few were prepared to participate and those that did were included in 
the research. It was important that participating companies were knowledge- 
intensive and that they came from a range of sectors. The choice of sectors and 
firms included could not be pre-determined because of the difficulties involved in 
recruiting participant firms.
The group of case studies selected was categorised into two conceptual groups: 
the first group consisted of multinationals with asset-seeking motives, while the 
second group consisted of multinationals with asset-exploiting motives. This 
conceptual division served a dual purpose. First, it facilitated the exploration of 
investment motives of both types of firms. Second, it enabled the comparison of 
both asset-seeking and asset-exploiting firms in terms of their investment effects 
on British business partners.
3.3.2. Data collection
This research is based upon a combination of primary and secondary data. The 
first part of this section details how primary data was collected, while the second 
part focuses on secondary data.
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3.3.2.1. Primary data
Participant recruitment
Initially a database of potential participants was generated from the “China in 
Britain” publication which specialises in Chinese investment in the UK (China- 
Britain Business Council 2010). The publication provided a list of Chinese 
companies according to UK regions and sectors which made it possible to 
separate firms belonging to knowledge intensive sectors. Once a list of enterprises 
was compiled with their contact details, emails were sent out inviting the 
companies to participate. As the response rate to the emails was low, the emails 
were re-sent and followed up by telephone.
Once telephone contact was established with the relevant individuals the aim of 
the study was explained to them. Some of the companies agreed to participate on 
first contact while others wished to have an informative meeting before making a 
decision. Thus the participant recruitment process consisted of several stages all 
of which were time-consuming. The majority of firms did not reply to the email 
invitation while telephone contact was equally difficult to establish. Many of the 
Chinese managers travel to China frequently and to other parts of Europe where 
they have subsidiaries to manage. They are in the UK for a limited amount of time 
and have little time to spare because of the demanding nature of their roles.
After many months of emails, telephone calls and informative meetings, a final list 
of participants was drawn up. A total of nine Chinese multinationals companies 
agreed to participate and the number of interviewees within each company varied. 
The table below outlines the companies’ names and the number of interviews 
conducted within each firm.
Table 3 - Participating firms according to number of interviews
Company name
Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Corporation 
(SAIC)
Changan Automobile 
Group 
Chongqing Machinery 
and Electric (CQME) 
Zhuzhou CSR Times 
Mindray 
Weigao
No. of interviews
8
1
3
1
T
T
Duration
10hrs
2hrs
5hrs
1 hr 30min 
1 hr 
1 hr 30min
TP Link 1 45min
Vanceinfo
Hytera
1
1
45min
1 hr 45min
Source: Author’s database
In addition to the case study firms, interviews were also arranged with UK 
government organisations, industry experts and firms that had partnered with 
Chinese multinationals. These interviews were used to supplement the case 
studies by providing an outside perspective on Chinese investment activities. Their 
interaction with Chinese multinationals meant that they had insight into their 
investment behaviour and could comment on the effects of their investments. The 
names of the organisations and the number of interviews conducted are outlined in 
the table below.
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Table 4 - Participating organisations according to number of interviews
Organisation Type of Number of Duration
name organisation interviews
UK Trade and Government 1 1 hr 30min
Investment (UKTI)
East Midlands Government Ihr
Development
Agency (EMDA)
Mediatech Communications 1 1 hr
Mahle Engineering 1 1 hr 30min
Cosworth Engineering 1 1 hr
Source: Author’s database
A total number of 23 interviews were conducted: 17 with representatives from 
Chinese multinationals, and five with non-Chinese organisations. One other 
interview was conducted with the general manager of a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise but it was not included in the study. The interviewee did not wish to 
answer the questions because he thought they were too sensitive. The issue of 
confidentiality was exacerbated by the fact that the Chinese SOE had just formed 
a joint venture with a UK based company. The general manager thought that this 
was a particularly sensitive time for the company as the joint venture arrangement 
had yet to be implemented. Although the interview did not yield any useable data, 
it serves as a useful illustration of how difficult it can be to engage Chinese 
companies in academic research projects.
Instrumentation
The main data instrument used to gather primary data for this study was the 
interview. The interview is the most widely used data collection tool in qualitative 
research (Nunkoosing 2005). It represents a conversation where one person (the 
interviewer) seeks responses from another person (the interviewee) for a particular 
purpose (Gillham 2000). Broadly speaking interviews can be structured, semi- 
structured or unstructured. Interviews used for this research were semi-structured. 
In this type of interview the researcher focuses on a specific topic and prepares a
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limited number of questions in advance. In addition follow-up questions are asked 
during the interview (Rubin, Rubin 2012).
The suitability of the interview as a data collection tool for this research is reflected 
in several advantages. The interview enables collection of rich and detailed data 
from the participants (Rubin, Rubin 2012). This kind of data allows the researcher 
to obtain in-depth information from a relatively small group of people. It provides 
depth of meaning and ensures insight and understanding of the unit of analysis 
(Gillham 2000). Interviews yield more detailed data compared to surveys because 
the answers to the questions can be open-ended. This gives interviewees the 
freedom to respond in as much detail as they wish. Interviews as a data collection 
method also have the advantage of being flexible. Questions are not fixed and can 
be re-worded, added or removed (Rubin, Rubin 2012) in order to maximise the 
quality of collected data.
Despite their advantages interviews also have a number of limitations which 
require careful consideration. The first two limitations are of a practical nature and 
relate to the time and cost of carrying out interviews. Interviews are time- 
consuming (Collis, Hussey 2003) because they consist of the following activities: 
developing and piloting the interview, setting up the interviews, travelling to and 
from the interview location, transcribing and finally analysing the collected data 
(Gillham 2000). The issue of time was mitigated through effective planning and 
organisation. In this research a period of 18 months was allocated for interviews to 
ensure that all of the above-listed activities were given sufficient time to be 
completed.
Interviewing is a costly data collection method (Collis, Hussey 2003). The issue of 
costs was alleviated by ensuring that the budget allocated to this research project 
would cover all the interview-related costs. The total budget allocated to this 
project was £3,000. During the course of data collection the research budget was 
managed carefully to ensure that expenses such as travel and accommodation 
would be covered for all of the interviews. Thorough budget planning and control 
meant that there were no financial issues throughout data collection which enabled 
the researcher to concentrate on collecting high-quality data.
Further issues regarding the usefulness of interviews as a data collection tool are
of a methodological nature. The issues commonly identified in methodological
literature relate to misunderstanding, generalisability, subjectivity, bias and
credibility. Each of these concerns is discussed in light of the interview data 
collected for this research.
Evidence from survey-based research shows that questions asked in surveys are 
frequently misunderstood. Respondents are quite likely to misinterpret aspects of 
questions as well as some of the terms used (Belson 1981). For instance the word 
you can be understood to mean yourself or it could include others. The way in 
which a term is understood is likely to influence the response given. The challenge 
of misinterpretation was resolved in this research by testing out the interview 
questions before they were administered to study participants. The issue of 
misunderstanding was all the more pertinent because some of the interviewees 
spoke English as a second language. The question testing was a good opportunity 
to identify ambiguous questions and to do something about them. It involved 
asking native and non-native English speakers who were not study participants to 
provide feedback and comments on the questions. The questions were then 
modified to reflect the feedback so that potential misunderstandings in the 
interviews proper would be minimised. The testing process is described in more 
detail on page 84.
The question of generalisability is commonly discussed as part of the quantitative 
versus qualitative debate. Being a typically qualitative data collection tool, the 
interview is frequently criticised for its lack of generalisability. The significant time 
and resources required for interviewing dictate that a relatively small number of 
interviews can be carried out per research project. For example 23 interviews were 
conducted for the purposes of this research. The number of respondents in 
interview-based studies will inevitably be lower than in survey samples (Kvale 
1996) which brings into question the generalisability of findings made on the basis 
of interview data.
Quantitative research methods are well-suited to generalisation. A representative 
sample of the appropriate size is constructed which enables conclusions to be 
generalised to a larger population. The strength of this type of research is breadth
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of knowledge. On the other hand interview-based research has smaller samples 
and a different purpose (McCracken 1988). Its aim is to develop a detailed 
understanding of the unit or units of analysis. Thus interviews are designed to 
provide depth of knowledge rather than a basis for generalisation.
In the context of this research interviews were selected as the most appropriate 
data collection tool because of their ability to provide in-depth understanding of a 
unit of analysis in a particular context. The intention of this research is to develop 
our knowledge of Chinese investment behaviour in the UK so that we can have a 
better understanding of the implications of their investments for the local economy. 
The study was not designed to generate findings which could then be applied to 
Chinese multinationals in other host economies for example.
A further limitation of interview-based research relates to the influence of personal 
views or opinions. Subjectivity is identified by some methodologists as one of the 
main difficulties of using interview data (Gillham 2000, Roulston, deMarrais & 
Lewis 2003). Perspectives on the degree of subjectivity in interviews vary 
significantly. Some believe that the interviewer and the interviewee shape the data 
and its meaning. This view focuses on the interactive aspects of interviews and is 
referred to as an ‘active interview’ (Holstein, Gubrium 1995). According to this 
position the role of the interviewer and the interviewee is to co-construct the 
meaning of the data. It emphasises the influence of the interviewer and of the 
interviewee and the constructed nature of the entire interview process (Gubrium, 
Holstein 2001). Moreover evidence from the social work context suggests that 
interviewing is not merely information gathering but a process of knowledge 
production and identity creation (Suoninen, Jokinen 2005).
Other perspectives focus on the role of the interviewer which is seen to have more 
or less influence on the interview data. One standpoint proposes that the 
researcher is an ‘instrument’ of data collection (Guba, Lincoln 1981). The 
researcher uses his or her range of experiences and cognitive abilities to 
systematise and analyse the collected data. However a contrasting view argues 
that the interview provides the researcher with an opportunity to gain insight into 
interviewees’ realities (Silverman 1997). The first point of view perceives the
interviewer to have some impact on interview data while the second sees this role 
as being more passive.
In this study the issue of subjectivity was alleviated through two series of 
measures that were built into the interview process. The first set of measures was 
designed to minimise interviewee subjectivity. Each group of interviewees was 
asked the same questions on the basis of a prepared questionnaire. The 
interviewees came from three different types of organisations: Chinese firms, 
British partner organisations or government agencies. The individuals themselves 
were from different backgrounds -  mostly Chinese and British and they held a 
range of positions in their organisations. The potential subjectivity of the interviews 
was significantly reduced by the inclusion of secondary data which was used to 
corroborate the findings.
The second set of measures was devised to minimise interviewer subjectivity. In 
this study the role of the interviewer was to facilitate data collection rather than 
participate in data creation as some methodologists suggest. The questions were 
posed in the same manner. Both main and follow-up questions were asked in a 
neutral way. The use of persuasive or encouraging questions (Suoninen, Jokinen 
2005) was avoided to ensure that the data was not influenced by the views and 
opinions of the interviewer.
Interviewer subjectivity was further reduced by creating a distance between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. In most cases they had not met before the 
interview so the professional distance between them helped to minimise 
subjectivity during the interview process. Subjectivity was also moderated by the 
effects of cultural distance. Namely in this research the interviewer and the 
interviewees were from different cultural backgrounds which created a cultural 
distance between the researcher and the subject of the research (McCracken 
1988).
A further concern regarding the interview as a data collection technique is partiality 
or one-sidedness. Similar to subjectivity, bias can be driven by the interviewer and/ 
or by the interviewee (Collis, Hussey 2003). For example interviewers can be 
biased in terms of class, race and culture while interviewees could provide
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responses which they perceive to be ‘correct’ or ‘acceptable’. In this study 
interviewer bias was controlled by ensuring that the interviewer was not obtrusive 
throughout the interview process (Brenner, Brown & Canter 1985). The 
interviewees were given the opportunity to answer questions in their own way. At 
the same time it was important for the interviewer to maintain control of the 
conversation through use of questionnaires. The questions were posed in a 
neutral way so that they would not affect the interviewees’ responses.
Interviewee bias was controlled by ensuring that the collected data was balanced. 
It included alternative points of view and a range of perspectives (Rubin, Rubin 
2012). Data on the investment behaviour of Chinese firms in the UK was collected 
from the perspective of the firms themselves, their British partners and 
government organisations. The professional and cultural diversity of individual 
respondents also helped to reduce interviewee bias. Furthermore the triangulation 
of interview data with secondary data from company documents, government 
reports and specialist publications played a part in minimising the possibility of 
biased data.
Establishing the right kind of relationship between the interviewer and the 
interviewee can assist in reducing interview bias. During the interview stage of this 
research particular care was taken to establish trust between the interviewer and 
interviewees. The respondents were given detailed information about the purpose 
of the study and the about the way in which the data would be used. They were 
also given assurance with regards to confidentiality and anonymity. The 
researcher also maintained a degree of distance from the interviewees so that the 
relationship did not affect or obscure the interviewees’ responses (McCracken 
1988).
The issue of credibility was addressed during all stages of the interview process.
In the participant recruitment stage it was important to recruit individuals who were 
directly involved in Chinese investment (Rubin, Rubin 2012). It was vital to include 
interviewees who would provide internal and external perspectives on the Chinese 
firms. In the questionnaire design phase the same questions were prepared for 
each group of interviewees (Roulston, deMarrais & Lewis 2003) so that the 
responses could be easily compared.
Credibility was further enhanced in the interview stage where questions were 
asked in a neutral way. Any additional questions represented prompts for further 
details. Leading questions were used occasionally to check the reliability of the 
responses and to verify the interviewer’s interpretation (Kvale 1996). The purpose 
of these questions was not to influence the interviewees’ responses but to 
enhance the credibility of the data. Most of the interviews were recorded and then 
transcribed woid for word. Where recording was not possible the notes taken 
during interviews were clarified and elaborated once the interviews were 
completed (Holstein, Gubrium 1995). This was done straightaway to ensure that 
the notes accurately reflected the interviewees responses.
Primary data was gathered by means of individual and group interviews. The 
majority of data was collected through individual interviews while group interviews 
were used on two occasions. During the group interviews several interviewees 
from the same organisation were asked to respond to questions and to participate 
in the discussion. Group interviews were held with Zhuzhou CSR Times -  Dynex 
and with CQME-Holroyd. In both instances, the interviews consisted of participants 
from the Chinese parent companies and from their UK subsidiaries. The use of 
group interviews was advantageous from a credibility point of view. It facilitated the 
inclusion of views and opinions from employees who are normally based in China 
and happened to be visiting their UK subsidiaries while the interviews were being 
held.
The interviews were guided by semi-structured questionnaires which outlined the 
topics that were to be covered and also contained some specific questions. The 
semi-structured approach to interviews facilitated flexibility during the interview 
process. For example this approach allowed the researcher to investigate 
interesting new threads that emerged during interviews. Similarly the semi- 
structured approach also allowed topics and questions to be excluded if it became 
apparent that they were no longer relevant during the interview process. If certain 
threads were added or excluded this was done across all of the case studies to 
ensure consistency.
Interview questionnaires were designed for three broad groups: Chinese 
multinationals, their partner organisations and other external organisations
(government organisations and independent observers). Interviews with Chinese 
multinationals focused on their investment motives, inodes and effects. While 
many of the questions were the same, some of them were modified to capture the 
distinctions between asset-seeking and asset-exploiting investors.
Meanwhile interviews with partner organisations and external organisations were 
quite different because they served a different purpose. Respondents from both 
types of organisations were asked to give their views and opinions on the 
investment behaviour of Chinese multinationals. Thus the semi-structured 
approach to interviewing aided the process of open discovery by enabling 
questions to be tailored towards different types of respondents.
Most of the interviews were conducted in English because all of the interviewees 
except for one were fluent English speakers. The only exception was the interview 
with Changan which was conducted in Chinese. A native Chinese speaker 
volunteered to simultaneously interpret the interview from English to Chinese and 
vice versa. The rest of the interviews were conducted in English without any 
problems. Many of the interviewees were native English speakers, while those that 
spoke English as a second language were confident enough to respond to 
questions and engage in discussion. The use of a professional interpreter would 
not have been possible given the financial constraints of the study.
The data was recorded through note-taking or the use of an audio recording 
device. The use of an audio recording device was the preferred method because it 
allows interviews to be played back repeatedly. This option ensures that nothing is 
missed and that the essence of the interview is captured. However, the use of 
audio recording equipment depended on the approval of interviewees. Some of 
the interviewees agreed for the interviews to be recorded while others did not. 
Interview data was captured via note-taking in cases where the use of audio 
recording devices was not approved. Although note-taking is an effective way of 
recording interviews, there is a risk that some important information may be 
missed or misunderstood.
Comparability of the two types of data was achieved by converting it into written 
form so that the end result was as close to the original as possible. The audio
recording was played back and transcribed. Each word, pause and gesture made 
by the interviewees was written down as it was said. The recording was played 
back several times to ensure that the words were written down accurately. 
Meanwhile the data recorded by note-taking was carefully reviewed immediately 
after the interview. The aim of this was to fill gaps, complete sentences and verify 
that the content made sense. This was done while the interview was still fresh in 
the researcher’s mind and could be recalled correctly.
During the conceptual stages of this project it was envisaged that the 
questionnaires would be piloted before the interviews proper began. A pilot study 
refers to the ‘trying out’ of a particular research instrument (Baker 1999). In 
qualitative research a pilot study gives the researcher an opportunity to test the 
questionnaire for validity and reliability. Based on feedback from the pilot study the 
researcher can make necessary improvements before the questionnaire is 
administered to the main interviewees. In order to run a reliable pilot study it is 
necessary to involve interviewees who are representative of the group that will be 
included in the study proper but who are not from that particular group (Gillham 
2000). The aim is to obtain feedback and comments which can be used to improve 
the questionnaire and therefore the reliability of the interview data.
By its very nature the research process is unpredictable and the process of 
recruiting study participants was more difficult than expected. Most of the 
organisations invited to participate declined and those that did were only prepared 
to commit to one interview per person. In most cases there was only one 
opportunity to talk to the participants because they were unable to spare any more 
time. Consequently there were no opportunities to run a pilot study with individuals 
from participating organisations.
Despite the advantages of pilot studies it has been argued that it is not always 
necessary to run a pilot study in qualitative research. This is because of the 
progressive nature of the interview process which allows researchers to improve 
questions, introduce new issues or add new topics as the interviews progress 
(Holloway 1997). According to this view there is no need to conduct a separate 
pilot study beforehand because improvements to the questionnaire take place as
part of the interview process.
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Given the impossibility of running a pilot study with individuals from participating 
organisations it was vital to ensure reliability and validity of the questionnaire by 
other means. This was achieved by requesting comments and suggestions from 
the supervisory team, several university lecturers and individuals from a Chinese 
company that was not included in the study. Fortunately some of the individuals
were from China which was very helpful because many of the main interviewees 
were Chinese business people.
Some of the comments and suggestions related to the ability of Chinese 
interviewees to understand the questions. For instance one of the comments was 
that some questions used complex language while others were not clear. Such 
questions may be difficult to understand or could be misinterpreted by non-native 
English speakers. These questions were re-worded clearly and simply to ensure 
they could be fully understood by both native and non-native speakers.
Other comments related to the length of the questionnaire which helped to 
sharpen the focus on important topics through omission of questions that were 
less significant or interesting. Comments regarding overlapping questions helped 
to eliminate repetition allowing more time for exploration of key areas. This was 
also helpful in keeping the questionnaire focused given that time with the 
interviewees was very limited. Further feedback prompted organisation of the 
questionnaire into logical groups which would help interviewees give full answers. 
Logical grouping also enabled easier data analysis at a later stage of the research 
process.
Finally some of the feedback helped to identify sensitive or controversial topics. 
Managers from a Chinese company were asked if they would be willing to discuss 
particular areas of the internationalisation process and to identify topics which they 
would prefer not to discuss. Based on their guidance it was possible to change 
direct questions into indirect ones. Meanwhile topics deemed too sensitive were 
removed from the questionnaire and were replaced by other questions that 
Chinese firms would respond to more readily. The lack of opportunity to conduct a 
pilot study was offset by the inclusion of an alternative mechanism which relied on 
feedback from individuals who were not involved in the study proper. The aim of
this mechanism was to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire which 
would in turn enhance the value of the interview data.
Duration
The collection of primary data took place between May 2011 and October 2012 
over a period of approximately 17 months. The interviews were staggered 
throughout this period because of the time required to arrange the interviews. Most 
of the individual interviews were approximately one hour long on average.
However some of the individual interviews were longer and took about one hour 
and 30 minutes. The focus groups consisted of three to five participants and lasted 
approximately two hours so that everyone was given an opportunity to contribute.
Location
The collection of primary data took place at the participants’ business premises. 
The researcher undertook substantial travelling throughout England during the 
data collection period. Almost all of the interviews were carried out in-person 
except for one interview which was conducted by telephone. The table below 
shows the locations where data was collected between May 2011 and October 
2012.
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Table 5 - Interview locations
Company name Location
Mahle; Cosworth Northampton
Mindray Huntingdon
Shanghai Automotive Industry Birmingham 
Corporation (SAIC)
UKTI; Vanceinfo; Chinese SUE London
Hytera Slough
TP Link Reading
Weigao Southend-on-Sea
East Midlands Development Nottingham
Agency; Changan
PTG Holroyd Rochdale
Dynex Lincoln
Mediatech Telephone interview
Source: Author’s database 
3.3.2.2. Secondary data
The process of secondary data collection was undertaken in parallel to primary 
data collection. Secondary data was gathered intermittently during this period with 
a view to complementing the interview data. It was particularly useful for building a 
detailed picture of the case study firms. Secondary data provided insight into their 
histories and backgrounds. It also provided information about their current 
activities in China and in overseas markets. Secondary data was a valuable 
source of information about the activities of Chinese multinationals in the UK. For 
instance the dates when an acquisition took place or details about its value and 
the companies involved. Secondary data about their current and historical 
behaviour contributed towards developing an in-depth understanding of their 
investment motivations and investment modes.
Secondary data was sourced through a combination of freely available public 
resources and subscription-based databases. Company websites were found to 
be a valuable source of secondary data e g. Dynex Semiconductor, SAIC, CQME, 
TP Link, Hytera, Mindray, Weigao, Vanceinfo and Zhuzhou CSR Times. In some
cases the website content provided interesting material, while in others the
websites were an access point for company annual reports, newsletters and 
presentations.
English versions of Chinese news portals such as China Daily, Xinhua News and
China Business News were also an invaluable source of information on the
international activities of Chinese firms. Nine articles were retrieved from China
Daily, three articles fiom Xinhuanet and one from China Business News. Chinese
government websites such as MOFCOM (four articles retrieved) were an important
source of historical and contemporary investment statistics relating to outward 
investment from China.
General British news portals were also a rich source of information about Chinese 
investments in the UK. Two articles were retrieved from the BBC, one from the 
Guardian and one from Reuters. Economic portals helped to complete the picture 
by providing information on current issues. Namely three articles were retrieved 
from the Financial Times, five from the Economist and one from IB Times.
Specialised trade publications such as China Car Times (one article), Machinery 
Market (one article), The Engineer (one article), Electronics Weekly (one article), 
Techradar (one article), Marketing Week (one article) and PR Newswire (one 
article) provided detailed reports on news and events that Chinese companies are 
involved in. Non-government organisations such as OECD and UNCTAD were 
also reliable sources of secondary data. The OECD definition for FDI was used in 
this study while World Investment Reports for 2006, 2012 and 2103 provided 
investment statistics for China.
3.3.3. Data analysis
The overall approach to data analysis in this thesis is inductive. The data was 
examined from the “ground up” which involves reviewing the data until patterns or 
concepts begin to emerge (Yin 2014). The inductive analytic strategy was selected 
because of the qualitative approach of this study and its exploratory nature.
Namely the study is not based on a set of initial theoretical propositions which it 
seeks to verify. Instead it is designed to explore the relationship between
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investment motives, modes and effects of Chinese multinationals in the context of 
their interaction with British business partners.
3.3.3.1. Company overviews
Before the data analysis process began it was necessary to build an overview of 
each of the case study firms. This was achieved by collating secondary data from 
a range of sources including company websites, newsletters, presentations as well 
as online news portals and specialised trade publications. These sources provided 
vital background information about the firms such as ownership structure, primary 
activities, location and technological capacity. They also provided insight into the 
companies’ domestic activities and their internationalisation efforts. The data was 
especially useful for gaining an understanding of their investment activities in the 
UK such as the date of entry and investment value for example. The background 
information about the firms was used as a basis for developing a comprehensive 
understanding of their investment motives, investment modes and investment 
effects on business partners in Britain.
3.3.3.2. Cross-case analysis
Once an overview was developed for each of the firms the process of data 
analysis was initiated. The data was analysed using a technique referred to as 
cross-case synthesis which is recommended for case studies that include more 
than one unit of analysis (Yin 2003, 2009, 2014). The strength of this analytic 
technique is that findings are likely to be more robust compared to those derived 
from a single case study. Each company is treated as an individual study and the 
findings are synthesised across all of the studies. For the purpose of this study 
cross-case synthesis was conducted using both primary and secondary data.
Data collection
The first stage of cross-case analysis involved collating the primary and secondary 
data into one place in preparation for analysis. This was done by importing all of 
the data into a software package called NVIVO designed to assist with qualitative 
data analysis. NVIVO is essentially a tool which helps researchers to organise 
their data more efficiently and is not designed to do any of the actual analysis.
Before the interview data could be imported into NVIVO it had to be converted into 
textual form. This process is also known as transcription and it involves listening to 
the interviews and writing them down. The transcription process was time- 
consuming as the interviews generated approximately 25 hours of audio data. 
Once the transcription was complete the textual files were imported into NVIVO. 
Not all of the interviews were recorded with an audio device. Some were 
documented through note-taking which meant that they were already in written 
format. These files were imported directly into the computer software package.
Next the secondary data was imported into NVIVO. This type of data was sourced
primarily from company websites and a range of other online resources. It was
already in textual form and could be imported into the software package without
difficulty. Once the primary and secondary data had been centralised, the process 
of data analysis was initiated.
Data coding
The advantages of using a software package extend beyond its ability to store 
data in a centralised location. NVIVO was particularly helpful for categorising or 
coding data. The interview data generated approximately 120 pages of text which 
would have been difficult to code manually because of the sheer volume of data. 
Manual coding would have involved the use of highlighter pens to mark words or 
phrases which belong to a certain category. Different colour highlighters would be 
used to denote a different category. Manual coding poses great difficulty when it 
comes to arranging the categories into themes because of the number of 
categories available and the challenge of organising them into appropriate themes. 
The coding process tends to become even more challenging when particular 
words or phrases are recoded. Recoding is an inevitable part of qualitative data 
analysis. As the coding progresses the researcher s ideas evolve which is 
reflected in changes to the codes. Thus the dynamic nature of the coding process 
makes it particularly challenging if it is carried out manually.
To avoid the issues involved in manual coding, the data was coded with the 
assistance of NVIVO. Once all of the textual files were imported into the software 
the coding process was initiated. Certain words or phrases were assigned to a 
particular code. Each code had its own colour so that a distinction between
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different codes could be made. The data was reviewed several times over to 
ensure that appropriate codes had been assigned. The advantage of using NVIVO 
is that it enables data to be recoded without difficulty. A further benefit of this 
software is that clicking on a code reveals all of the words and phrases associated 
with that particular code throughout the entire data set.
Conceptualisation
Once all of the interviews were reviewed several times and the coding stage was 
completed, the codes were then grouped together under common themes. This 
process was repeated until every code was assigned to a theme. For example 
codes such as “brand" and “technology" were assigned to the “motivation” theme 
because they reflected the reason for investment. Similarly codes such as 
“financial resources” and “access to overseas markets” were grouped under the 
“investment effects” theme. The end result was that clicking on a particular theme 
would reveal all of the codes associated with that theme. NVIVO proved to be a 
valuable tool during this phase because it enabled changes to be made to the 
codes and the themes. For example it was possible to move codes, together with 
all their text references, to another theme simply by using the drag and drop 
function. It was equally straightforward to delete an existing theme if it was no 
longer relevant, or to create a new one if new evidence emerged during the 
analysis.
Data analysis in this phase was conducted on two levels. First, conceptual links 
were made between the categories and their themes, ensuring that each of the 
categories was closely associated with the theme it was under. Second, on a 
higher level of abstraction, the themes were analysed to reveal the relationships 
that existed between them. The conceptual framework that emerged as a result of 
this analysis continued to be developed up to the point when it could sufficiently 
address the research question.
3.4. Limitations
The issue of generalisation has been the most widely criticised aspect of the case 
study research method. Namely, some methodologists observe that it is not 
possible to generalise on the basis of case study findings. Responses to these
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criticisms by advocates of the case study approach are varied. Some accept that
generalisations should not be made on the basis of case studies because they
were not designed with this purpose in mind. Instead case studies are seen to
have an exemplary function and it is believed that inferences can be made about
them (Thomas 2011). The purpose of the case study is seen to be one of
particularisation rather than generalisation (Stake 1995) whereby emphasis is 
placed on uniqueness.
Meanwhile other supporters of this research method believe that it is in fact 
possible to make generalisations on the basis of case study findings. However, in 
their view, it is first necessary to redefine the concept of generalisation in 
qualitative enquiry (Ward Schofield 2000) so that a distinction can be made 
between what is meant by generalisation in quantitative and in qualitative research 
methods. Yin, for example, proposes that case studies are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations as would be the case in 
experiment-based methods (Yin 2014).
As an exploratory case study, the purpose of this research is not to generate a 
series of findings which can then be generalised to other populations of 
multinationals. Its aim is to develop a detailed understanding of the investment 
behaviour of a particular group of multinationals in the UK. This research explores 
the extent to which the investment motives and modes of Chinese MNEs influence 
the effects of their investments on business partners in Britain. The conclusions 
drawn on the basis of this study pose questions to existing theory and extend 
empirical knowledge of the effects of Chinese investment in knowledge intensive 
sectors. In short, this case study was designed to generate more questions than 
answers. It is possible that some of the inferences may apply to the behaviour of 
multinationals from other emerging markets such as India or Brazil. However these 
propositions would first need to be verified through further research.
The second limitation of case studies relates to the rigour with which they are
undertaken. Case study research is sometimes criticised for lack of rigour
compared to other research methods. This may be because there are fewer texts
available on case studies (Yin 2014) compared to other research methods such as
grounded theory for example. However there is still sufficient literature available to
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ensure that case studies are undertaken systematically and thoroughly. In this 
research numerous books on case studies were consulted to ensure a high 
degree of academic rigour (Yin 2014, Stake 1995, Thomas 2011, Ward Schofield 
2000). Some of the leading texts, such as the one by Yin, provide specific 
procedures on how the case study should be conducted.
The third and final limitation relates to the amount of effort required to conduct a 
case study. They can potentially be time-consuming and can generate large 
volumes of data that are difficult to manage (Yin 2014). This could be especially 
pertinent to multiple case studies that rely on interviews and observations as their 
main data collection techniques. However it is possible to conduct a multiple case 
study in a manageable way. In this research, for example, the number of 
interviews was limited which ensured that the data could be collected, transcribed 
and analysed on time. The interviews were supplemented by data from secondary 
sources which took significantly less time to collect. The use of software also 
helped to simplify and reduce the time required to carry out tasks such as data 
manipulation and analysis.
3.5. Credibility
The credibility of this research was enhanced through construct validity, external 
validity and reliability as suggested by Yin (Yin 2014). Construct validity was 
achieved through the application of data triangulation which involves collecting 
data from several sources. The logic is that findings are likely to be more 
convincing or accurate if they are based on different sources. In this case study, 
data was collected from a range of sources including: Chinese multinationals, 
partner organisations, government agencies, international news portals and 
specialised trade publications amongst others. The use of multiple data sources 
ensured that the conclusions were based on several sources and were therefore 
more compelling.
External validity was achieved by ensuring the generalisability of findings.
Here, generalisability does not refer to a sampling logic whereby conclusions 
made on the basis of a case study are used to inform us about a population. 
Rather, generalisability refers to the ability of the study’s findings to shed empirical
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light on theoretical concepts. In this research the conclusions made about the
motivations of Chinese investors challenge two existing theories on the
internationalisation of firms from emerging markets. The two theories make
different assumptions about the competitive advantages of firms from emerging
markets, both of which were found to be deficient when applied to the case of 
Chinese multinationals.
Reliability was achieved by minimising the errors and bias in this case study. This 
was accomplished by closely following specific procedures developed by leading 
methodologists specialised in case study research. Texts by Yin and Stake were 
referred to extensively especially when it came to designing the study, planning 
data collection and undertaking data analysis.
3.6. Ethical considerations
The ethical considerations in this research are associated with interview data 
which was collected from a range of participants. These considerations pertain to 
data confidentiality and to the anonymity of the interviewees. The interviewees 
agreed to participate on the basis that their responses would be used solely for the 
purpose of conducting PhD research.
Once the interviews were finished the audio recordings were stored on a desktop 
computer located at Northampton Business School. Copies were also stored on a 
recording device which was kept in a locked cabinet at the university. Transcribed 
versions of the interviews were also kept in a secure cabinet and were not shared 
with any individuals or organisations outside the supervisory team. Once the study 
is completed, the audio and text versions of the interviews will be held securely for 
ten years. During this time the data will not be shared with anyone. Potential re-
use of the interview data in conference papers or journals will be subject to 
additional consent from the study participants.
Most of the participants consented to having their organisations’ names published 
in this thesis. The majority of the data provided is not commercially sensitive so 
the organisations had no reason for concern. The names of the participating 
companies are included in this study but the names of all interviewees are coded
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as a precaution. The inclusion of interviewee names would not enhance the study. 
Instead the positions of individual interviewees in their respective organisations 
are listed under “interviewees” in the references section. Only one of the case 
study firms, Holroyd, had concerns regarding confidentiality and anonymity. The 
company agreed to participate provided that the name of the company and the 
names of individuals were not available to the public.
Given that this research is based on multiple case studies whereby background 
information is provided on each company, the idea of anonymity with regards to a 
company s name is, unfortunately, unattainable. Holroyd is a well-known machine 
tool manufacturer and the only company in this sector to be acquired by a Chinese 
partner. Despite the researcher’s best efforts to anonymise the company’s name, it 
would still be identifiable based on the background information provided. Thus 
Holroyd’s name was included in this research without alterations. The issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity regarding Holroyd are resolved by requesting an 
embargo on the access to and use of this thesis until the individual participants 
agree for it to be lifted. At present the interviewees from Holroyd perceive that their 
positions in the organisation may be under threat if the data they provided 
becomes publicly available. It is therefore appropriate to have the thesis 
embargoed until the circumstances of the interviewees change e.g. when they 
retire, move to another company or the owners of the company change.
3.7. Concluding remarks
Having outlined the method used in this research, the following four chapters 
provide an in-depth examination of nine Chinese multinationals in the UK. Each 
case study focuses on the firm’s activities in UK especially their reasons for 
investing, the modes that were employed, the challenges they faced and the 
effects of their investments. The next chapter investigates the investment 
behaviour of Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) in the UK paying 
particular attention to these aspects.
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4. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC)
SAIC is owned and controlled by the Shanghai municipal government and its 
headquarters are in Shanghai. Today, a Fortune 500 company, its core business 
areas include R&D, manufacturing, sales, distribution and finance. SAIC 
manufactures both commercial and passenger vehicles. It is the largest 
automotive company in China selling 4.49 million whole vehicle units in 2012 
(SAIC Motor Corporation Limited 2012a). Most of its sales in the passenger 
vehicle segment are generated through joint ventures with Volkswagen (VW) and 
General Motors (GM) which together accounted for about 90% of sales in 2012 
(SAIC Motor Corporation Limited 2012c). SAIC’s increasing success is illustrated 
by rapidly increasing profit rates.
Table 6 - SAIC profits 2009-2011
Year 2009 2010 2011
Total profit (RMB) 8.5 billion 26.5 billion 42 billion
Source: SAIC Annual Report 2011
4.1. SAIC overview
The company was founded in 1955 under the name Shanghai City Diesel Parts 
Manufacturing Company. Over the years it went through numerous name changes 
and in 1990 became known as Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC 
Motor Corporation Limited 2012b). The company’s first car, the Phoenix was 
produced in 1958.
Figure 7 -  The Phoenix
Source: SAIC Group website
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SAIC s growing success was based on joint venture (JV) agreements with leading 
western automotive manufacturers. In 1984 Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW) was 
formed as a joint venture between Volkswagen and SAIC. The car produced by 
the JV was called the Santana and carried the VW brand (Thun 2006). VW was 
interested in the prospect of lowering its production costs while the Shanghai 
municipal government saw the international JV as a development opportunity for 
the automotive industry and the city of Shanghai in general. SVW and AMC Jeep 
were one of the first foreign multinationals to enter the Chinese market. Initially 
they set up basic assembly facilities with low local content and even less local 
knowledge content. SVW was very successful in the 1980s and 1990s because its 
products were superior to those offered by domestic manufacturers and the
company was not facing strong competition from other foreign MNEs (Zhao,
Anand & Mitchell 2005).
In 1997 Shanghai General Motors was formed as a joint venture between General 
Motors and SAIC. The joint venture launched the Buick New Century into the 
Chinese market in 1998 (SAIC Motor Corporation Limited 2012b). Most of the local 
knowledge content in international automotive joint ventures was limited to 
adaptation or localisation of existing products such as changes to a car’s length, 
re-design of its interior and exterior or the fitting of a new engine. The SGM joint 
venture made 600 engineering changes to the Buick Century to make it more 
suitable for Chinese driving conditions and regulations. For example elevation of 
rear seats, increased rear leg room and modification of suspension in line with 
Chinese road conditions (Zhao, Anand & Mitchell 2005).
It has been argued that the SVW and SGM joint ventures in China have enhanced
in-house production capability as a result of technologies and relevant technical
support provided by international parent companies VW and GM. The purpose of
technology transfer was to improve local productivity and product quality. In
contrast their capacity to develop new vehicles in-house remained modest (Nam
2011). Most foreign parent companies limit their engineering support to local
adaptation of imported technologies such as minor vehicle interior modifications
suited to local preferences. While this is true of SVW, GM has made more effort to
upgrade local engineering capability than any other foreign vehicle manufacturer in
China. Rather than being limited to technology adaptation, GM intends to expand
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into more significant vehicle development and engineering in its China based Pan- 
Asian Technical Automotive Centre - PATAC (Nam 2011).
Despite the commercial successes of joint ventures with GM and VW, SAIC had 
limited know-how when it came to vehicle design and development. The Chinese 
based joint ventures had primarily been set up for production purposes rather than 
vehicle engineering. Consequently the opportunities for technological learning 
were limited. Secondly there was the issue of brand. SAIC was successful at 
marketing vehicles with established western brand names such as GM and VW 
but it did not have its own brand. SAIC’s ambitious plans to become one of the 
world’s top automotive manufacturers meant that it could no longer rely on foreign 
brands and needed to develop its own.
4.2. MG Rover overview
Though Rover was established towards the end of the 19th century its early history 
is associated with several British automotive manufacturers. Rover’s history can 
usefully be divided into three phases (Holweg, Oliver 2005). During the first phase 
between 1900 and 1950 MG Rover consisted of a number of independent 
companies including Alvis, Austin, Morris, Rover, Riley, Triumph, Wolseley and 
others.
The second phase from 1950 to1970 marked a period of integration where the 
majority of British car manufacturers were brought together under a single 
organisation called the British Motor Corporation (BMC). The British Motor 
Corporation, later renamed British Leyland Motor Corporation BLMC, was created 
in an attempt to create a consolidated British automotive company capable of 
competing with US rivals. BLMC achieved large production volumes in the early 
1970s but failed to integrate its operations across the different companies.
The third phase marks the company’s continuous decline from 1970 onwards.
Poor financial performance led to its nationalisation in 1975. At this point its name 
was changed to British Leyland (BL). In 1979 British Leyland joined forces with 
Honda in order to develop new models and changed its name to Austin Rover in 
1982. Five years later the company changed its name yet again to Rover Group in 
1987. It was sold to British Aerospace in 1988 and subsequently to BMW in 1994.
By 2000 the Rover Group was making heavy losses and BMW took the decision to
sell. It was bought by venture capitalists -  the Phoenix Group who renamed the 
company MG Rover.
4.3. SAIC’s entry into the UK
As MG Rover s financial decline continued under the ownership of the Phoenix 
Group it explored JV opportunities with a number of Chinese companies between 
2000 and 2005. MG Rover was seeking funding in exchange for product designs. 
Meanwhile SAIC’s success was primarily built on joint ventures with VW and GM.
It lacked proprietary intellectual property which was a hindrance to its growth and a 
potential threat. In 2000 SAIC began to explore ways in which it could create its 
own designs, intellectual property and products. That way it would gain
independence of its JV partners’ brand names and have its own (Interviewee A1 
2012).
Negotiations between MG Rover and SAIC began in 2004. SAIC bought the 
intellectual property of two models and several engines from MG Rover (Holweg, 
Luo & Oliver 2005). It was hoped that a full joint venture would be formed between 
the two companies but this did not happen. SAIC was concerned about MG 
Rover’s financial position and was not prepared to take on significant redundancy 
and pensions liabilities. SAIC decided not to go ahead with the joint venture. 
Meanwhile MG Rover could no longer cover its operating costs and consequently 
went into administration in 2005.
Its remaining assets were sold to Nanjing Automobile Corporation (NAC). Most of 
the production lines were moved from Longbridge to China. NAC resumed 
production of the MG TF sports car in Longbridge using complete knock-down kits 
from China (Bailey, Kobayashi & MacNeill 2008) but only a limited number of units 
were made because of quality concerns. SAIC bought the intellectual property 
rights to the Rover 25 and 75 and the replacement model for the Rover 45 which 
was in development when the company went into administration (Bailey,
Kobayashi & MacNeill 2008). In 2007 SAIC acquired NAC’s car manufacturing 
business giving it access to the assets that NAC had bought from MG Rover a few
years earlier.
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Following the collapse of MG Rover approximately 600-700 product development 
engineers were made redundant. Some of them went to Bentley, Jaguar Land 
Rover, Lotus or Aston Martin while others had previously been involved in 
discussions with SAIC. SAIC recognised this as an opportunity and acted fast to 
secure the best people (Interviewee A2 2012). A new company called "2010 
Consultants” was set up in 2005 to deliver engineering services exclusively to 
SAIC. SAIC employed the services of Ricardo, a British automotive consultancy 
based in Leamington Spa, to set up and run the organisation. In return SAIC 
provided the funding. Ricardo 2010 was set up within six weeks and started 
work immediately. The newly established consultancy grew rapidly from 70 to 300 
employees and was largely staffed by former MG Rover engineers with expertise 
in designing and engineering cars (Interviewee A1 2012).
SAIC had acquired the designs to Rover 75 which was adapted to manufacturing 
for the Chinese market. All the engineering was done in the new company and 
paid for by SAIC. The first car launched in China under SAIC’s own brand was a 
modification of the Rover 75, an upper medium saloon, which was made slightly 
larger for the Chinese market (Interviewee A5 2012).
Figure 8 - Roewe 750
Source: SAIC Group website
For the first two years the UK engineering centre supported the engineering
activities of SAIC’s self brand group called Shanghai Motor Passenger Vehicles
(SMPV). Within SMPV there was another company called Shanghai Motor
Technical Centre which was the engineering group based in China. In 2007 when
SAIC was content with the proposition they bought “Ricardo 2010" and changed its
name to Shanqhai Motor Technical Centre UK (SMTC UK) (Interviewee A1 2012).
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The company was based on Ricardo’s premises in Leamington Spa until 2008 
when it was moved to Longbridge, a suburb of Birmingham. It joined the 
manufacturing company MG Motor which was already operating at the site and 
was owned by Nanjing. Two sister companies were effectively operating at the 
same site -  the engineering company SMTC UK and the manufacturing company
MG Motor. The two companies represent separate legal entities although they 
share the same parent company -  SAIC.
Figure 9 - SAIC's organisational structure in the UK
Source: Author’s interpretation
It is clear from SAIC’s initial activities that its investment strategy in the UK was 
cautious, gradual and risk averse. A direct takeover of MG Rover would have 
carried a high degree of risk given MG Rover’s pension scheme liability for 6,000 
employees and the urgent need to invest in new models (Interviewee A4 2012). 
Instead SAIC pulled out of joint venture talks and waited shrewdly for MG Rover to 
file for bankruptcy. The Chinese automotive giant then acted swiftly to set up a 
new company with former MG Rover employees.
SAIC’s lack of experience and familiarity with the UK market meant that it may 
have had difficulties in setting up the business by itself. It did not have particularly 
high levels of exposure to the UK or European environment, the legal and human 
resource requirements (Interviewee A2 2012). So SAIC engaged the services of 
Ricardo, a reputable and experienced British automotive consultancy to set up and 
manage the business. As expected Ricardo’s execution was efficient and the
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company was established and operational within a matter of weeks. Ricardo took
much of the worry out of SAIC’s investments in the UK. They set up the business
and also recruited local experts to do the engineering work. SAIC’s investment
strategy was gradual in the sense that the engineering centre was owned by
Ricardo for the first two years. SAIC acquired “Ricardo 2010” only once it was 
assured of its stability.
The joint venture with Ricardo initially allowed SAIC to have relatively less 
commitment than would have been the case if a wholly owned subsidiary had 
been set up. The financial investment into “Ricardo 2010” was substantial but 
SAIC did not have too much emotional or structural investment which meant that 
they could easily disinvest if the business did not go to plan (Interviewee A5 2012). 
The venture with Ricardo also minimised SAIC’s risk as the set up costs and risk 
levels were known in advance. The facilities were provided by Ricardo so SAIC did 
not have to develop its own facilities or provide any equipment such as desks, 
chairs or IT equipment. “So if SAIC decided to pull out they could just take it all 
with them” (Interviewee A4 2012). SAIC had fixed costs and knew exactly what 
they were spending.
The decision to set up an engineering centre under Ricardo worked to SAIC’s 
advantage in terms of engineer recruitment. MG Rover’s failure meant that large 
numbers of automotive engineers were looking for employment. One of the things 
that made joining SMTC UK a more attractive proposition was that it was under 
the umbrella organisation of Ricardo rather than a Chinese company. Not many 
people in the UK knew about SAIC at the time and “were cautious of going and 
working for a Chinese organisation” (Interviewee A5 2012). Thus the joint venture 
with Ricardo presented a friendlier front to potential employees. As SAIC became 
more established it began to been seen as a suitable employer in its own right. 
SAIC’s later takeover of “Ricardo 2010” and integration into the SAIC group was 
therefore an acceptable course of action.
4.4. Investment motives
It is widely argued that Chinese companies invest in developed economies to 
enhance their competitiveness. Some researchers believe that by investing abroad 
Chinese companies gain access to certain assets which may enable them to 
compete more effectively against leading players (Deng 2007, Huaichuan, Yip 
2008, Deng 2009). Meanwhile others have argued that Chinese multinationals 
engage in international acquisitions to address competitive disadvantages (Child, 
Rodrigues 2005). The literature has identified several types of strategic assets that 
are likely to be accessed by Chinese companies in developed economies. They 
are: technology, R&D skills, brands and distribution channels (Clegg, Voss 2012, 
Child, Rodrigues 2005). The case of SAIC’s investment activities in the UK follows 
patterns identified in the literature. SAIC was pursuing three key strategic assets 
when the decision to invest in the UK was made -  brand, technology and know-
how. These investment motives are addressed in the following three sections and 
are different for each of the examined firms.
4.4.1. Brand
SAIC’s home market success was based on brands owned by leading 
multinationals such as GM and VW. However the company’s aspirations to 
become a world class automotive manufacturer meant that it would need to 
develop a brand of its own. They wanted to position their own brand as being a 
quality level above domestic brands and “more comparable to the imported brands 
in the Chinese market” (Interviewee A5 2012).
SAIC acquired the “MG” brand from MG Rover which is the brand currently in use 
in the UK. But they failed to acquire the “Rover” brand which is owned but not 
used by Ford. Ford exercised the right to buy the brand in order to protect its 
range of off-road vehicles. In order to capitalise on the brand values associated 
with the “Rover” brand, SAIC created the “Roewe” brand which had the “same 
logo and similar brand concept as Rover” (Interviewee A1 2012). SAIC acted 
swiftly to create a new “Roewe” badge which closely resembled Rover’s. The 
values of the “Rover” brand were very much translated into the newly created 
“Roewe” brand for the Chinese market focusing on themes such as Britishness, 
quality, comfort and tradition (Interviewee A4 2012).
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Figure 10 - Rover and Roewe badges
Source: SAIC website
The “Roewe” brand is portrayed as being European in the Chinese market 
because of the additional value that this adds to the brand (Interviewee A4 2012). 
The fact that SAIC’s cars have been engineered in Europe, according to European 
standards and are on sale in Europe adds to the brand’s credibility (Interviewee A5 
2012). Moreover the link with a UK manufacturing centre adds to the perceived 
quality of “Roewe” products. One of the main reasons for having a manufacturing 
centre in the UK is to try to change the perception of Chinese goods. A UK 
manufacturing base entitles SAIC to market their cars as British not Chinese 
because they have been designed and developed in the UK. SAIC is very much 
intent on presenting the company as British. Until recently any external contact 
with journalists for example was the responsibility of British employees rather than 
Chinese.
However, in reality, the cars on sale in the UK are actually manufactured in China 
and then assembled in the UK (Interviewee A5 2012). The cars are transported to 
the UK in semi-knock down kit form which effectively means that the cars arrive 
90% built. Once the kit arrives at the Longbridge plant the sub-frame is taken out 
from the car and the engine is fitted. Next the suspension is then put on and bolted 
into the car. Finally the exhaust is fitted and the car is filled with water and oil.
Marketing material in China plays heavily on the UK link as well as the European 
link. British icons such as Big Ben or the Houses of Parliament are readily used in 
marketing in China. It is an image which people can immediately associate with 
Britain (Xu, Hu & Fan 2011).
4.4.2. Technology and know-how
SAIC’s lack of proprietary intellectual property meant that SAIC had a fundamental 
problem when it decided to launch its own products. They had “many many 
students and graduates that were coming out of college and university” 
(Interviewee A2 2012). They came from strong educational backgrounds and 
possessed theoretical knowledge but lacked the practical skills and experience 
required to design and develop a car. For example if there was a problem with an 
engine they would not have the experience to solve it (Interviewee A7 2012).
SAIC engineers were seen to be very intelligent and well-educated but they lacked 
“business or real-life experience of the business” (Interviewee A6 2012). Even the 
more experienced engineers from the VW and GM ventures had limited 
experience because they used finished designs developed not by themselves but 
by their foreign JV partners. They have “no experience in initial and concept 
development, their understanding of building a car from scratch is pretty poor” 
(Interviewee A1 2012).
When the own brand was set up, a handful of key people were recruited from 
different areas within the company. Noticeably few engineers were recruited from 
existing JVs. SAIC also looked outside of the UK for technical experts. They 
looked in America particularly for Chinese Americans working for companies like 
GM or Ford. At the time the companies were going through a financial crisis so 
there were people available. Some of them were recruited by SAIC and currently 
hold senior positions in China because of their experience (Interviewee A3 2012).
SAIC had acquired intellectual property rights to two models developed by MG 
Rover, the Rover 75 and the Rover 25 which allowed it to quickly launch a car into 
the Chinese market under its own brand. The original Rover 75 was modified 
slightly before being launched as the Roewe 750. Although useful in providing a 
head-start, the finished designs did not solve SAIC’s problem of new product 
development. They still lacked the skills and experience required to design and 
develop new vehicles.
The decision to set up an engineering centre in the UK was designed to give SAIC 
access to the engineering skills and experience it lacked. The company’s
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leadership recognised that they needed some help in developing new products 
relatively quickly to a high standard and quality. They knew that this would be 
faster than relying solely on SAIC’s internal capacity. Through its UK base SAIC 
was able to access 250-300 experienced former MG Rover engineers to provide 
technical input into the development of new vehicles.
The technical expertise provided by SMTC UK consists of four main areas: design; 
power train technology; new vehicle concepts and European projects (Interviewee 
A5 2012). Design is very important to SAIC as it is used as a main selling point in 
China. Power train technology relates to engines and transmission especially 
conceptual design. In terms of new vehicle concepts the largest ongoing project is 
a range of new vehicles which are planned to be launched in China in two or five 
years time. Finally European projects involve re-engineering of vehicles which 
exist almost exclusively in China for the European market.
The first product developed by SMTC UK, the Roewe 750, was a simple makeover 
of an existing product, the Rover 75. The next product, the Roewe 550 was based 
on the Rover 75 design but it was changed significantly. Since then most of the 
products developed by British engineers have been new. The new generation of 
products are based on internally generated ideas rather than the adaptation of 
technical solutions created elsewhere (Interviewee A5 2012). SMTC UK engineers 
are applying innovative thinking in terms of new features and tackling basic 
engineering problems such as vehicle mass reduction or keeping 
vehicle size down while optimising occupant and luggage space.
Figure 11 - Roewe 550
Source: SAIC Motor website
According to British engineers at SAIC they have expertise in chassis which 
relates to the dynamic performance of the car. Their strength lies in the fact that 
they have been driving for many years and are well positioned to assess a car’s 
character i.e. the way it feels to the customer (Interviewee A4 2012). Although 
numerous elements of a car’s dynamic performance can be measured objectively, 
it is the more subjective factors such as safety and reliability that form the final 
impression of a car s performance. British engineers have the ability to assess and 
link subjective customer thoughts with objective measures used to design a car.
They perceive that their expertise in upfront concept design has also proved 
invaluable to SAIC (Interviewee A4 2012). In this respect the role of British 
engineers is to start from a blank sheet of paper and suggest a basic design e.g. 
the layout, identification of hard points, basic component shapes and some initial 
analysis to show the car will be strong enough. Subsequently the design is passed 
over to Chinese colleagues who are skilled at detailed design, optimisation and 
refinement because of their experience of localising existing designs. Chassis 
engineers in the UK also carry out “downstream tuning and finessing” because of 
their understanding of customer preferences (Interviewee A4 2012). The tuning 
adjusts the feeling of a car to make it feel more sporty or comfortable for example. 
The UK chassis team also does initial tuning for Chinese cars such as the original 
damper tuning for the Roewe 550.
SMTC UK also provides expertise in design. According to one of SAIC’s 
designers, most of their work is on brand new clean sheet of paper design cars 
(Interviewee A2 2012). They are currently heavily involved in a program which did 
not exist six months ago. The design team is developing a “vehicle platform which 
will be used to build a number of vehicles for the Chinese market” (Interviewee A2 
2012). The project involves detailed, difficult, high IPR work. The UK design team 
is also responsible for more straightforward projects such as taking a car that is 
already engineered for China and then modifying it back for the European market. 
Modifications may include right hand drive or EURONCAP requirements for 
example.
Initially the role of the UK engineering centre was to do the initial work using their 
expertise in design and concept design. “It would move over to Chinese
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colleagues who would then develop the design and go through testing processes 
because they were then using that as a learning process in China” (Interviewee A3 
2012). The UK is now moving away from mainstream engineering to upfront 
development such as common platforms. The focus is more on "problem-solving, 
engine development, safety and fuel efficiency” (Interviewee A7 2012) Meanwhile 
the more general, basic vehicle engineering is now being handled in China. At the 
moment the UK team is the lead for common platforms and multiple models off the 
same platform but it is likely that this will also get transferred to China in the future.
From an SMPV point of view, the UK technical centre is “the most important part of 
the engineering group because of the high skill level it has relative to China” 
(Interviewee A3 2012). Europe is still considered to be the world’s centre for 
automotive technology. SMTC’s European location means that there is frequent 
contact with other European companies which lead technological advancements. 
Having been part of a mature industry for many years, British engineers have an 
“awareness of the European automotive industry in terms of products, trends, 
suppliers and technological advancements” which would take Chinese engineers 
years to develop (Interviewee A5 2012). SMTC UK is currently exploring fuel 
economy improvements in terms of different types of hybrid and energy saving 
techniques, as well as improvements in aerodynamics. A large part of their job is 
to “understand where everyone else is going. Go to the seminars, talk to the 
engineering service providers like FEV and Ricardo and figure out which way 
things are going” (Interviewee A3 2012).
Aside from technical skills SAIC is also gaining access to management skills via 
the UK technical centre. SAIC’s senior managers’ exposure to the global 
workplace has been limited in the past and part of their involvement with SMTC 
UK is about learning new management practices (Interviewee A7 2012) and 
developing their business skills (Interviewee A6 2012). By visiting their UK base, 
Chinese managers can access managerial knowledge which is either non-existent 
or limited in the Chinese organisation (Interviewee A5 2012).
SMTC UK does not only provide access to British technical and management 
expertise but also acts as a channel for accessing knowledge externally This is
achieved primarily through interaction with local universities and automotive 
consultancies.
Academic knowledge is one of the UK’s key strengths. Some UK universities have 
particular competencies in automotive R&D and therefore represent a highly 
valuable source of technical knowledge. SMTC UK has ongoing research projects 
with a number of local universities such as Coventry, Birmingham, Warwick, 
Loughborough, Cranfield, Brunei, Imperial College London and Cambridge 
(Interviewee A1 2012, Interviewee A5 2012, Interviewee A3 2012). Most of the
projects are technologically focused and involve work on specific technological 
advancements.
SMTC UK is also working with local universities to provide placements for 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. From a company point of view, this is 
an effective way of generating engineering talent internally. Fresh graduates were 
brought in to SMTC UK for the first time in 2011 and it is hoped that they will 
contribute with “new ideas, new perspectives and perhaps less conventional 
approaches towards problem-solving” (Interviewee A5 2012). Student or graduate 
placements are also a good way of recruiting new talents. Once students have 
spent time on a project, the company can then identify those students it would like 
to attract into the business upon completion of their studies. SMTC UK recognises 
the importance of keeping up with the latest technologies and continually 
"developing its skills in order to support SAIC in expanding its technical expertise 
in China” (Interviewee A3 2012).
Despite the decline of British automotive manufacturers and suppliers, Britain is 
still a very strong base for vehicle development and engineering. SMTC UK has 
good links with local consultancies and service suppliers in the automotive and 
other cognate sectors. Limited facilities at the centre’s Longbridge site mean that 
they often use services provided by local external organisations. For example 
SMTC UK often uses Mira’s test track and Milbrook’s crash testing service 
(Interviewee A1 2012).
They are also working on R&D projects with other local automotive consultancies 
such as Ricardo, FEV and AVL (Interviewee A3 2012). SAIC engineers are
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currently working with Ricardo engineers on power train technologies. They are 
developing new energy components, designs and systems. So far “they have 
developed a hybrid gear box which is the most advanced system to come out of 
the SAIC-Ricardo relationship” (Interviewee A1 2012). SAIC can also rely on 
British colleagues to tap into the technologies embedded within “Formula 1 
companies located in the Midlands” (Interviewee A7 2012)
Knowledge is transferred from SMTC UK to SAIC in China largely through staff 
mobility between the two countries. The UK engineering centre has engineers who 
are temporarily and permanently based in China. At the time of writing 
appioximately 20 UK engineers were in China for the purpose of transferring 
engineering knowledge, experience and attending meetings (Interviewee A7 
2012). Many UK engineers visit China once a month. Most of the interviewees had 
visited the parent company on a number of occasions for training purposes. For 
example the Quality Systems Manager visited Shanghai twice to deliver training 
(Interviewee A6 2012), while the Deputy Director of Power Train Integration was 
based in China for three and a half years. His role was to set up the power train 
program management group which was created to manage the development of 
power train (Interviewee A3 2012).
Similarly there is a constant stream of people from China visiting the UK for 
varying lengths of time. Placement duration may vary from a couple of weeks to 
several months and sometimes even longer (Interviewee A5 2012). Chinese 
engineers travel to the UK to support ongoing engineering work but also to 
develop their technical skills. There are also 10 people from China who are 
permanently based in the UK (Interviewee A5 2012). Some of them are in the UK 
in a managerial capacity while others have supportive roles.
Transferring information can be difficult because of language and other cultural 
barriers so the role of support staff can be quite important in terms of reducing 
these barriers. Initially it was thought that visits from Chinese colleagues would be 
quite frequent. It was planned that they would spend six months working on a 
project in the UK which would then be taken back to China for finalising. This 
would have been a very effective way of transferring implicit or complex technical
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knowledge to Chinese colleagues, however in practice this was difficult to achieve 
because of strict visa requirements for Chinese nationals.
4.4.3. Evolving technological capabilities
In the past Chinese technological capabilities were largely based on imitation. 
However it has been argued that, today, their strategies are based more on the 
creation of proprietary technology (Xie, White 2006). Chinese firms are achieving 
technological upgrading through several means. Firstly they are investing heavily 
in internal R&D in terms of facilities and personnel. Secondly they are forming 
linkages with foreign multinationals that have R&D centres in China. Thirdly 
Chinese firms are increasingly setting up offices and R&D offices abroad from 
where they can access and acquire foreign technology.
There is general consensus amongst industry analysts regarding innovative 
capabilities of Chinese automotive companies. Their production capabilities have 
been upgraded significantly but their innovative capabilities remain modest for the 
time being. However there are signs that this is beginning to change. A great deal 
of effort is being put into the technological upgrading of the Chinese automotive 
industry at national and firm level. The national government is actively supporting 
and encouraging innovation in areas such as hybrid vehicles and hydrogen fuel 
cells (Altenburg, Schmitz & Stamm 2008). Meanwhile Chinese companies are 
investing heavily in R&D. According to Geely’s Vice President and President of its 
research institute, the company is investing 10% of its annual sales revenue into 
R&D (Geely Group 2012). Chinese automotive manufacturers are also upgrading 
their technology through international acquisitions e.g. SAIC’s acquisition of 
intellectual property from MG Rover and more recently Geely’s acquisition of 
Volvo.
SAIC is making substantial investments in R&D staff and facilities in China. They 
built brand new engine and vehicle factories. The engineering centre has world 
class facilities and is located on a completely new site. It has new offices, facilities 
and a design studio. The centre’s facilities include engine test beds, transmission 
rigs, rolling roads, cold and hot chambers, wind tunnels and a power train testing 
facility (Interviewee A3 2012). The centre currently houses 2,500 engineers and it
is expanding rapidly. SAIC is continuously investing in engineering talents through 
annual recruitment of university graduates.
Figure 12 - Roewe production line in China
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Though most of SAIC’s investments are in China, the company’s UK technical
centre in Longbridge has also seen considerable investment (Interviewee A5
2012). The office building has undergone substantial improvement to get it back
up to a standard where it could be used. A design studio was built with all the
necessary equipment and it is currently being expanded. When the centre was first
relocated to the Longbridge site it had a very small workshop which has since
been moved and expanded. From a manufacturing point of view considerable
investment has qone into the facilities needed by MG Motor. SAIC is also investing
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in engineering talent in the UK. In the beginning the technical centre started off 
with about 70 people and today it houses well over 200 engineers. Furthermore 
the centre operates a student placement scheme and is recruiting graduates 
annually as part of its strategy to attract young talent.
SAIC’s investments in people and facilities both at home and abroad are starting 
to have an impact on the company’s technological capabilities. Chinese engineers 
are learning rapidly and as a result the main engineering of car development is 
now actually located in China (Interviewee A7 2012). Initially when designing a car 
from the very beginning the UK technical centre would do the initial concept 
designs. The designs would then be passed over to engineers in China for 
development and testing. While the UK team still does some of the upfront design 
work, “the main engineering of car development is actually located in China” 
(Interviewee A4 2012).
Over time the teams have become much more integrated and now form a very 
large global engineering group. The UK team does not necessarily take the lead 
with every project. Rather the type of project determines whether Chinese or 
British engineers take the lead role. The evolution of Chinese technological 
capacity is illustrated by the way in which work used to be allocated between 
engineering teams. In the early days the UK engineering team would develop 
technologies which would then be passed over to Chinese engineers at a later 
stage. Today, the work is passed on to Chinese engineers at a much earlier stage 
than before (Interviewee A3 2012).
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Chinese engineers have developed expertise in specific areas such as chassis 
that deals with the analysis of components. “There is a large team of engineers 
that are able to run modelling and optimisation of structures for weight and 
stiffness “ (Interviewee A4 2012). SAIC has concentrated on developing expertise 
in this particular area and now has a very competent team in China. Chinese 
engineers have also developed competencies in new energy technologies beyond 
those held by the UK technical centre. SAIC has set up a New Energy Power Train 
(NEPT) Centre in China specialising in C02 issues, hybrid and electric vehicles 
(Interviewee A3 2012). UK engineers have limited knowledge in this area so most
of SAIC’s investment is directed towards developing skills and expertise in China.
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The centre of expertise for new energy power train and electric vehicles is actually 
held by Chinese engineers.
4.5. Investm ent challenges
SAIC encountered a series of challenges when investing in the UK. The 
acquisition of strategic assets requires good communication and knowledge 
sharing which may not be easy to achieve because of differences between British 
and Chinese organisations. The challenges identified by SAIC can be categorised 
into two major groups: cultural and organisational.
4.5.1. Cultural
Existing literature shows that cultural differences can have significant effects on 
knowledge transfer (Bhagat, Kedia & Triandis 2002, Kedia, Bhagat 1988, Simonin 
1999). Numerous studies on inter-organisational knowledge transfer suggest that 
the effects are largely negative. For example research on knowledge transfer in 
joint ventures finds that cultural differences between international JV partners may 
hinder knowledge sharing (Buckley, Casson 1996, Flanvanich et al. 2005, Lyles, 
Salk 1996). In the same vein it has been suggested that cultural compatibility 
between I JV parent companies facilitates learning from foreign parent companies 
(Lane, Salk & Lyles 2001). Others highlight that cultural differences negatively 
affect the longevity of strategic alliances (Parkhe 1991). Meanwhile some have 
found cultural distance to be a frequent cause of misunderstanding between 
individuals (Bresman, Birkinshaw & Nobel 1999).
Studies on intra-organisational knowledge transfer are also insightful in 
highlighting cultural challenges to knowledge transfer. There is evidence that 
knowledge transfer is likely to be successful if the subsidiaries are culturally 
aligned. Conversely it is likely to be constrained when subsidiaries with different 
cultural dynamics are involved (Lucas 2006). Knowledge transfer within the firm 
can be impeded as a result of an arduous relationship between the source of 
knowledge and the recipient. That is to say when the relationship is laborious and 
distant this is likely to lead to difficulties in knowledge transfer (Szulanski 1996).
Three aspects of cultural differences were identified as being particularly relevant 
to SAIC s investment activities in the UK. The first is the concept of face (mianzi) 
which is vastly important in Chinese culture. Giving face to others and saving 
one s own face is an essential part of daily interaction amongst Chinese people 
(Buckley 2010). The question of face has caused difficulties in relationships 
between British and Chinese employees at SAIC.
The issue of face has shown to be a significant barrier to communication. “It can 
be very difficult to get to the bottom of what actually happened, because there is. 
particularly from the Chinese colleagues, this whole issue of face and not wishing 
to lose face” (Interviewee A5 2012). When there is a problem British colleagues 
start to ask questions but are met with silence as Chinese colleagues are not 
prepared to say what has gone wrong. In an attempt to resolve the problem British 
engineers try to get in touch with Chinese colleagues but telephone calls are not 
answered and emails are not replied to. Sometimes it can be extraordinarily 
difficult and the only way to understand the problem is to be on the ground in 
China with the people that are involved.
The second aspect is that of trust which plays a significant role in Chinese 
business culture. It is key to building strong long-term relationships with Chinese 
employees, managers and government officials (Buckley 2010). Building trust has 
been an important aspect of establishing good relationships between Chinese and 
British colleagues at SAIC. One British engineer finds that frequent visits to China 
are especially important because they provide an opportunity “to build up rapport 
and relationships” (Interviewee A5 2012). Aside from spending time on project 
activities he feels that it is equally important to socialise with Chinese colleagues in 
a less formal setting e.g. having tea or lunch together. In his view, far more is 
achieved in this sort of environment and it is an effective way of building trust.
Once the engineers are back in their respective countries communication and 
knowledge sharing becomes much easier.
Engineers that spend a quarter of their time in China “tend to get quite well 
integrated into the business” and communication on a daily basis appears to be 
relatively straightforward (Interviewee A2 2012). They have had a chance to get to 
know and trust their Chinese colleagues in professional and social settings. On the
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other hand, the situation is rather different with British engineers who visit China
every year or two. They lack personal relationships with Chinese colleagues and
there is a lack of trust which makes communication and knowledge sharing 
difficult.
The third aspect of cultural differences relates to communication. Most 
communication issues arise out of the inability of Chinese and British colleagues to 
understand each other’s language (Interviewee A1 2012, Interviewee A7 2012).
Not many former MG Rover engineers speak Chinese. Although they did attempt 
to learn their efforts were unsuccessful and SAIC recognised that it would be 
easier for Chinese employees to learn English instead. Consequently SAIC “now 
only employs English speaking Chinese” (Interviewee A7 2012). The situation is 
somewhat improved when it comes to Chinese engineers many of whom speak 
English with varying degrees of proficiency. The language barrier can cause 
misunderstandings amongst employees which may in turn lead to difficulties in 
knowledge sharing.
4.5.2. Organisational
There are significant organisational differences between British and Chinese firms 
which can sometimes cause frustration and lack of cooperation amongst 
employees. They key organisational differences identified in this section are 
hierarchy, management practices, bureaucracy and state influence.
The most noteworthy difference that has emerged out of the interview data is the 
issue of hierarchy. British staff repeatedly highlighted that Chinese companies are 
much more hierarchical than British organisations (Interviewee A2 2012, 
Interviewee A5 2012, Interviewee A4 2012, Interviewee A3 2012). This is clear 
from SAIC’s lengthy approval processes whereby huge amounts of time effort are 
spent on writing reports and preparing presentations. For example obtaining 
approval to start a new project takes “many weeks rather than a couple of days" 
and involves obtaining approval at SMTC UK level, company level and finally at 
main board level over many iterations (Interviewee A5 2012).
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From a British perspective, Chinese management is very much based on the 
issuing of instructions’ (Interviewee A5 2012) and "following orders” from senior 
employees (Interviewee A4 2012, Interviewee A3 2012). Instructions from China 
often “come in the form of one line emails” (Interviewee A4 2012) and they are 
expected to be "followed without question” (Interviewee A2 2012). Although they 
may have open discussions major decisions are ultimately made by senior 
managers in Chinese organisations (Interviewee A7 2012). In the UK hierarchy is 
less important. It is "more about having an open discussion” (Interviewee A5 2012) 
where the lowest engineer can express his opinion to a senior individual and if the 
project does not go to plan they can then resolve it together (Interviewee A3 
2012). In Chinese oiganisations decisions are always made by senior managers 
which can sometimes be time consuming. This is quite frustrating for British 
engineers who are used to making decisions themselves. They are used to a
higher degree of empowerment than they are granted at SAIC (Interviewee A3 
2012)
Chinese management practices differ significantly from the way businesses are 
managed in Britain. British employees perceive that they are closely controlled or 
"micromanaged" by their Chinese parent company (Interviewee A1 2012, 
Interviewee A7 2012). Business practices have been exported from China which 
British employees find “frustrating and stifling”. The management has introduced 
Chinese operating procedures e.g. procurement procedures which are “long, 
involved and very bureaucratic” (Interviewee A1 2012). One of the managers in 
charge of finance finds that micromanagement erodes job satisfaction and 
creativity in his role (Interviewee A7 2012).
From a British perspective the organisation has become more formalised and 
everything is managed from China. Decision-making is seen as centralised and 
there is little delegation. British employees are accustomed to different 
management practices whereby delegation and collective decision-making are 
more prevalent. In contrast Chinese managers are used to having the final say 
and their decisions being implemented without question. This management style 
has been described as “dictatorial” (Interviewee A6 2012). Flowever it is also true 
that British and Chinese teams are managed differently. Chinese managers have 
to “modify their approach to make it successful” (Interviewee A2 2012). Their
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management style is less aggressive than it is when managing Chinese 
employees.
Chinese managers have a different approach to planning than British managers. 
For example if a problem is identified they will not resolve it immediately. “They’ll 
let it get to a certain point and then they’ll throw every amount of resource to 
actually get the problem fixed” (Interviewee A 7 2012). In contrast the British 
approach is to make plans for resolving the problem shortly after it has been 
identified. The Chinese management style also differs with regard to strategy. 
They tend to formulate long-term five year strategies, whereas Western 
companies are “about instant rewards and returns” (Interviewee A7 2012).
The level of bureaucracy is quite high in Chinese state-owned enterprises such as 
SAIC compared to British run businesses (Interviewee A2 2012, Interviewee A7 
2012, Interviewee A3 2012). The organisation is laden with paperwork and 
processes. A good illustration of this is purchasing orders at SMTC UK which 
require multiple signatures before they can be approved. The same lengthy 
process applies regardless of the item’s value. For example “purchase orders that 
have been pre-approved require one signature, then another, then another” 
(Interviewee A7 2012). Under MG Rover if an engineer wished to purchase some 
components within a budget that had already been approved, he would need to 
obtain 4 signatures before the order was placed with a supplier. But under 
Chinese management the same process requires “14 or 15 signatures” 
(Interviewee A3 2012).
Another significant difference between Chinese and British organisations is the 
extent of state involvement. Being a state-owned enterprise the Chinese state 
plays an active role in the administration of SAIC. “The leadership that we’ve got in 
China are in general very senior people in the local party” (Interviewee A5 2012). 
The state provides strategic direction (Interviewee A2 2012) to the company 
through Party officials who have desks and offices within SAIC. They participate in 
senior meetings and support the company’s business development activities 
(Interviewee A3 2012). For instance Party officials were involved in the graduate 
recruitment process to ensure that the right numbers of graduates were taken on.
“They are part and parcel of developing the business and are not far from senior 
meetings” (Interviewee A5 2012).
Although British employees are not used to working for a company that is run both 
as a business and a political entity their view of Chinese state influence on SAIC is 
positive. They appreciate the visits made by several high ranking Chinese officials 
over the years. The Prime Minister, Wen Jiaobao visited in 2010 and the mayors 
of both Nanjing and Shanghai made visits to SAIC’s UK engineering centre in 
2011 (Interviewee A5 2012). The company’s strong ties to the government mean 
that some of its decisions are taken for ‘‘the good of the country rather than the 
business” (Interviewee A4 2012). This is somewhat different to the way British 
organisations are run whereby most decisions are based on the company’s best 
interests. British employees are used to working in environments in which the state 
has little or no direct involvement. From their point of view some of the decisions 
made by headquarters may be not make commercial sense because other wider 
interests they are not aware of may have been taken into account during the 
decision-making process.
The final organisational challenge is one posed by the UK government. Under 
current immigration regulations Chinese nationals require visas to visit the UK for 
business purposes. However the application procedures are lengthy and 
applications are sometimes not approved which makes it difficult for engineers and 
other staff to visit the UK engineering centre. Initially it was planned that teams of 
Chinese engineers would “come over here and spend six months working on a 
project and then taking the project back to China” (Interviewee A7 2012). However 
this is not possible as Chinese engineers are finding it difficult to obtain short-term 
business visas. The visa problem has proved to be a challenge for technological 
learning where Chinese engineers are unable to visit the UK as often as they 
would need to. Instead most of the technology transfer takes place when British 
engineers visit China. Although many of their visits are frequent and regular, 
knowledge sharing between the UK and China would have been far more efficient 
if travel in both directions was permissible.
4.6. Investment effects
So far this chapter has focused on SAIC’s investment motives, their investment 
modes and the challenges they encountered. However this section examines the 
effects of their investment activities. These effects are addressed in the following 
three sections and are different for each of the examined firms.
4.6.1. Local employment
SAIC s entry into the UK market had an immediate impact on local employment. 
When MG Rover closed there were approximately 600-700 product development 
engineers out of employment (Interviewee A2 2012). SAIC’s decision to invest in a 
new engineering centre directly lead to the initial employment of 70 vehicle 
development engineers. As the business grew the number of employees 
expanded to approximately 300. Today more than one third of these employees 
have permanent rather than temporary contracts (Interviewee A4 2012). The 
company has chosen to make more permanent arrangements by setting up a 
human resources department and financing the company pension scheme.
4.6.2. Financial investment
SMTC UK is part of a very large, profitable umbrella organisation with vast 
amounts of capital and global ambitions. Compared to MG Rover’s financial 
position in the early 2000s, the engineering centre is a great deal more stable.
The company’s investment activities had financial implications for the local 
economy. In the early stages the financial implications were confined to the 
automotive consultancy, Ricardo, which was responsible for setting up and 
managing the engineering centre for the first two years. The entire project was 
funded by SAIC including monthly wages for local employees.
Once SAIC took ownership of the engineering centre and it was moved to the 
Longbridge site further investment followed (Interviewee A5 2012). Some of the 
buildings were disused and required considerable investment to get them back to 
a standard where they could be used again. SAIC invested in the main office 
building which currently houses most of the company’s employees.
Further onsite investments included a new fully equipped design studio which is
currently undergoing expansion. The size of the studio will be doubled and the
investment will include a new state-of-the-art visualisation suite, increased
modelling facilities and a CNC (Computer Numerical Control) five axis milling
machine (SAIC Motor UK Technical Centre 2012). The studio’s capacity will be
significantly increased allowing the designers to work on up to five full-size models
at a time. The value of the expansion is £1.5. Moreover significant investment
went into the expansion and relocation of a workshop which was originally very 
small.
The financial implications of SAIC s investment go beyond the engineering centre
based at Longbridge. The centre often employs the services of local automotive
consultancies and universities on a commercial basis (Interviewee A1 2012). For
example Milbrook and Mira provide crash testing services, Ricardo provides
research and development expertise in the area of power train, while universities
such as Coventry, Birmingham and Loughborough provide expertise in automotive 
research.
4.6.3. New markets, technologies and expertise
Through its ownership link with SAIC, the engineering centre has acquired access 
to China’s fast growing domestic market. At the moment about 14 million 
passenger cars are sold in China every year and this figure is expected to 
increase in the future. Growing demand in the Chinese market represents a good 
opportunity for SAIC to expand its own brand by designing and developing new 
products.
SAIC’s investment in the UK has given British engineers the chance to work with 
the biggest car company and the biggest car market in the world (Interviewee A5 
2012). The unprecedented demand for passenger vehicles in China along with 
SAIC’s financial backing has provided British engineers with an opportunity to 
develop new products for this market (Interviewee A3 2012). SAIC has a 
significant production plan which British engineers are already contributing to. One 
of the projects they have worked on is the platform for the MG 6. It was “an all new 
platform that we designed from the ground up” (Interviewee A4 2012). So far the
UK engineering team has “been involved in or started three new architectures”
(Interviewee A4 2012) which is quite an achievement for the automotive industry in
which few engineers have the opportunity to work on several cars from start to
finish. SAIC s investment has provided the centre with an opportunity to invest in
new technology, techniques, software and tools needed for the development of 
new products for Chinese market.
New product development requires not only application of existing technologies 
but also the development of new ones. Thus new product development by SMTC 
UK encourages its engineers to develop new skills and techniques. If other local 
organisations are involved in the product development process then they too have 
an opportunity to develop their own expertise. For example if SMTC UK employs a 
local consultancy to develop a combustion chamber for a new engine, they will 
apply existing expertise and at the same time learn new ones. “Every project is
different, every project has its problems” (Interviewee A3 2012) and therefore 
offers new learning opportunities.
By working for SAIC, British engineers are able to learn more about new energy 
technologies from their Chinese colleagues. SAIC’s significant investment into new 
energy technologies in China has led to the development of strong capabilities in 
this area. In particular they have developed expertise in new energy power train 
for electric and hybrid vehicles. So far British engineers have been “supporting the 
Chinese with more conventional engineering skills” (Interviewee A1 2012). It is 
likely that future involvement in new energy projects will enable British engineers 
to upgrade their skills in this promising field.
4.7. Concluding remarks
SAIC’s decision to invest in the UK was driven by its need for strategic assets. 
Namely the company gained a strong brand, technology and know-how when it 
acquired the legacy of MG Rover. In doing so SAIC encountered a series of 
investment challenges relating to cultural, organisational and administrative 
issues. Its investment activities in the UK had implications for the local economy 
with regard to employment; financial investment; and access to a new market and 
expertise. The next chapter provides a detailed examination of the investment
behaviour of another Chinese multinational -  Chongqing Machinery and Electric 
(CQME).
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5. Chongqing Machinery and Electric Company (CQME)
5.1. CQME overview
Chongqing Machinery and Electric Company (CQME) is a Chinese state-owned 
enterprise established in 2007. It is under the direct administration and control of 
the Chongqing Municipal Government and its headquarters are in Chongqing, 
China. CQME is primarily engaged in manufacturing and sales of commercial 
vehicle parts and components, general machinery, machine tools and power 
equipment (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2012). Its operations are 
largely based in China. The company has been expanding continuously over the 
last five years which is illustrated by increasing profits. CQME’s profit grew steadily 
between 2007 and 2011 but was followed by a significant decline in 2012.
Table 7 - CQME’s annual profit from 2007 -  2012
Year
Profit 
RMB ‘000
2007
473,823
2008
523,881
2009
624,556
2010
698,760
2011
745,195
Source: (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2012, 2013a)
2012
455,673
CQME is the largest equipment manufacturer in Western China consisting of 47 
subsidiaries in total (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2013d). Out of the 
total number of subsidiaries, 16 are wholly owned while the remaining subsidiaries 
are jointly owned (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2013b). The company’s 
operations are organised into four core business areas: commercial vehicle parts 
and components; power equipment; general machinery; and CNC (Computer 
Numerical Control) machine tools (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2013d). 
CQME’s annual sales of machinery and equipment exceed £650 million 
(Marketing Week 2012).
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Figure 14 - CQME’s core business areas
Source: (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2013d)
The company s aim is to become a driver of economic development in its home 
city of Chongqing. CQME aspires to be a globally competitive equipment 
manufacturer by following four pillars of its corporate philosophy: “speed- up. 
open-up, innovation and dedication”
Figure 15 - CQME’s corporate philosophy
Source: (Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2013c)
R&D is high on CQME’s agenda having completed 122 new product development 
projects in 2011. The company successfully registered over 20 patents and eight 
of its R&D projects were awarded by the Chinese Mechanical Industry and the 
Municipality of Chongqing. According to the company’s 2011 annual report, the 
government supported technologically innovative projects valued over RMB 50 
million which equates to approximately 6.5% of CQME’s profit for that year 
(Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2012)
X
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CQME s leadership recognises that the company needs to improve its technology 
base in order to become globally competitive. The company has a national 
technological centre and 13 city technological centres. CQME also has its own 
R&D platforms such as national laboratories, academic and post-doctoral work 
groups, and a technological innovation centre in Europe. The company has 
received over 100 national, provincial and ministerial awards for scientific 
research. It has developed long-term collaborations with several leading Chinese 
universities such as Qinghua, Fudan, Xiamen, Chongqing and Sichuan 
(Chongqing Machinery and Electric Co. 2011).
Although the majority of CQME s development efforts are geared towards raising 
domestic innovation capability, they are not confined to China. The company is 
increasingly looking to overseas markets for investment opportunities. The 
Chairman of CQME, Mr Xie Huajun, believes that “mergers and acquisitions are 
an effective method of expansion’ and that “going out is a very bold but rational 
move” (China Daily 2011c). CQME is considering two to three projects for each of 
its 4 manufacturing areas: commercial vehicle parts and components, power 
equipment, general machinery and machine tools. The purpose of the acquisitions 
is to secure access to new technology, new markets and to strengthen the 
company’s brand image (China Daily 2011c) as part of its high growth strategy.
5.2. PTG overview
The establishment of Holroyd dates back to 1861 when John Holroyd set up a 
machine tool and textile machinery manufacturing business in Hulme, Manchester. 
He worked with Joseph Whitworth, a famous engineer known for his 
standardisation of ‘British Standard Whitworth’ screw threads. Joseph Whitworth’s 
nephew, Joshua, became a director of Holroyd and helped establish the company 
as a leading manufacturer of many types of machine tools and textile equipment 
(PTG 2012). From the beginning of its 150 year history, the company’s success 
was based upon its ability to innovate. Holroyd moved to Milnrow, Lancashire in 
1896. One year later it invented the thread milling process and designed, built and 
patented the first machine of its kind (Precision Technology Group 2013b). In 1906 
Holroyd started to make worm gears as well as screw thread milling and grinding 
machines. In 1920 Holroyd developed the first spuncast Super-Holfos and JH17
Bronze, with high strength and very low coefficient of friction (PTG 2012). The 
company set a new world record in worm gear efficiency in 1931 which remains 
unbeaten to this day. In 1956 the company invested in a large-scale rotor 
production facility and started sub-contract rotor manufacturing (PTG 2012).
More recently in 1995, Holroyd developed a new range of CNC (Computer 
Numerical Control) thread and gear grinding machines based on unique ‘Probe 
Feedback’ and tooth profile correction technology (Precision Technology Group 
2013b). Between 1996 and 2004 the company developed advanced grinding 
machines for high-precision gear, pump and metering screw production. It also 
made further developments in advanced grinding for high-precision compressor 
rotors and twin/tri-screw pump systems between 1997 and 2007 (PTG 2012). In 
2009 it manufactured and installed the world s largest rotor milling machine 
capable of milling rotors up to 824mm in diameter. Throughout its history Holroyd 
has been at the forefront of developing new methods in the design, manufacturing 
and measurement of complex helical components.
Figure 16 - Precision rotors manufactured by PTG
Source: (Precision Technology Group 2013a)
PTG’s headquarters are located in Rochdale, UK and it had 240 employees in 
2012. A very high proportion of the company’s products are exported - over 97% 
(PTG 2012). PTG’s core operations consist of four areas: Holroyd Machine Tools 
and Precision Components, Advanced Developments, Heavy Industries and PTG 
Deutschland. Holroyd, PTG’s machine tools and precision components division is 
made up of two areas: Holroyd Precision which produces advanced manufacturing 
tools and manufacturing technologies for screw rotors and pump parts; and 
Precision Components which is responsible for the production of screw and rotor
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parts, systems design, development and tooling supply (PTG 2012). During its 150
year history Holroyd has sold more than 2000 gear, screw and rotor milling and 
grinding machines around the world (PTG 2012).
Figure 17 - PTG's core operations
Source: Author’s interpretation
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Figure 18 - Holroyd's business areas
Holroyd
Holroyd 
Precision
Heavy 
Industries
Source: Author’s interpretation
Despite its track record of innovation and healthy order book, PTG was not spared
by the recession in 2008. At the time, it was one of the biggest manufacturers of
grinding machines, rotor milling machines and lathes in the UK. The company had
170 employees across two sites in Rochdale and Halifax and its annual sales
amounted to £20 million (Hibbert 2010). When the recession struck, there was a
decrease in orders but the company remained active because of orders taken prior 
to 2008.
According to Tony Bannan, PTG’s CEO, the company’s “biggest problem was 
cash" (Hibbert 2010). PTG’s main bank account with an Icelandic bank was 
suspended because of the financial crisis. Consequently the company was unable 
to accept orders as clients could not make payments to the company bank 
account. In effect this meant that PTG had to cease trading until financial stability 
was restored. Cash flow problems continued into 2009. Orders declined further 
and the company was compelled to take cost-cutting measures in the form of job 
cuts. Meanwhile discussions with COME about a potential takeover were ongoing.
5.3. CQME’s entry into the UK
The discussions ended in June 2010 with the announcement of CQME’s 
acquisition of PTG. The takeover was valued at approximately £20 million (China 
Business News 2010) and was CQME’s first international acquisition. CQME 
acquired the Precision Technologies Group which consisted of Holroyd Precision,
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Precision Components, PTG Heavy Industries (Binns & Berry, and Crawford Swift
brands), PTG Advanced Developments, Milnrow Investments and PTG 
Deutschland (Marketing Week 2012).
Holroyd Precision manufactures CMC machine tools and full manufacturing 
systems. It is also involved in areas such as design, consultancy, project 
management, manufacturing, rebuilding, sales, marketing and distribution. 
Precision Components manufactures technically complex parts such as helical 
screw rotor components, metering pumps, super-charger rotors
(automotive/marine), precision gears, gas/air compression screws and 
refrigeration components (Allcock 2010). PTG Heavy Industries is the umbrella 
company for the Binns & Berry and Crawford Swift brands. Its primary activities 
include design, consultancy, project management, manufacturing, rebuilding, 
sales, marketing and distribution. The Binns & Berry brand is focused on the 
design and manufacturing of large capacity CNC lathes and deep hole boring 
machines, while the Crawford Swift brand develops and manufactures high quality 
CNC machining systems for large cylindrical shafts and rolls.
PTG Advanced Developments delivers R&D and product innovation services for 
all business within the group. It undertakes both basic and applied research to 
ensure the continuous development of the company’s products and services. It is 
expected that the company will extend its R&D services to parts of the CQME 
Group (Allcock 2010). Milnrow Investments manage the property, land and 
buildings of Holroyd Precision and Precision Components while PTG Deutschland 
GmbH mainly supports the company’s sales and marketing activities in European 
markets.
5.4. Investment motives
Like SAIC, CQME invested in the UK mainly to acquire strategic assets. CQME 
required access to a different mix of assets to SAIC. It was particularly interested 
in gaining access to technology, know-how and management expertise which are 
explained in the following three sections.
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5.4.1. Technology and know-how
Despite considerable domestic efforts to raise its technological capacity, CQME’s
engineering capability does not match the west. By British standards their
“technology is dated and relatively low level.” It is “not very well designed or
constructed" (Interviewee B1 2012). CQME needs to upgrade its technology
significantly in order to achieve its goal of becoming a globally competitive 
equipment manufacturer.
The acquisition of PTG is seen by CQME as an opportunity to add value and 
complementary products by utilizing the advanced technologies of Holroyd 
Precision to enter new markets in the global precision gear manufacturing sector 
(Marketing Week 2012).The company is investing abroad to enhance its R&D 
capabilities and product development, particularly in the UK where “innovation is 
clearly a strength according to CQME’s Director and Vice President, Liao 
Shaohua (The British Business Awards 2013).
In an official statement by CQME it was highlighted that the acquisition of PTG 
was a strategic move intended to “improve the technical know-how of Chongqing, 
reinforce the capability of technical development of relevant enterprises of the 
company, expand its business scale and enhance its profile" (Allcock 2010). It is 
planned that PTG’s two production sites in Northern England will retain some 
machine tool manufacturing responsibilities while most high volume production will 
be located in Chongqing, China. CQME intends to turn PTG’s existing site in 
Rochdale into a high-tech research and development centre for several machine 
tool disciplines (Marsh 2012).
CQME is already making use of PTG’s technological expertise through the 
development of two new products. The Holroyd Zenith 400 helical profile grinder is 
the first grinder to use all three grinding wheel technologies -  aluminium oxide, 
plated CBN (cubic boron nitride) and vitrified (dressable) CBN. The machine has 
the ability to grind some of the largest rotors. Other significant applications include 
refrigeration and air-conditioning components, air-compressor components, 
vacuum screws for semiconductor manufacturing and other complex helical 
shapes (Albert 2011).
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Figure 19 - Holroyd Zenith 400 helical grinder
Source: (Albert 2011)
PTG also designed and developed the GTG2 helical gear grinder which produces 
ultra-high precision helical gears in diameters up to 350mm (PTG Holroyd 2011). 
The GTG2 has the capability to produce accurate master gears, precision 
prototyping and timing gears for aerospace applications as well as gearboxes, oil 
pumps, and other high performance helical gears for automotive applications. The 
machine also has applications in F1, industrial optics and custom designed 
industrial products (Modern Machine Shop 2009).
Figure 20 - GTG2 Helical Gear Grinder
Source: (Modern Machine Shop 2009)
Besides taking advantage of PTG’s internal R&D capacity, CQME also has access 
to technological capabilities found within other UK organisations. It relies on 
market knowledge and personal networks within PTG to find specialist consultants 
for particular projects. CQME’s UK base also provides access to local universities. 
For instance Advanced Developments, PTG’s research and development division, 
operates a compressor and profile design consultancy in partnership with City 
University London (PTG 2012).
In 2012 CQME launched a collaborative development project between PTG,
Chinese sister company - Chongqing Machine Tool Industry (CHMTI) and external
UK consultants. They are developing a gear grinding machine for the Chinese
market which produces commercial quality gears for passenger cars, vans and
trucks. The machine grinds gears that go into the gearbox. Once the customer has
bought the machine, it is installed in their own plant to make gears which are then
fitted into cars. PTG engineers are developing the software while the mechanical
part i.e. the machine building is being undertaken by Chinese engineers from 
CHMTI.
CQME is also interested in obtaining market-ready designs for products “which 
they can manufacture and sell in the Chinese market, without having to go through 
the lengthy process of R&D themselves” (Interviewee B1 2012). For instance 
CQME owns a multitude of large engineering companies which manufacture large 
machines. They have a series of projects lined up such as a hydroelectric 
generator of 200 megawatts for which they do not have the technology.
Initially, PTG management believed that the new technology would be developed 
in collaboration with UK universities in the form of R&D projects but this was not 
so. Instead CQME is interested in acquiring finished designs which are ready for 
manufacturing. At this stage it is not certain how this will be achieved but in future 
CQME might purchase designs from other companies and/or acquire entire 
companies with particular technological strengths.
Taking into consideration its technological status and global aspirations, CQME's 
acquisition of PTG was a logical move. It gains access to the technological 
capability and local knowledge found within PTG. CQME’s new UK base also 
provides an opportunity to access expertise found within other organisations. The 
gear project is a good illustration of this as it involves external consultants who 
were recruited locally for their expertise. The company’s UK presence also opens 
doors for collaborations with UK universities such as Huddersfield, John Moores 
and Cranfield with which PTG already has a good links
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5.4.2. Management expertise
Aside from technological know-how, CQME’s acquisition of PTG is driven by a 
need for management expertise. Mr Liao Shaohua, Director and Vice President of 
CQME, recognises the extensive experience of UK managers in areas such as 
international business and product strategy implementation, both of which 
represent valuable assets to CQME (The British Business Awards 2013). From a 
Chinese point of view, there are significant learning opportunities from PTG. One 
of the CHMTI employees, currently on secondment to PTG, observed that some 
western management practices are being exported to China. For example until 
recently CHMTI did not hold monthly board meetings until they visited PTG. 
Chinese managers from CHMTI learned that PTG’s executive board meets 
monthly to discuss strategic issues. Upon their return to China they too introduced 
regular monthly executive board meetings (Interviewee B2 2012).
5.4.3. Global expansion
Although China is currently the world’s biggest market for advanced machine tools 
and CQME has been very successful in this market in the last six years, it has 
plans to expand globally. The acquisition of PTG is a logical step in this direction 
because it provides CQME with the strategic assets it needs -  technological know-
how and international management expertise. CQME will then leverage these 
assets to enhance its competitiveness and penetrate new markets. CQME has 
ambitious plans for PTG worldwide. It intends to increase PTG’s annual sales from 
£15 million in 2012 to approximately £100 million in 2014 by doubling numbers of 
UK staff (Marsh 2012). Mr Cui Jian, director of the Chongqing Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission which controls Chongqing Machinery, believes 
that the acquisition is part of an effort to “learn from the western approach to 
business” as well as to expand globally. He highlighted that the company is 
“seeking more opportunities to invest in Europe” (Marsh 2012).
5.5. Investment challenges
Like SAIC, CQME faced a number of challenges when investing in the UK.
CQME’s pursuit of strategic assets is not easily achieved because it requires 
frequent and regular collaboration between British employees from PTG and their
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Chinese counterparts from COME. The challenges encountered can be 
categorised into two groups: cultural and organisational.
5.5.1. Cultural
The concept of face is one of the first aspects of Chinese culture which caused 
difficulties during a collaborative project between Chinese and British engineers. A 
team of UK engineers was tasked with visiting China to install new software on a 
newly developed Chinese machine (Interviewee B1 2012). Before setting off to 
China, the engineers tried to contact their Chinese colleagues to confirm whether
the machine was ready or not. Since they did not receive a response, the British 
engineers assumed a positive response and set off to China.
On arrival there was no confirmation that the machine was ready and after 
spending three days in China they learned that it was not ready after all. British 
engineers then spent six days in China before they could begin work on the 
machine. From a British point of view, the engineers thought this to be “a waste of 
time and resources and could not understand why the delay had not been 
communicated prior to their departure from the UK" (Interviewee B1 2012). The 
Chinese lack of communication served only to exacerbate the situation.
Although it appears confusing from a Western point of view, the behaviour of 
Chinese engineers makes more sense if it is examined from a Chinese 
perspective. The notion of saving face is a priority in Chinese culture which is 
exactly what the Chinese engineers did in this instance. Admitting directly that the 
machine was not ready would have caused them to lose face in front of their 
British colleagues. Instead they chose not to respond in order to preserve face.
This was a lesson in Chinese culture for PTG -  “if the answer to a question is 
unfavourable they will avoid answering it" (Interviewee B1 2012). If a question is 
asked via email and the Chinese do not reply this should be interpreted as a “no”. 
Instead of sending a negative reply they prefer not to send one at all. This lack of 
communication caused a misunderstanding as British engineers assumed that no 
reply meant that there was no problem. The expectation from a British point of 
view is that “the Chinese should be more truthful and open in their interactions,
especially with UK colleagues who might otherwise misunderstand a situation” 
(Interviewee B1 2012).
The language barrier is another cultural aspect which has been an impediment to 
collaboration between Chinese and British employees. For example when 
engineers and commercial personnel from China visit PTG the level of 
engagement with projects is quite low because the employees do not share a 
common language. Although employees from both sides are working to improve 
their language skills, achieving fluency in a foreign language is a lengthy process. 
In ordei to meet everyday business needs CQME has devised a system whereby
Chinese employees with advanced English language capabilities are temporarily 
sent to PTG to assist with communication.
At the time when interviews with PTG were conducted there were two employees 
from China who were temporarily based in the UK. One of the employees is an 
engineering manager from CHMTI who is a qualified mechanical engineer and a 
machine design specialist. He is temporarily based at PTG in the UK and goes 
back to China every few months. His role is that of a technical liaison between 
PTG and CHMTI which means that he facilitates communication between the two 
parties on technical matters (Interviewee B4 2012).
This role is seen to be vastly important because of language and cultural 
differences that need to be ironed out on a daily basis. The technical liaison role is 
supported by another employee from CHMTI in China who is also temporarily 
based in the UK. She usually works in the export/import department at CHMTI and 
also assists with communication with PTG because of her excellent English 
language skills (Interviewee B2 2012).
PTG has also taken measures to alleviate the language barrier between Chinese 
and British colleagues. They have recruited a bilingual individual on a permanent 
basis who deals with translation and interpretation from Chinese to English and 
vice versa (Interviewee B4 2012). This role is considered vital to the everyday 
running of the business.
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Most communication is direct and takes place via telephone, conference calls,
emails and in person visits. Employees from CQME and CHMTI visit PTG on a
regular basis to sign documents, discuss targets or make strategic decisions. The
visits are two-way so PTG managers often visit the parent and sister companies in
China. "Telephones don't work very well, particularly for technical matters. This is
because of the language barrier'' (Interviewee B1 2012). Instead email is the
preferred communication channel so that any misunderstandings can be clarified
with the assistance of the technical liaison and other bilingual staff if necessary.
Technical language such as formulas and figures” are also found to be an
effective way of alleviating the language barrier when sharing technical information 
between the two sides (Interviewee B4 2012).
The challenges posed by the language barrier are easing over time. Language 
skills are improving and the employees are getting to know each other. "They are 
forming strong personal bonds and there is good rapport” (Interviewee B1 2012). 
When individuals need help they know who to contact whereas in the past they 
were not sure. Together these factors should contribute towards reducing the 
language barrier which will enable more effective communication and knowledge 
sharing between Chinese and British employees.
Although both Chinese and British employees generally feel that there are no 
major inter-cultural differences which would prevent them from working together, 
there are significant differences in customs which illustrate just how distinctive the 
two cultures are. A good example of this is the symbolism of colours and how their 
use differs in the two cultural contexts. When British and Chinese employees were 
jointly arranging an opening ceremony, “the British wanted to use black and white 
colours which are only used in China for funerals and other ominous occasions” 
(Interviewee B2 2012). In contrast, the Chinese wished to use red because it 
symbolises good luck in Chinese culture.
5.5.2. Organisational
Although CQME has minimised the introduction of changes to PTG Chinese 
influences are becoming more noticeable. “Targets are now set centrally without 
hesitation or discussion of how these targets can be met" (Interviewee B1 2012).
For example the parent company, CQME, has instructed PTG to increase its sales
by 10% without considering PTG's current production capacity. Meanwhile PTG’s
management believes that they do not have the production capacity required to
achieve the sales targets set by CQME. Thus PTG’s management feels that the
parent company s demands are sometimes unrealistic” (Interviewee B1 2012).
PTG s management team is accustomed to participating in target setting and
having more influence on the process than they currently do under Chinese 
ownership.
British managers are adjusting to a management system in which they have less
control because key decisions are now centralised. Meetings with Chinese
colleagues from CQME are significantly different to those held in a western
management context. From a western perspective the only people attending a
meeting will be those who are expected to contribute whereas, in a Chinese
business environment, the meetings are also attended by “silent observers who do 
not participate” (Interviewee B1 2012).
The question of hierarchy in Chinese business culture also sometimes makes it 
difficult for British employees to navigate the system and work effectively with their 
Chinese colleagues. From a western point of view it is acceptable for an employee 
to talk directly to his or her CEO about a strategic idea they have. The pathway to 
getting a strategic idea across to the right person in a Chinese organisation would 
be very different. Traditional Chinese companies, especially state-owned 
enterprises are “very hierarchical, employees’ ideas and contributions are not 
always heeded” (Interviewee B1 2012).
Chinese employees respect their superiors and would never indicate that he or 
she is wrong. This would be inappropriate and unacceptable in a Chinese 
business context. It is therefore vital for British employees to gain an 
understanding of CQME’s hierarchical structure. Once they have developed their 
understanding of how the system works they will know what approach to take and 
whom to contact when they have ideas they wish to get across.
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The role of the Chinese state is inevitable in state-owned enterprises such as 
CQME. Government representation in these organisations is commonplace 
and is not something to which PTG employees are accustomed. There is a feeling 
amongst PTG employees that some of CQME’s "targets may be politically driven 
by powers higher than their immediate bosses in China” (Interviewee B1 2012), In 
the past, prior to CQME’s takeover, PTG’s decisions were driven by commercial 
objectives and did not have any political considerations. The role of the state in 
Chinese SOEs is something that Chinese employees accept and British 
employees ought to familiarise themselves with. It is therefore likely that some 
decisions taken by CQME executives may have underlying political motives.
5.6. Investment effects
Despite the change to Chinese ownership in 2010 "PTG still feels like a British 
company” (Interviewee B1 2012). It is an old-fashioned machine tool manufacturer 
with a long-standing tradition. It is not very Chinese except for some specific 
projects which are being carried out jointly. This perception is echoed by the 
company s CEO who views PTG as “a British company, providing British jobs and 
manufacturing high quality British tools” (Bannan 2012)
Figure 21 - Machine tool development at PTG
Source: (PTG Holroyd 2013), ©Gareth Walker2012
Its new Chinese owners, CQME, have a taken a soft approach towards the 
acquisition, allowing PTG to pursue its own business activities with little 
interference (Interviewee B1 2012). PTG is retaining its presence in established 
markets and things are being kept the way they were. PTG is well known in the 
market and its new owners would like it to be seen as the same company. It has a
good reputation and therefore not many changes are being introduced in order to 
preserve the company’s image.
Some of PTG’s customers from the US were “uneasy when they learned of the
Chinese takeover" (Interviewee B1 2012) In order to retain these customers the
managers of PTG made assurances that any confidential information obtained by
PTG would not be Passed on to the parent company in China. Based on this
guarantee PTG managed to preserve its US customer base. It is clear that PTG
remains relatively independent of its parent company which is of high importance 
to some of its customers.
Figure 22 - PTG’s UK manufacturing facility
Source: (PTG Holroyd 2013), © Gareth Walker 2012
Based on CQME’s post-acquisition behaviour it is evident that the company’s 
acquisition strategy is one of minimal interference. This stands to reason because 
the takeover was partly motivated by PTG’s good reputation and image of 
traditional British machine tool manufacturer. PTG’s success was built on this very 
image and represents a good foundation for the Chinese company to build on. 
CQME’s plans of global expansion stand a better chance with the support of 
PTG’s market image than they would under CQME’s own brand which is not well 
known outside China.
The effects of CQME’s investments are explained in the next three sections. 
Although they are similar to those displayed by SAIC there are some significant 
differences.
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5.6.1. Financial investment
Although not many changes have been made to PTG’s daily operations, the
effects of CQME’s ownership are profound in a number of different ways.
The first and most immediate effect was financial. PTG’s financial problems came
to an end with the takeover (Bannan 2012). CQME's financial leverage improved
PTG s operational performance and company finances” (Interviewee B3 2012).
Prior to the acquisition PTG had cash-flow problems and a large debt. CQME
provided financial assistance by expanding PTG’s credit limit based on the parent 
company’s links with Chinese banks.
The new owners are in a strong position to make substantial investments and the
decision to support PTG’s move to a new site reinforces their commitment. The
move is expected to improve PTG’s facilities, product capacity and market image
(Interviewee B1 2012). In addition Holroyd Precision announced that it was
successful in securing £2.7 million from the government’s Regional Growth Fund.
The funding will be used to support the development of a new manufacturing
facility and a new European R&D and Innovation Centre which will create 137 new
jobs (Precision Technology Group 2012). In the words of CQME’s Director and
Vice President, CQME is “investing in manufacturing capacity, staff, facilities and
R&D for the long term success of our UK business” (The British Business Awards 
2013).
5.6.2. Employment
The acquisition has also had an impact on employment within PTG. CQME’s 
decision to acquire PTG secured 220 British jobs (Bannan 2012). Chinese 
ownership has also brought PTG stability and a long-term outlook. Prior to the 
acquisition PTG was owned by “venture capitalists who were interested in short-
term gains” (Interviewee B3 2012) In contrast, the new Chinese owners belong to 
the same industry and have long-term plans for the company. The machine tool 
development cycle lasts two to three years which means that companies in this 
industry need to have long-term strategies (Interviewee B1 2012). The new 
Chinese owners have a longer term view compared to most British companies 
(Bannan 2012) which has a positive effect on PTG’s stability and long-term plans.
5.6.3. New markets, skills and knowledge
It is significant for the local economy that all existing manufacturing facilities, 
services and supply chains will continue to be maintained and developed by the 
new owners (Marketing Week 2012). CQME's strong drive towards expansion and 
sales is already having an impact on the growth of the PTG business. CQME's
commitment to the development of PTG is illustrated by the words of its Chairman, 
Mr Xie Huajun. CQME is planning to expand the business by “using PTG as an 
international arm of the business, not just in Europe, but worldwide, to tap into new 
markets (Allcock 2010). There is already some evidence of PTG’s growth.
Namely PTG Heavy Industries achieved machine sales valued over £10 million in 
2012, which represents an increase of 30% compared to the previous year.
According Chris Cheetam, the company’s sales manager, PTG Heavy Industries is 
entering new markets such as the US, China and Russia (Machinery Market 
2013). The company received a large order from the US for a deep-hole boring 
machine valued at US$2.3 million and a roll-turning lathe valued at US$900,000. It 
also designed and built a Powerstir friction-stir-welding machine for a customer in 
China’s aviation industry. The machine is believed to be the most powerful of its 
kind and has the capability to produce friction stir welds in aluminium alloys,
titanium and stainless steel. The company is also currently building two machines 
for the Russian space industry.
Holroyd also has a significant customer base in China which it plans to expand 
(Interviewee B3 2012). Holroyd’s link with CQME will certainly open up new 
opportunities in China. Given CQME’s strong position in the domestic market, it 
will be well placed to identify new customers for Holroyd and support its 
development in the Chinese market which has been growing consistently over the 
last five years (PTG 2012).
The development of products for the Chinese market is contributing towards the 
development of new technical skills within PTG. For example in order to build a 
new gear grinding machine, PTG engineers had to learn a “new grinding technique 
they had not used before” (Interviewee B1 2012). In addition they developed 
expertise in Siemens software which they were previously unfamiliar with. As PTG
expands into China and other new markets there are likely to be further 
opportunities for the development of new products and technical skills.
Aside from technical skills CQME's ownership is also contributing towards 
increased knowledge of the Chinese market and Chinese culture amongst British 
employees (Interviewee B1 2012). They are becoming acquainted with Chinese 
management practices and the significance of hierarchy in Chinese organisations. 
British employees are learning what kind of behaviour is expected from them, and 
also how to navigate the organisational system in a Chinese business context. 
Some British employees are also making an effort to learn the Chinese language. 
An enriched understanding of the Chinese market and culture is particularly 
relevant for British employees because of CQME’s plans to expand into China and 
the prospect of collaborative product development with Chinese colleagues.
CQME’s presence in the UK is not only having significant effects on PTG but it is 
also influencing other businesses in the UK. An illustration of this is the 
involvement of specialist external consultants who were recruited especially for the 
development of a gear grinder for the Chinese market. Work on this project 
provided the consultants with an opportunity to learn a new grinding technique 
they had not used before As a result of their interaction with Chinese engineers 
from CQME, the British consultants are becoming more competent and 
comfortable in working for Chinese clients. They are learning about Chinese
business practices and gaining a better understanding of Chinese culture in 
general.
The consultants are also developing their personal networks in China through their 
work for CQME. This may be particularly valuable in terms of opening up new 
consulting opportunities in China, The experience of working for a Chinese 
company and gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese culture 
may well increase the consultants’ chances of success in the fast-growing Chinese 
market. As PTG’s plans of expansion go ahead, there are likely to be further 
opportunities for collaboration with other UK organisations which will also be 
impacted.
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5.7. Concluding remarks
CQME s decision to invest in the UK was driven by its need for strategic assets. 
The company’s aim was to improve its technological know-how by acquiring PTG, 
a British manufacturing company with strong R&D capabilities. CQME intends to 
make use of existing technology but also to develop new technology using PTG’s
know-how. In addition the Chinese investor is interested in accessing PTG’s 
expertise in international business and product strategy.
The challenges encountered by CQME in its acquisition of PTG relate to cultural 
factors such as the importance of saving face to Chinese people and the language 
barrier. Further challenges are driven by different managerial styles and
perceptions of hierarchy. Moreover the role of the Chinese state can be an issue
for British employees who are not used to direct state intervention in the business 
environment.
Although CQME took a light touch approach to the acquisition, the investment 
brought significant improvements to PTG. Its financial position was strengthened 
through a combination of debt reduction and investment in facilities, production 
capacity and R&D. I he acquisition ensured job preservation and opened up new 
market opportunities for PTG in China and elsewhere. These opportunities led to 
the acquisition of new knowledge about the Chinese market and culture which will 
prove useful given PTG’s business links with China. Overall it appears that PTG 
has benefited from becoming part of a large Chinese manufacturing group. The 
next chapter investigates the case of Zhuzhou CSR Times and its acquisition of 
Dynex in the UK.
6. Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company Limited (CSR 
Times)
6.1. CSR Times overview
Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company is a subsidiary of CSR (China South
Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation Limited), a Chinese state-owned
enterprise. The parent company CSR was founded in 2007 and its headquarters
are located in Beijing. CSR went public in Shanghai and Hong Kong in August
2008. The company has approximately 90,000 employees and consists of 17
subsidiaries acioss 10 provinces and cities. CSR’s core business areas include
development, manufacturing and servicing of railway locomotives, passenger
trains, freight wagons, bullet trains, metro vehicles and associated parts (CSR 
Corporation Limited 2011).
The company also develops and markets a range of other products such as 
electric vehicles, wind generation equipment, automotive parts, diesel engines, 
semiconductor devices and construction machinery. As an innovative company, 
CSR has four R&D centres, six national technical centres, seven test centres and 
six doctoral workstations in China. It also has two overseas R&D centres in the US 
and the UK (CSR Corporation Limited 2011).
Its subsidiary Zhuzhou CSR Times develops, designs, manufactures and markets 
mass transit electric drive converters and control systems. The company was 
founded in 2005 and its headquarters are located in Zhuzhou, Hunan province. 
CSR Times was listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange in 2006. The company 
has enormous production capacity consisting of the following six production bases: 
railway transportation equipment, electric connectors, power electronics, railroad 
vehicles, overseas production and Ningbo production base (CSR Corporation 
Limited 2011).
Figure 23 - CSR Times power electronics production base
Source: (Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company 2012b)
The organisational structure of CSR Times is made up of 12 business units most
of which are wholly owned. The rest are jointly owned with ownership share
varying between 50% and 75%. The company’s business units are illustrated by 
the organisational chart below:
Figure 23 - Zhuzhou CSR Times organisational chart
Source: (Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company 2013)
CSR T,mes has been expanding rapidly over the last five years which is illustrated 
by a considerable profit increase between 2007 and 2011
Table 8 - CSR Times net profit from 2007 -  2011
Net profit 
‘000 RMB
341,982
2008
423,337
2009 
529^594
2010 
852^062
Source: (Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company 2012a)
2011
1,187,036
The company’s net profit grew by 28% between 2010 and 2011 mainly because of 
an increase in revenue. Most of CSR Times' revenue is generated through sales 
of electric multiple units, locomotives and power semiconductor components 
(Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Company 2012a).
6.2. Dynex Semiconductor overview
The original business was founded 1956 in Lincoln and has previously traded 
under the names AEI Semiconductors Ltd (AEI), Marconi Electronic Devices Ltd 
(MEDL) and GEC-Plessey Semiconductors Ltd (GPS) (Dynex Semiconductor 
2013b). Dynex Semiconductor Ltd was established in January 2000 and is located 
in Lincoln (Dynex Semiconductor 2013d). The company’s Lincoln site houses fully 
integrated silicon fabrication, assembly and test, sales, design and development 
operations (Dynex Semiconductor 2013c). Dynex has 322 employees at present 
(Dynex Semiconductor 2013d).
Dynex Semiconductor designs and manufactures power semiconductor devices 
and silicon on sapphire integrated circuit products. Its products include high power 
bipolar discrete semiconductors; high power insulated-gate bipolar transistor 
(IGBT) modules; high power electronic assemblies and components; and high 
reliability silicon on sapphire integrated circuits (Dynex Semiconductor 2013b).
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Figure 24 - Dynex’s products
I W * ’
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Source: (Dynex Semiconductor 2013c)
Dynex s business can be categorised into three main product groups: power
semiconductors, power electronic assemblies and integrated circuits. Dynex’s
power semiconductor operations represented 85% of the company’s revenue in
2012. As a core business area, the power semiconductor division consists of two
major product groups -  bipolar devices and power modules. It manufactures a
range of high power modules and bipolar discrete products including: IGBT
modules, bipolar thyristors and diodes in Lincoln (Dynex Semiconductor 2012a 
2013a).
The company s power electronic assemblies product group also constitutes a 
significant source of revenue According to Dynex’s annual report, this product 
group generated 10% of the company s revenue for 2012 (Dynex Semiconductor 
2013a). Demand for this product is driven by large infrastructure projects in the 
power transmission and distribution sector. Lastly, the integrated circuit product 
group is a minor source of revenue for Dynex. It accounted for 1% of the 
company’s total revenue in 2012 (Dynex Semiconductor 2013a). However, Dynex 
has ceased manufacturing of new silicon on sapphire products. It is currently 
considering outsourcing production in order to meet demand from customers 
around the world.
Dynex’s products are used in power electronic applications including electric 
power transmission and distribution, renewable and distributed energy, marine and 
rail traction motor drives, aerospace, electric vehicles, industrial automation, 
controls and power supplies (Dynex Semiconductor 2013c). Meanwhile integrated 
circuit products are used in the aerospace industry (Dynex Semiconductor 2013d).
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6.3. CSR Times’ entry into the UK
In the past CSR Times had used IGBT conductors made by leading European and 
Japanese manufacturers. But it had aspirations to compete with leading 
international companies such as Siemens from Germany and Alstom from France. 
Therefore CSR Times decided to develop its own technology for IGBT 
semiconductors which would reduce the company’s reliance on foreign imports In 
2007 the company was looking for a partner to develop IGBT technology and 
found Dynex to be a good fit (Liu 2013). At the time many Chinese companies 
believed that the UK had some interesting privately owned engineering businesses 
that were undervalued (March 2011). In October 2008 the Chinese company, 
Zhuzhou CSR Times, acquired a majority 75% stake in Dynex Power Inc.
6.4. Investment motives
Similar to SAIC and CQME, CSR Times invested in the UK to acquire strategic 
assets. However it required a different mix of assets to the previous two firms.
CSR Times was especially interested in technology and know-how and business 
expertise which is described in the following two sections.
6.4.1. Technology and know-how
Once the acquisition was finalised the Executive Director and President of CSR 
Times Electric, Mr Lu Penghu announced the company’s intentions "... we expect 
Dynex to develop high power products with advanced high power technology,
R&D capability, and proven reliability and quality...” (Dynex Semiconductor 2008). 
As suggested by the words of Mr Lu, one of the key motivations behind CSR 
Times’ acquisition of Dynex was access to technology. CSR Times invested in 
Dynex with the intention of using some of its technology in the manufacture of high 
speed motors for high-speed trains in China (March 2011).
CSR Times intends to develop Dynex into a world-class R&D centre dedicated to 
power semiconductors. “The aim is for the UK R&D centre to be focused on high 
end R&D activities while the company’s activities in China are specialised in 
production” (Interviewee C1 2012). At present the centre carries out joint R&D 
activities for the UK subsidiary and for the parent company. The activities relate to
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the next generation of IGBT chips and modules, electric vehicles, new energy 
vehicles, wind and solar energy, high speed trains, silicon carbide materials (a 
new kind of semiconductor material), and bipolar transistor systems etc” 
(Interviewee C1 2012, Interviewee D1 2011). The centre is developing new power 
semiconductor technologies such as new IGBT modules which have applications 
in the above listed fields such as new energy vehicles for example.
In the power semiconductor sector Europe has more advanced technology
compared to China. The UK has strengths in high end R&D and this is well
supported by the government. The acquisition enabled CSR Times to build a new
base and to share Dynex’s advanced technology. 'The R&D centre in the UK is a
window from CSR Times because it often sends people here for training”
(Interviewee C1 2012). Access to advanced technology is intended to improve the 
quality of CSR Times’ products in China.
CSR Times’ ownership of Dynex means that advanced technology can be 
transferred from the UK to China. Experts from Dynex helped to establish a 
manufacturing line for IGBT semiconductors in Zhuzhou by installing production 
equipment and designing the assembly process (Liu 2013). Regular visits are 
made to Zhuzhou to ensure that the production line is similar to the one in Lincoln
While developing the technology needed for the construction of the 8-inch IGBT 
production line China, the UK R&D centre achieved some significant 
breakthroughs in terms of technology and process research for 1200V and 1700V 
IGBTs and fast recovery diodes. One of the key objectives of the project was 
transfer of advanced manufacturing technology know-how from the UK R&D 
centre to CSR Times Electric consisting largely of engineering training (Dynex 
Semiconductor 2013a). The existing manufacturing facility in Lincoln specialises in 
high voltage semiconductors while the new plant in Zhuzhou will focus on low 
voltage semiconductors and will have a significantly higher production capacity.
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Figure 25 - New six-inch silicon fabrication facility in Zhuzhou
Source: (Dynex Semiconductor 2013c)
The acquisition of Dynex gives CSR Times access to the company’s internal R&D 
capabilities but also to those found in UK universities. Dynex’s R&D teams are 
working closely with local universities such as Nottingham, Loughborough, 
Warwick and others on advanced R&D and knowledge transfer projects. Dynex is 
currently building relationships with the new Engineering School at the University
of Lincoln having already enjoyed strong educational links with Lincoln College 
over the years (Dynex Semiconductor 2012c).
The University of Nottingham has expertise in power electronics systems and has 
had a 10 year working relationship with Dynex. When Dynex needed some extra 
technical expertise a Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP) was established 
between the two organisations. A university student was selected by the University 
to work on a project with Dynex. The student made a valuable contribution to 
Dynex’s technology by introducing new thinking into the organisation. 
Consequently Dynex now has a complete motor drive system that uses the 
company’s electronics along with controls and software developed by the student 
(University of Nottingham 2012).
Dynex participated in a three year research collaboration with Durham University, 
the University of Warwick and nuclear energy conglomerate Areva. The project 
looked into the degradation of power electronic convertors with the aim of finding a 
way to predict failures. Dynex joined the project because it was addressing the 
problem in a novel way. The company was also involved in several EU and DTI 
supported R&D collaborative programmes relating to aircraft power electronic
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systems, electric grid interconnectivity and power module reliability (The Engineer
2007).
The acquisition of Dynex has also given CSR Times access to R&D capabilities
found in local industrial organisations. Dynex is working with local firms to develop
high power semiconductor devices, some of which are supported by the UK
government. For example Dynex was awarded a development grant of £530,000
in 2006 to support two collaborative projects over a three year period (Wilson
2007). The aim of one of the projects named Newton was to develop ultra-high
power thyristor switches. This project was a collaboration between Dynex,
Loughborough University and two high technology companies -  Areva T&D, and
Semefab. The aim of the second project named Hidrive was to build high power
transistor modules. This project was a collaboration between Dynex, De Montfort
University and two high technology companies, Converteam and Dudley 
Associates (Wilson 2007).
The acquisition enabled CSR Times to access technology and know-how found in 
Dynex as well as in UK universities and high technology companies. However it 
also made it possible for CSR Times to acquire significant business expertise.
6.4.2. Business expertise
In September 2012 a group of colleagues from China were visiting Dynex in 
Lincoln. The visiting staff came from three different sister companies in China. The 
delegation consisted of 11 people and was divided into several groups including: 
international R&D, sales and marketing and human resources. The purpose of 
their visit was to attend training courses run by the Business School at Nottingham 
University. The staff from China attended lectures and presentations at the 
University in their relevant disciplines.
The group of engineers from China attended a course on how R&D is conducted 
internationally. Fortunately, three of the engineers were available for interview. 
They provided more insight into their roles in China and the training course they 
were attending at Nottingham University. One of the engineers works at CSR
Nanjing Puzhen and is an electrical systems engineer. In the past he designed
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electrical systems for trains and electric cars but has since been promoted to 
assistant director of the assembly workshop. The duration of his training in the UK 
was three months (Interviewee C2 2012). The second engineer came from
Zhuzhou Electrical Module Company which manufactures electrical modules and
metro cars (Interviewee C3 2012), while his colleague is a design engineer whose
company is specialised in the design and manufacture of wagons (Interviewee C4 
2012).
Based on the descriptions of their roles it is clear that the engineers from China 
are well qualified and experienced in their respective technical fields. However 
their knowledge of conducting R&D activities internationally is limited owing to lack 
of experience Thus CSR Times' UK base is a convenient springboard for 
accessing such expertise through courses run by local universities like 
Nottingham. The visiting engineers were enthusiastic about sharing knowledge 
with UK universities. They were keen to discuss their roles and welcomed all 
questions about the companies they work for. The engineers were equally 
interested in gaining new knowledge on R&D internationalisation at Nottingham 
University. They also expressed an interest in the ongoing research at the 
University of Northampton regarding the internationalisation of Chinese firms.
6.5. Investment challenges
CSR Times encountered two types of investment challenges in the UK which can 
be categorised as cultural and administrative.
6.5.1. Cultural
The Chinese management finds that there are cultural differences between 
Chinese and British employees. Their perception is that there are differences in 
the pace of work. “In China we like to do things quickly but here things are done 
slowly” (Interviewee C1 2012). The R&D centre has high expectations but things 
sometimes do not happen as fast as the Chinese owners would want them to.
CSR Times’ “biggest challenge is that we are not moving fast enough”
(Interviewee C1 2012). Their impression is that when British engineers are given a 
task they make detailed plans and think things through several times over. They 
take a long time before taking any action but the Chinese do things very
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differently. They don't plan and then act. "Instead they act immediately and plan 
alongside what they are already doing” (Interviewee C1 2012).
6.5.2. Organisational
The second challenge encountered by CSR Times relates to government
immigration policies which restrict the entry of Chinese citizens into the UK. CSR
Times has problems in obtaining visas for temporary and permanent employees. It
is especially difficult for them to be granted long term visas as their applications 
are often rejected.
The problem of visas has been highlighted by many of the Chinese firms
participating in this study. It makes it difficult for Chinese employees that need to 
travel from China to UK frequently.
6.6. Investment effects
When CSR Times took over Dynex it retained the management board with the 
addition of two Chinese managers -  one to lead sales and marketing, and the 
other to lead research and development. CSR Times did not replace Dynex’s 
British CEO with a Chinese one after the acquisition. In fact they kept the existing 
British CEO who was trusted to continue managing the organisation as he saw fit. 
Dynex was granted a high degree of autonomy by its Chinese parent company 
(Liu 2013). Most of the employees are from Dynex and the local labour market 
while “only about 20% are from the parent company” (Interviewee C1 2012).
The management style is more western than Chinese because most of the 
managers are British. From the new owner’s point of view it is vital that stability is 
maintained within the management team and amongst the rest of Dynex’s 
workforce. In the words of the UK R&D centre’s director “we want the technology 
to change not anything else” (Interviewee C1 2012). Although few changes were 
made to the management structure and Dynex continues to enjoy a high degree of 
independence from its parent company, the investment effects were considerable.
The effects of Zhuzhou’s investments are not the same as those displayed by
SAIC and CQME and are therefore addressed under four different sub-headings.
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6.6.1. Financial investment
One of the benefits of the acquisition from a Dynex point of view is access to 
financial resources as pointed out by its President and CEO, Dr Paul Taylor,
There is not only excellent product and technology synergy with Dynex but they 
also bring strategic focus and access to greater financial resources” (Dynex
Semiconductor 2008). CSR Times' financial strength is illustrated by its acquisition 
of land and buildings used by Dynex Semiconductor in Lincoln. (Dynex
Semiconductor 2012a).This investment will allow Dynex greater flexibility for future 
development of operational facilities and reduction of fixed costs in the long term.
CSR Times’ financial influence is also evident through its extensive investments in 
Dynex's production and R&D facilities.
At the time of the acquisition Dynex was seeking a new investment partner. Its 
facilities needed to be upgraded but this was not something Dynex could achieve 
on its own. CSR Times proved to be a good choice because of its financial stability 
and willingness to invest ' After the acquisition we have invested about £30 million. 
We first bought 75% of Dynex shares, we then invested £12.5 million to upgrade 
the production line” (Interviewee C1 2012). Following that the Chinese company 
purchased the land on which Dynex’s business premises are located and invested 
in new buildings onsite. A new energy efficient building was completed in 2012 at 
Doddington Road, Lincoln which houses the R&D engineering teams, senior 
executive offices, finance department and conference rooms (Dynex
Semiconductor 2013a). The new offices were formally opened in July by the 
President of the CSR Corporation.
As a result of CSR Times’ financial position all 200 employees from Dynex were 
retained and another 100 new ones have been recruited. Dynex now owns the 
land its premises are built on and it has a new building. Moreover the production 
line has been upgraded and several new R&D projects have been set up. All this 
would not have been possible prior to CSR Times’ investment because of limited 
financial resources. Dynex “can now do more than they could in the past” 
(Interviewee C1 2012).
6.6.2. Production capability
CSR Times has made significant investments in Dynex’s production capability.
One of its key investments in production has been the expansion and upgrading of 
Dynex's silicon fabrication facility. The value of the project was £12.5 million and it 
was completed in June 2012 after 21 months. Dynex's old production line used to 
process four-inch diameter silicon and has since been upgraded to process six- 
inch diameter silicon. The facility’s production capacity has increased
approximately tenfold as a result of the investment. The vast majority of production
output will be sold to Dynex’s parent company Zhuzhou CSR Times (Dynex 
Semiconductor 2013c).
Two new six-inch wafer fabrication lines have been installed to meet future 
demand from China’s growing railway sector. Dynex has improved productivity of 
the newly installed IGBT lines to generate more than 2.5 times revenue in 2011 
compared to 2010 (Dynex Semiconductor 2012a). The company also designed 
and built an advanced test facility in collaboration with a key customer.
Figure 26 - New silicon manufacturing facility in Lincoln
Source: (Dynex Semiconductor 2013c)
Interestingly, CSR Times has also announced the development of an eight-inch 
high power IGBT fabrication facility in China. The new facility will be one of the 
largest of its kind with an annual capacity of 240,000 wafers. Most of its production 
output will be sold in China but it will be designed in such as way that its capacity 
can easily be transferred to the UK to support high volume demand if needed 
(Dynex Semiconductor 2013c). This shows that CSR Times is keen to maintain a 
manufacturing base in the UK and will be able to respond quickly if local demand 
increases.
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Prior to the acquisition Dynex had been a leader from a technological point of view 
but its scale of production was small compared to that of leading companies. Since 
CSR Times’ '"vestment in production capacity, Dynex can now compete with the 
world’s top semiconductor manufacturers such as Infineon from Germany, ABB 
from Switzerland and Mitsubishi from Japan. The number of employees at Dynex 
has grown from 250 in 2008 to approximately 300 in 2013. Today Dynex is the 
UK s largest manufacturer of high voltage semiconductors (Liu 2013).
6.6.3. R&D capability
CSR Times' considerable investment in R&D facilities enabled Dynex to increase 
its R&D capacity. CSR Times funded the development of a new R&D facility 
named “CSR Times Electric Power Semiconductor R&D Centre” which is focused 
on developing new products and technologies to meet growing demand for power 
semiconductor products in China and the rest of the world. The new £1.8 million 
R&D centre was launched in August 2012 creating approximately 40 highly skilled 
engineering jobs in Lincoln The company is still recruiting and aims to have 50 
engineers working in the new R&D centre (Dynex Semiconductor 2012c).
Figure 27 - New R&D centre launch in August 2012
(Dynex Semiconductor 2012c)
The centre also enhanced Dynex’s capability to develop new products and 
technologies. Its current focus is the development of technology and 
semiconductor based products for high power electronic equipment in sectors 
such as railway transportation, electric grids, renewable energy, automotives, 
industrial equipment and aerospace. During 2011 R&D activities were directed
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towards building platform technologies for the next generation of IGBTs and 
thyristor components.
For example IGBTs were further improved and significant progress has been
made in the development of a more advanced high voltage IGBT and fast recovery
diode chip. These products are expected to form the basis of new products in the
near future. In the longer term, Dynex's R&D activities will be focused on creating
IGBTs and diode processes and designs compatible with eight-inch silicon. These
will have increased capacity and will therefore be suitable for higher volume
markets such as electric vehicles, wind turbines and solar power systems (Dynex 
Semiconductor 2012a).
In 2012 the UK R&D centre developed a number of new IGBT modules which
have been installed successfully into railway systems (Dynex Semiconductor
2013a). Some of the latest IGBT modules have been redesigned for improved
technical performance and reliability. In other non railway transportation sectors
such as renewable energy and electric grid application, the R&D team has also
improved the technical capability of existing chips, created prototypes for certain
modules and made notable advances in fundamental research (Dynex 
Semiconductor 2013a).
6.6.4. New market
One of the key advantages of being owned by CSR Times is the opportunity to 
access the Chinese market which has high demand for railway equipment. In 
China railway construction is growing rapidly. The population is huge and railway 
transportation is a very popular means of transportation for both business and 
leisure. Railway transport is inexpensive in China which is why most people travel 
by train and most goods are also transported in this way. Therefore there is “great 
demand for railway equipment such as locomotives and wagons” (Interviewee C3 
2012).
Dynex has gained access to the Chinese fast-growing market through its
relationship with CSR Times. The chances of Dynex succeeding in this market
alone would be very low. Its main product, the IGBT module is a key component of
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invertors and convertors used in high speed trains. These devices are 
manufactured by sister companies in China and are built into electrical 
locomotives and metro cars which are also made by CSR Times. Through its 
supply of IGBT chips Dynex has become an integral part of CSR Times’ 
production chain (Interviewee C3 2012). Prior to the acquisition CSR Times used 
invertors made by Siemens but now they have the technology to manufacture 
them in-house. First of all the IGBT chips are designed, developed and 
manufactured in the UK. They are then shipped to China for IGBT testing and 
assembly after which they are built into IGBT modules. The modules are used in 
the production of convertors and invertors which are fitted into high speed trains.
Figure 28 - Dynex's role in CSR Times' production chain
IGBT chips
IGBT chips are designed, 
developed and manufactured by 
Dynex in the UK
IGBT modules
IGBT chips are tested, assembled 
and fitted into modules in China
Invertors/convertors
IGBT modules are built into invertors 
and convertors in China, which are 
used in high speed trains
Source: Author’s interpretation
Dynex moved into a new market which would not have been possible without the 
support of its parent company CSR Times (March 2011). Dynex now has a route 
to China’s vast market for high power semiconductors. Moreover since the 
acquisition CSR Times has become Dynex’s most significant customer, 
accounting for one third of the company’s total sales (Liu 2013). CSR Times also 
distributes Dynex’s products to Chinese companies in high-tech industries such as 
transport, smart-grid aerospace, electric vehicles and renewable energy (Liu 
2013).
Admittedly the high speed train accident that occurred in July 2011 caused a 
slowdown in high speed rail projects in China. However the government’s 
commitment to expansion remains strong and the amount of planned investment 
has not been reduced. In the medium-term demand for IGBT modules
manufactured by Dynex remains strong and is expected to increase as a result of 
the development of electricity, transmission and distribution networks in China.
Mr Li Donglin, the Chairman of Dynex and Executive Director and General
Manager of CSR Times admitted that investments in the Chinese railway system
have slowed down temporarily but believes that there is “still a robust, long-term
demand for the expansion of the Chinese national railway and urban metro
systems” (Dynex Semiconductor 2012b). He is confident that further demand will
be generated by China’s development of renewable energy from wind power and
photovoltaic power generation. Greater demand is also likely to be fuelled by the 
construction of smart electric grids in China.
6.7. Concluding remarks
Similar to CQME, Zhuzhou CSR Times’ decision to invest in the UK was driven by 
its need for strategic assets. Namely the company gained technology, know-how 
and business expertise when it acquired Dynex. In doing so CSR Times 
encountered investment challenges relating to cultural and administrative issues. 
Its investment activities in the UK influenced Dynex in terms of financial 
investment, production capability, R&D capability and access to the Chinese 
market. The next chapter investigates the investment activities of another six 
Chinese multinationals including: Changan, Weigao, Mindray, TP Link, Hytera and 
Vanceinfo.
7. Other case studies
The in-depth analysis of SAIC, CQME and CSR in the previous three chapters 
was possible because of the large volume of high quality data available on these 
companies. The data was gathered from interviews, existing research papers, 
company documents and websites as well as various media portals. The 
combination of data sources was different for each of these firms but was 
substantial enough to warrant an in-depth case study.
Extensive interviews were undertaken with numerous respondents from SAIC and
CQME which is where much of the data came from. Meanwhile the interview with
CSR was not as long but generated rich data because it was a group interview. It
included a manager from the UK as well as three engineers from the company’s
headquarters in China. The interview data from SAIC was supplemented by data
from previous academic studies. The case of MG Rover has attracted much
academic research in the context of the changes taking place in the British 
automotive industry.
Company documents and a presentation provided by PTG were valuable sources 
of information on CQME’s investment. Moreover the media attention dedicated to 
SAIC and CSR because of their size and reputation in China meant that there was 
ample publicly available information on these companies including their acquisition 
activities in the UK. Company websites also proved to be a useful source of 
information. This is especially true of the Dynex website which contains a great
deal of detailed information on the company and its relationship with its owner 
CSR.
On the other hand, the six companies examined in this section were analysed in 
less detail because of limited data availability. In some cases interviews were 
conducted with one interviewee and took approximately one hour e.g. TP Link and 
Mindray. In other cases the interviews yielded data that was not as rich as was 
expected e.g. Changan and therefore could not be used for in-depth analysis. 
Companies like Hytera, Weigao and Vanceinfo are not well-known in the UK or in 
China and therefore there was little publicly available information on them. Some 
of the websites were also less informative those of the in-depth case study firms.
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This chapter looks into a further six Chinese firms that have undertaken 
investment activities in the UK. They are: Changan, Weigao, Mindray, TP Link, 
Hytera and Vanceinfo. Each case begins with an overview of the company and 
then moves on to explore their modes of entry, investment motivations, the 
challenges they encountered and the effects of their investments.
7.1. Changan
7.1.1. Changan overview
Since 2009 China has been the world's largest producer and consumer of cars
and light trucks. According to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers,
19.27 million vehicles were made in China last year (Young 2013). Moreover the
rapid growth of the Chinese car market is reflected by a 7% increase in car sales 
in 2012 (Young 2013).
Changan is one of the top ten vehicle manufacturers in China. It produces
passenger cars and commercial vehicles such as vans and trucks. The company
was founded in 1862 (Changan 2012a) and its headquarters are located in
Chongqing, China. Changan is China's largest national car brand measured by
output (Chang 2012) and the fourth largest automotive company measured by 
total unit sales.
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Table 9 - Chinese automotive companies according to total unit sales
Company Total unit sales
SAIC Motor 357,800
Dongfeng Motor Corporation 198,900
FAW 
Changan
BAIC Group
GAC Group 
Brilliance Auto 
Great Wall 
JAC 
BYD
Source: (Young 2013)
162.500
147.500
123^900
48.300
46.300 
407900 
387300
35.300
Changan has approximately 50,000 employees and offices in six cities in China -  
Chongqing, Beijing, Jiangsu, Hebei, Zhejiang and Jiangxi. It has a total of 15 
vehicle and engine factories with the capacity to produce two million vehicles and 
two million engines per year (Changan 2012a). Much of Changan’s success in the 
domestic market can be attributed to the sale of vehicles under foreign company 
brand names such as Ford, Mazda and Suzuki.
Changan’s earliest joint venture arrangement was set up with Suzuki in 1993 in 
which it holds 51% equity. Changan Suzuki currently produces 20 different types 
of cars across four ranges which include TianYu, Swift, LingYang and Alto 
(Changan 2012d). These products are amongst the most profitable for the 
company, generating a net profit of 187.5 million Yuan which equates to 
approximately £20 million (Chongqing Changan Automobile Company Limited 
2012)
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Figure 29 - Suzuki Changan logo and car
Source: (Changan 2012d)
Changan also has a joint venture arrangement with Ford and Mazda which is 
known as the Changan Ford Mazda Automobile Co. The company was 
established in 2001 and is 50% owned by Changan. It has two manufacturing 
bases, one in Chongqing which manufactures Ford and Volvo, and the other in 
Nanjing which mainly manufactures new Ford Fiesta and Mazda B vehicles 
(Changan 2012b). This is by far Changan’s most profitable product generating 2.6 
billion Yuan in 2011 which is approximately £280 million (Chongqing Changan 
Automobile Company Limited 2012).
Changan also has an engine manufacturing joint venture with Ford and Mazda 
known as the Changan Ford Mazda Engine Co. It was set up in 2005 to 
manufacture engines under the Ford and Mazda brand names. The company 
manufactures five types of engines (BZ 1,3L\ BZ 1,5L\ 1,6L and NI4 2.0L\ 2.3L) 
across two different engine series (Changan 2012c).
Figure 30 - Mazda and Ford cars; Mazda Changan logo
Source: (Changan 2012b, 2012c)
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Changan s latest domestic joint venture was set up in 2011 with PSA Peugeot 
Citroen. The company is 50% owned by Changan and is known as CAPSA. It is 
planned to manufacture cars under PSA's brands as well as under Changan's own 
brand. CAPSA began by importing and selling the Citroen DS3, DS4 and DS5 in 
2012 before starting local production this year (China Daily 2011b). CAPSA 
Shenzhen has two vehicle plants and is in the process of constructing an engine 
plant in the same location (China Daily 2011b). Unlike most international
automotive JVs in China, CAPSA is also constructing an R&D centre to develop 
new environmentally friendly cars (China Daily 2011a).
Changan’s international JVs have been profitable and as such have made a
significant contribution towards the company’s success in China. However,
Changan’s ambitions to become a leading global automotive company cannot be
fulfilled using brand names of other companies alone. It is for this reason that the
company decided to launch its own brand. So far Changan has developed a series
of own brand cars including the CX30, CX20, Yuexiang, Benben, Honor and
more recently models such as the new Raeton, CX35 SUV and EADO sedan 
(China Car Times 2012).
Figure 31 - Changan’s own brand passenger cars: CX20 and Benben Mini
Source: Changan company website 2013
In order to build a world renowned brand Changan is developing its own 
technology. The Vice President of Changan, Mr Huarong Zhu recognises that it is 
“vitally important for a company to own its own brand and technologies” (Hu, 
Yingzi 2013) which is why R&D has been a long-standing focus for Changan. It 
has 5 R&D centres in China including the Research Institute of Automotive 
Engineering in Chongqing as well as Automobile Research Institutes in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Harbin and Jiangxi.
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Changan has also set up four global R&D centres in the US, UK and Japan 
(Changan UK R&D Centre Limited 2013b).The R&D centre in Turin, Italy is in 
charge of styling, the centre in Yokohama, Japan is responsible for interior design; 
the US centre is located near Detroit and specialises in chassis design and
development; while the UK R&D centre in Nottingham deals with advanced engine 
and transmission design and development. 10% of Changan's employees are
engaged in R&D and are reported to create two patents per day across the entire 
organisation (Hu, Yingzi 2013).
By setting up global R&D centres Changan is able to tap into local areas of 
excellence in order to improve its technological capacity. Over 90% of Changan’s 
employees abroad are foreign nationals (Hu, Yingzi 2013), many of whom are 
engineers with specialised skills and experience. For example, Italy is a world- 
renowned centre for automotive design which is why most of Changan's cars are 
designed at the Turin R&D centre. A further example is the US R&D centre near 
Detroit which has strengths in auto-chassis technology such as performance 
development, computer-aided engineering, technology research and 
manufacturing process research (Zhang 2011). A recent outcome of Changan’s 
global research and development team is the new EADO which took three years to 
develop. It is a mid-range passenger car created for global market according to 
international standards (Changan Automobile Company Limited 2013).
7.1.2. C h an g an ’s entry into the UK
As part of its global R&D strategy Changan established a centre for research and 
development in Nottingham. The centre was launched in June 2010 and it 
specialises in powertrain design and development (Changan UK R&D Centre 
Limited 2013a). At present the R&D centre is located at Nottingham Science Park 
but Changan plans to build “a more permanent base in the UK" (Interviewee D1 
2011). The existing site is rented but the company would like to own a site and has 
plans to set up further R&D centres in the UK (Changan UK R&D Centre Limited 
2013a).
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7.1.3. Investm ent m otives
C hange ’s investment in the UK was primarily driven by access to strategic 
assets. The company is particularly interested in acquiring technological know-
how. The Vice General Manager of the UK R&D centre acknowledges that the 
company's technology is "currently not world class” and that there is “still a 
significant technological gap between China and the UK” (Interviewee D1 2011).
However Changan aims to achieve its ambitions of becoming a world leading 
automotive company by upgrading its technology.
Like all of its other global R&D centres, the UK R&D centre was set up primarily to 
acquire the latest technologies. Changan’s aim is to utilise technological resources 
available in the UK with the intention of becoming more and more self-sufficient as 
their technological base grows. The Vice General Manager emphasises that there 
will be a need for collaboration with external organisations” even when the centre 
has reached a target of 200 R&D employees (Interviewee D1 2011).
Changan is particularly interested in accessing the UK’s expertise in powertrain 
technology. Despite the collapse of the UK automotive industry Changan 
recognises that the skills and experience they need still exist. The company’s 
decision to locate its R&D centre in Nottingham was driven by the legacy of the 
automotive industry in the Midlands region in areas such as Northampton,
Leicester and Birmingham. Changan is directly accessing UK expertise by hiring 
highly skilled local employees who were at least principal engineers in their 
previous roles. The R&D centre had 43 employees when the interview was 
conducted in May 2011. “The majority of these employees (36) are involved 
directly in R&D and have been recruited locally” (Interviewee D1 2011). Very few 
employees have been brought from China.
Changan is particularly interested in R&D collaborations with UK universities 
located in this region. The company has done comprehensive research on the 
expertise held by each university. For example Changan is aware that the 
University of Birmingham has competencies in powertrain research, the University 
of Nottingham has expertise in engine development, while Loughborough is 
specialised in engine testing (Interviewee D1 2011). The Vice General Manager of 
the R&D centre has already established contact with several universities in the
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region including Nottingham, Leicester, Derby and Coventry and plans to establish 
links with others in due course.
Besides universities, Changan is also interested in working with local automotive
consultancies that have powertrain expertise. Private companies such as Ricardo,
Mahle, Mira and Cosworth are of particular significance to Changan (Interviewee
D1 2011). The Chinese automotive company is already working with some of
these companies. For example Changan is currently using Mira's testing facilities
until they have their own It is also working with a company called GNW which is 
specialised in making prototypes.
Changan s decision to establish a R&D centre in the UK was driven not only by the
country’s automotive expertise but also its strengths in “aerospace and F1
industries” (Interviewee D1 2011). This is because some of the new technologies
developed in these sectors can have applications in the automotive sector.
Changan is also planning to set up R&D collaborations with other local automotive 
consultancies and research institutes.
Changan s decision to invest was also encouraged by the UK government’s “low 
carbon strategy and its drive towards sustainable development” (Interviewee D1 
2011). The company is investing heavily in research and development of new 
energy vehicles. It has set up the Chongqing Changan New Energy Automobile 
Company which is dedicated to the core technology development of hybrid 
vehicles, electric vehicles, fuel cell and other energy focused automotive 
technologies (Changan UK R&D Centre Limited 2013b). Changan is the first 
Chinese company to produce hybrid electric vehicles for mass production and it 
has also developed a hydrogen powered concept sports car known as Qingcheng.
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Figure 32 - Changan’s new energy R&D team
Source. (Changan Automobile Company Limited 2012)
The investment challenges encountered by Changan are not included owing to 
insufficient data. During the interview there was not enough time to discuss this 
topic with the respondent. In addition a search for publicly available information on 
the challenges experienced by Changan did not bring any meaningful results.
7.1.4. Investm ent effects
The establishment of Changan’s UK R&D centre has two key implications relating 
to financial investment and creation of new R&D projects.
7.1.4.1. Financial effects
The first and most evident relates to financial resources brought into the UK. 
“Between January and May 2011 Changan invested £10 million pounds” 
(Interviewee D1 2011). Further investments are likely to follow as Changan plans 
to open new R&D centres and invest in a permanent UK base. Changan is 
contributing towards the buoyancy of the automotive sector by engaging the 
services of local consultancies on a contract basis e.g. the use of Mira’s testing 
facilities. The same is true of the academic sector which continues to provide 
technology specific R&D services to Changan. Given its global ambitions and 
technological needs Changan is likely to form further collaborations with other 
local universities and automotive consultancies to the mutual benefit of all 
concerned.
169
7.1.4.2. New R&D projects
Further implications for the local economy are less tangible however. Changan's 
continued focus on R&D and emphasis on external collaborations means that local 
R&D consultancies and universities are likely to be engaged in high end projects 
They will not only be contributing towards the creation of new technology but will 
also be developing their own technological capabilities in the process. This is 
especially true of new energy technologies on which Changan is focused. R&D 
projects in this field will provide a good opportunity for local organisations to learn 
and develop their expertise in technologies that may well represent the future of 
automotive engineering. Changan’s plans to establish a long-term R&D presence
in the UK should provide many high end projects for local R&D organisations to 
work on in the future.
7.2. Weigao
7.2.1. W eigao  overview
Weigao is a privately owned Chinese medical equipment company. It was founded 
in 1988 (Weigao Group Corporation 2013a) and the company head office is 
located in Weihai, Shangdong (Weigao Group Corporation 2013d). Weigao’s main 
activities include R&D, manufacturing and sales of single-use medical equipment.
Its extensive product range consists of three major products groups:
1. Consumables (syringes, medical needles, blood bags etc)
2. Orthopaedic materials and instruments (steel plates, screws, artificial joints 
etc)
3. Blood purification consumables and equipment (puncture needles, 
extracorporeal blood circuits for blood purification sets, dialyzers etc)
(Weigao Group Corporation 2012a).
The company had a total of 8,935 employees in December 2012. Its large sales 
network across China consists of 24 sales offices, 30 customer centres and 119 
municipal representative offices (Weigao Group Corporation 2012a). Weigao is 
currently focused on the Chinese market which is reflected in the structure of its 
annual turnover for 2012. The majority of the company’s turnover (94%) can be 
attributed to domestic sales, while the remaining 6% relates to overseas sales 
(Weigao Group Corporation 2012a).
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Weigao has been actively exploring international business opportunities and its 
products are currently being exported to 30 countries and regions across the world 
including Australia, Germany, UK and the US. Some of its products meet
international standards such as ISO9001 and EC Certification which ensures that 
they can be sold in overseas markets (Weigao Group Corporation 2013b).
The company's success over the last four years is reflected by steady profit growth 
between 2009 and 2012 as illustrated by the table below:
Table 10 - Weigao’s net profit between 2009 and 2012
Year 2009 
633^864Profit ( ‘000 RMB)
Source: (Weigao Group Corporation, 2 0 1 1 ,2 0 1 ^2 0 13c)
2010 
760628
2011 
750036
2012 
7024,441
The vast majority of Weigao’s sales revenue can be attributed to single-use
medical consumables, followed by blood purification consumables and equipment,
and orthopaedic equipment respectively. The single-use medical device group
generated 83% of the company’s total sales revenue in 2012, blood purification
consumables and equipment generated 11%, while orthopaedic products 
generated 6%.
Table 11 - Weigao’s total sales revenue in 2012 by product group
Sales revenue in 2012 (‘00b~RMB)
3,063,636
Product group
Single-use consumables 
Blood purification consumables and 402,464 
equipment
Orthopaedic products 
Total
223,015 
3,689,115
Source: (Weigao Group Corporation 2013c)
Weigao currently manufactures products on an OEM (Own Equipment 
Manufacturing) basis which means that its products are sold under other 
companies’ brand names rather than its own. The Chinese medical device 
manufacturer intends to develop its own products and to become an internationally
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competitive medical device company. In order to achieve these aims Weigao has
placed strong emphasis on research and development both nationally and 
internationally.
In 2012 the company invested approximately 170 million RMB in research and 
development which represents 4.6% of the company's total turnover for that year 
(Weigao Group Corporation 2013c). During 2012 Weigao registered 53 new 
patents while a further 55 patent applications are currently under review. The 
company also obtained 38 new product registration certificates and is in the 
process of registering 46 more new products for which R&D work has been 
completed (Weigao Group Corporation 2013c).
The company is actively engaged in R&D projects nationally and has established 
nine R&D centres across China. It also has R&D collaborations with local research 
institutes and universities and is involved in numerous national projects including 
Project 863, Project Torch, Model Project of National High Tech, The Key National 
Program of the State and others (Weigao Group Corporation 2013b). Weigao 
recently signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Academy of Military 
Medical Sciences. Based on the agreement the Academy will support Weigao in 
terms of pharmaceutical development, scientific and technological knowledge 
transfer and the development of biomedical competencies (Weigao Group 
Corporation 2012b). At present Weigao is working on a number of R&D projects 
relating to drug eluting stents, pre-filled syringes, and orthopaedic material.
Weigao attaches a great deal of emphasis on innovation as a source of growth
and is increasingly setting up R&D activities abroad It is currently engaged in R&D
projects in Europe especially in Germany and the UK. Weigao’s interest in
Germany is based on the country’s expertise in medical engineering and it has
three employees there. The company has a number of R&D collaborations with
German partners “to develop new technologies and prototypes” (Interviewee E1 
2012).
7.2.2. Weigao’s entry into the UK
Weigao set up an office in the UK under the name Wego Medical Europe Limited 
The office is quite small with three employees and undertakes sales and R&D
activities. Wego UK distributes and modifies existing products, undertakes market 
research and new product development.
7.2.3. Investment motives
The Weigao Group invested in the UK to access the market as well as strategic
assets. Wego is currently distributing existing products and modifying them in
accordance with local standards. The company’s products are being marketed
through seminars and workshops and it plans to start supplying the NHS directly
Medical equipment for the Chinese market differs to that found in the UK in terms
of design and size e.g. orthopaedic equipment or catheters. Thus Wego is working
with British partners to modify its products based on local requirements 
(Interviewee E1 2012).
The company also set up a UK subsidiary in order to access strategic assets in the 
form of local research and development expertise. In particular Wego is 
undertaking market research into the UK medical equipment market. It has set up 
a China Business Research Project at Essex Business School, University of
Essex. The aim of the project is to undertake research in the fields of international 
business and strategy relating to Chinese business in Europe and the UK 
(University of Essex 2013).
The project is funded by Wego and is focused on high technology industries 
especially medical devices, heart care, biotechnology and information technology. 
Essex Business School is providing consulting and research services on Weigao's 
internationalisation strategy. For example business school students are currently 
undertaking live case study research to find partners that Weigao could form 
potential mergers and acquisitions with (Interviewee E2 2012). The new 
knowledge generated by this research will help to inform Wego’s further 
investment decisions in the UK market. In addition to research activities Wego is 
also “working with doctors to develop new products” (Interviewee E1 2012).
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A sect,on discuss,ng Weigao's investment challenges has been omitted owing to 
lack of data Although questions around investment challenges were planned they 
were no, covered in the interview due to time constraints The researcher 
requested further interviews bu, this was, unfortunately, not accepted. In addition a 
secondary data search did not produce any useful information on this topic
7.2.4. Investment effects
Based on the interview with Weigao's manager it is clear that the implications of 
the company’s UK presence are twofold. First, the availability of its products is 
likely to make the market more competitive, while customers will benefit from 
additional products to choose from. Second, Weigao’s R&D projects in the UK
may be beneficial to local universities and other research organisations involved in
these collaborative projects. The R&D projects represent a source of revenue and
at the same time they stimulate high end work for local research and development
organisations. Weigao’s product development activities provide UK partners with
the opportunity to work with new technologies and advance their own knowledge 
and expertise in the process.
7.3. Mindray
7.3.1. Mindray overview
Mindray is China’s leading medical device manufacturer. The company was 
founded in 1991 by Huang Xu and Xiting Li , who were formerly employed as 
engineers in a state-owned medical device manufacturing company in the 1980s 
(Deng 2012). The company’s global headquarters are located in Shenzhen and it 
employs approximately 6,800 people globally (Mindray 2012). Mindray develops, 
manufactures and markets medical devices across three main product categories 
patient monitoring and life support products; in-vitro diagnostic products; and 
medical imaging systems (Mindray 2012).
Patient monitoring and life support products track physiological parameters such 
as heart rate, blood pressure, respiration and temperature. Mindray currently 
offers around 50 different patient monitoring devices (Mindray 2013b). In-vitro
diagnostic products include haematology and biochemistry analysers which
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provide data and analysis on blood, urine and other bodily fluid samples for clinical 
lagnosis and treatment, Mmdray offers both semi-automated and fully-automated
9" ° S" C devices Medical imaging systems include ultrasound digital 
radiography, MRI and Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) 
Mind,ay currently offers over 25 different medical imaging devices
Figure 33 - (From left to right) Mindray's diagnostic ultrasound system DC-7 
patient monitor iPM-9800 and auto haematology analyser BC-6800
60 • 
98 ;
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Source: (Mindray 2013b)
Patient monitor and life support devices are currently the company’s largest and 
most profitable product group. In 2011 43.9% of the company's total revenue was 
attributed to this group of products. For the same year, in-vitro devices and 
medical imaging systems each generated 25% of total revenue, while other 
products generated the remaining 5.7% (Mindray 2012). Mindray estimates that it 
presently holds 10% market share in the global patient monitoring device market 
(Mindray 2012), making it the third largest player behind leader Philips Electronics 
and General Electric Healthcare Life Support Solutions (Tsuruoka 2011).
Figure 34 - Revenue for 2011 according to product groups
Others
5.7%
PMIS
Source: (Mindray 2012)
While China remains its main manufacturing and R&D base, Mindray has a global
sales and service network comprising of 31 offices across China and numerous
overseas offices across the US, Latin America, Europe and Asia (Mindray 2013a).
Its products can be found in over 190 countries and regions around the world.
Mindray is the largest medical device manufacturer in China and nearly half of its 
business is conducted in this market (43%).
The company s ambitions, however, are not confined to the domestic market. 
Mindray’s global plans are made clear in a statement by Cathy Gao. the 
company’s spokeswoman for investor relations, “We want to become a global 
company (Tsuruoka 2011). Mindray aspires to become one of the top medical 
device manufacturers in the world and has already taken steps towards achieving 
its goal. The company has a significant world presence whereby 33% of its 
business activities are located in emerging markets and 24% are located in
developed countries (Mindray 2012). Its main global rivals are General Electric, 
Siemens and Philips.
Mindray’s R&D capability has been one of its core strengths from the very
beginning. The company’s heavy investments in R&D began in 1992 just one year
after it had been set up. This led to the development of Mindray’s first patient
monitoring device (Deng 2012). In 1993 the R&D team developed China’s first
multi-parameter patient monitor, followed by the country’s first three-part
differential analyser in 1998 which is used for blood testing and analysis (Tsuruoka
2011). Mindray was the first company in China to develop a number of medical
devices. In 2006 it developed the five-part haematology analyser, followed by the
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colour Doppler laptop-size ultrasound system in 2008 and the high end five part 
haematology analyser in 2011 (Mindray 2012).
Today Mmdray has a global R&D network consisting of centres in Shenzhen,
Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xi'an, Seattle, New Jersey, Miami and
Stockholm The company's R&D spending has remained consistently high at
approximately 10% of its total annual revenue. Consequently Mindray has
managed to introduce an average of eight products a yea, oyer the past seven 
years (Mindray 2013a).
Most of Mmdray's overseas R&D centres are located in the United States. In fact 
the company’s first international R&D centre was set up in Seattle in 2006. This is 
because Seattle is a centre for ultrasound innovation with a large pool of
technology experts and engineers. For Mindray, the Seattle R&D centre is all 
about developing the company’s technological and marketing expertise. In the 
words of the centre’s General Manager Mr Weng Lee, the Seattle R&D centre
“opens a window to our engineers and marketers in China. We learn technologies, 
customer expectations and marketing philosophies ...” (Deng 2012)
Mindray’s US expansion continued with the acquisition of Datascope’s patient 
monitoring business in 2008 based in New Jersey (Mindray 2012), The transaction 
was valued at USD 209 million and represented a significant step in Mindray’s 
expansion into US and Western European markets (Mindray 2008a). The 
acquisition gave Mindray access to Datascope’s established brands, its long-
standing reputation for high quality products and service, as well as its extensive 
and established direct sales and service network in the US and Europe (Mindray 
2008b). Mindray also benefitted from Datascope’s technological expertise in 
patient monitors and its innovative patient monitoring solution, NetGuard, designed 
to detect unexpected cardiac arrests in previously unmonitored patients (Mindray 
2008b). The New Jersey R&D centre previously owned and operated by 
Datascope is now an integral part of Mindray’s global R&D network.
From the outset Mindray focused on developing the internal R&D capability
needed to develop internationally competitive products Its innovation strategy
focuses on product features but also on emotional benefits to doctors and patients.
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Mmdray's innovations are geared towards the needs of medical staff, procurers 
and hospital administrators rather than technological enhancements themselves 
(Kwaku, Xu 2012). Its approach to innovation is very much based on the end user 
experience. For example one of the company’s aims is to create patient monitors 
that are simple to use enabling doctors “to make faster and more accurate 
decisions" (Interviewee F1 2012). This is becoming increasingly important in the 
hospital environment which is laden with various machines, cables and data 
making it difficult to extract relevant information at the right time.
7.3.2. Mindray’s entry into the UK
Mindray first entered the UK in 2006 by setting up a wholly owned subsidiary.
Two years later Mindray’s acquisition of Datascope had an effect on the
company’s UK operations because Datascope already had an office there. Once
the transaction was finalised in 2008 Datascope’s UK office merged with Mindray’s
UK subsidiary to form a single unit owned and operated by Mindray (Interviewee
F1 2012)- Today the UK subsidiary carries out mainly sales and marketing 
activities.
7.3.3. Investment motives
Mindray’s decision to invest in the UK was largely market driven. The company
decided to enter the UK market because of high healthcare standards and
sophisticated customers. The rationale was that if the UK market accepted their
products then they “would be suitable for most other countries” (Interviewee F1
2012). Thus if Mindray could meet the high standards of the UK healthcare
market, this would increase its chances of succeeding in other international 
markets.
The company was also encouraged by the openness of the market and by the fact 
that there was no language barrier because most of their Chinese employees 
speak English. Mindray also has strong links with local university hospitals with 
whom they carry out extensive clinical trials.
7.3.4. Investment challenges
Selling products and building brand awareness in the UK has been quite a
challenge for the Chinese manufacturer (Liu, Liu 2013). This is because the
Mindray brand is largely unknown to end users such as doctors and nurses.
Hospitals are likely to buy equipment that employees are familiar with. They are
quite “conservative" customers in the sense that they are not keen to try unfamiliar 
brands (Interviewee F1 2012).
Most doctors and nurses in UK hospitals have been using products made by 
Philips Healthcare and General Electric Healthcare for many years making it 
difficult for new companies to enter the market. The UK market is perhaps “less 
open than some other markets that welcome newcomers and are willing to 
experiment with new brands” (Interviewee F1 2012). However Mindray has 
managed to overcome these challenges having successfully entered the NHS’s 
procurement system which is one of the most rigorous in the world (Liu, Liu 2013)
7.3.5. Investment effects
Mindray’s UK subsidiary is impacting several aspects of the medical device 
industry including customers, competitors and partner organisations. Customers 
are benefiting from the company’s UK presence first because they have more 
choice. In the past hospitals had two to three medical device manufacturers to 
choose from and once the decision was made they would stick with the same 
company for years to come. Changing machines is a difficult process because it 
involves re-training staff to work with new machines which may be unfamiliar to 
them. Thus there is increased risk of errors until they get used to working with new 
devices (Interviewee F1 2012). Mindray’s competitively prices products are valid 
alternatives for UK hospitals. In the past hospitals would have had to spend vast 
sums of money on machine repairs but now they can spend a little more to have 
their machines replaced by Mindray. This option is particularly valuable at a time 
when the NHS is looking to lower costs and improve its level of service.
Second, customers are benefitting from product customisation offered by Mindray. 
They are very flexible in making machines based on the requirements of every 
individual hospital. Mindray works together with the customer to deliver a product
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tailored towards their specific needs. For example customers may request a
machine with adjustments and receive it within two to three months. “This kind of
product you can’t find in the market compared with other players” (Interviewee F1 
2012).
Third, customers are benefitting from innovative products developed by Mindray. 
These products are new and are not offered by other companies in the market. 
Mmdray's products are designed better than rival products and have been long 
awaited by customers. Once the customers become aware of the availability of 
such a product they express an interest in purchasing it even though they already 
have machines from other manufacturers (Interviewee F1 2012).
Mmdray’s competitors in the UK are well aware of their presence. Many of them 
mention Mindray in their annual reports as a serious threat. The competitors are 
changing the way they behave when it comes to pricing. For example when they 
are competing against Mindray to supply a hospital with devices they offer a 
“Mindray price" which is equal to or lower than Mindray’s. Competitors are also 
trying to retain their installation base by convincing customers that Mindray’s 
products are inferior to their own (Interviewee F1 2012).
Mindray’s UK presence has had significant effects on its partners in the UK and 
Europe. Patient monitor devices made by Mindray consist of a multitude of 
parameters which are small functions used to measure patients’ vital signs. For 
example parameters can measure heart rate, blood pressure, respiration rate etc 
These parameters are not made by Mindray but are sourced from specialist 
suppliers in Europe and then integrated into patient monitors. The key benefit for 
suppliers is that Mindray introduces their products to international markets like 
China or Brazil (Interviewee F1 2012).
The devices are made in Europe where they are well promoted but are less known 
elsewhere. Mindray works closely with suppliers to promote their products and 
develop their brand image in China and other emerging markets where it has a 
strong presence. Thus Mindray is providing European component or parameter 
suppliers with the opportunity to distribute products and build their reputation in 
emerging markets.
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For example a German parameter company makes small modules which measure 
card'0 ° Utput Parameters to test cardiac function. The module measures the 
volume of blood pumped with every heart beat. This is a new parameter which 
Mindray decided to build into its patient monitor devices. Now patient monitors 
containing the parameter are being promoted by Mindray in China
The supplier is gaining multiple benefits from Mindray’s UK presence (Interviewee 
F1 2012). First of all supplier sales have been boosted by demand from Mindray. 
Secondly their products are being promoted in new markets where they are 
beginning to build a reputation Finally it also opens up opportunities for suppliers 
to sell disposable consumables such as catheters along with their main products.
7.4. TP Link
7.4.1. TP Link overview
TP Link is a Chinese manufacturer of computer networking products with 
headquarters in Shenzhen The company was founded in 1996 by two brothers 
and currently employs 14,000 employees worldwide (TP Link 2013b). Its flagship 
products include routers (wireless and ADSL), switches, IP cameras, powerline 
adapters, print servers, media converters, and network adapters (TP Link 2013a)
TP Link started out as domestic company but its ambitions to become the world’s 
number one networking company motivated it to venture abroad in 2005. Since 
then its business has been expanding “at an average rate of 40% per year” 
(Interviewee G1 2012). The company’s global sales are continuing to grow at a 
remarkable rate. The latest figures for 2012 show that TP Link’s global sales 
increased by 45.5% in 2012 (TP Link 2013b).
Figure 35 - TP Link's global sales from 2005 -  2012
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Source: (TP Link 2013b)
International sales have become increasingly important generating 47% of the
company's total revenue for 2012 (TP Link 2013a). TP Link's products are
currently available in 120 countries and are used by over a billion people
worldwide. The company has consistently been ranked the world’s largest supplier
of wireless networking equipment since 2011. It has continued to maintain a
dominant lead in the global wireless market based on the number of units sold.
According to the Worldwide Quarterly WLAN Tracker, TP Link held 34% of the
global wireless networking market in 2012 based on the number of units sold (LAN 
Product News 2012).
From its early beginnings the company placed a great deal of emphasis on 
research and development. More than 8% of its annual sales revenue is invested 
in R&D (TP Link 2013b). TP Link's R&D activities are located in Shenzhen but the 
company is planning to set up new centres in the US, Germany and the UK 
(Interviewee G1 2012). These countries have very large, advanced markets and 
an abundance of experienced IT talent which TP Link intends to draw on for the 
purpose of expanding its own technological base. According to TP Link’s Country 
Manager for the UK and Ireland, innovation has been a key contributing factor to 
the company's rapid growth rates since 2005 when it went international
At present 890 employees are currently engaged in R&D (TP Link 2013b), half of 
which are devoted solely to product testing to ensure high standards are
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maintained (TP Link 20 ,3c). Most o, TP Link's employees are very young and
energetic. The average age of a TP Link employee is 26 years and most of them
are fresh graduates from top universities in China and all over the world. "Most of
the staff are very young and they are energetic. They have lots of ideas and their 
execution is also very very fast” (Interviewee G1 2012).
An example of the innovativeness of TP Link's employees is the TP Link Nano
Wireless Router. It was designed by an employee who recently graduated from
university. The router is palm-size to ensure portability and it can also be used as
an access point or connected to a set-top box. The product is selling very well
across the world and has won two awards in the US. It was awarded the Gold
award from techreaction.net, a technology news and review blog catering to
hardware enthusiasts (TP Link 2012a). It was also awarded the PTPA Winner’s
Seal of Approval. The PTPA Media is North America's largest volunteer parent 
testing community (TP Link 2012b).
Figure 36 - TP Link Wireless N Nano Router 150Mbps
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TP Link introduced another innovative product in January 2013, the TP Link “Halo” 
150 Mbps Wireless N Mini Pocket Router. It is one of the world’s smallest portable 
routers with a built-in power adapter designed for travel. The “Halo’s” design 
concept comes from the halo of the total solar eclipse with light being cast around 
its edge -  like a wireless signal being broadcast from the router. Justin Tu,
Director of International Product Development at TP Link explains “With Halo we 
reinvented the boring, table top or wall-mounted wireless router into a sleek, 
portable form factor with built in power plug and powerful wireless speed ... 
without the mess of cables and complex setups” (PR Newswire 2013).
Figure 37 - TP-Link “Halo" Wireless Mini Pocket Router
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Source (PR Newswire 2013)
TP-Lmk was named International CES Innovations 2013 Design and Engineering
Awards Honoree for this product (E-releases 2012). Products entered in this
prestigious program are judged by an independent panel of industrial designers,
engineers and media groups to honour outstanding design and engineering in
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cutting edge consumer products
TP Link has also received worldwide recognition for the design of its products
Namely the company’s two new portable routers, the TL-M5350 and the TL-
MR3040 were awarded the “IF” award for outstanding design in the product
category (TP Link 2013d). “iF” is an independent German institute for evaluating
design. Each year the “iF seal of quality is awarded for excellent design in three
categories -  product, communication and packaging.
Figure 38 - TP-MR5350 and TP-MR3040
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Despite TP Link’s heavy investment in R&D and significant achievements in this
area, the company still has some catching up to do when it comes to cutting edge
technologies. “Currently we are not at the edge of technology" (Interviewee G1
184
)■ Companies such as Netgear and Nexus are currently at the technological 
forefront of the computer networking industry. TP Link has made remarkable
progress in the last 17 years and it is only a matter of time before it catches up 
with incumbent technological leaders in this industry.
7.4.2. TP Link’s entry into the UK
The decision to set up a UK subsidiary was part of TP Link's international strategy 
to expand globally. The office was opened in August 2010 in Bracknell and later 
moved to Reading where it is presently located. The main purpose of the UK 
subsidiary is to undertake sales and market activities across the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland. The office is 100% owned by TP Link and it currently employs 
approximately 20 people. Most of the employees are local and are engaged in 
sales and marketing activities. “Only three people have been recruited from China 
-  the country manager, the sales manager who is also responsible for 
communication with headquarters, and the accountant” (Interviewee G1 2012).
TP Link decided to establish its own subsidiary in the UK so that it could “build its
own company culture (Interviewee G1 2012). This type of investment was the
most appropriate for the type of activity that TP Link was planning on carry out in
the UK. They could recruit employees themselves and did not need to buy an
existing business. “It is very hard to buy an independent company and change in 
to your own” (Interviewee G1 2012).
7.4.3. Investment motives
TP Link’s entry into the UK was primarily market driven. The company wanted to 
have direct access to the UK market taking into consideration factors such as local 
population and buying power. The UK computer networking market was large 
enough to warrant a designated subsidiary. TP Link already had an office in 
Germany but because products for the UK market and European markets are 
different, separate stock needed to be prepared for the UK (Interviewee G1 2012). 
One of the key differences is that European products have two-pin plugs while 
products for the UK use a three-plug system.
7.4.4. Investment challenges
Although TP Link had already successfully set up an office in Germany, they found
Hninn  h n c i n o c o  i w s  i . __ J
doing business in the UK to be quite different. In the words of the Country
Manager for the UK and Ireland "When we do business here, we start to learn"
(Interviewee G1 2012). This is especially true of the distribution channels which
have a different structure compared to Europe. Price is not always the most
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important consideration. Factors such as local support and mutual benefit appear
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to be equally significant. The way distribution channels are managed in the UK is
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quite different to other markets that TP Link has experience in (Interviewee G1
2012).
The company has also had to adjust to new cultural settings in Britain There are
A ft
differences in terms of work ethic between British and Chinese employees. For
example Chinese employees at the UK TP Link office accept evening and
weekend work as normal whereas their British colleagues have a stricter work-life
divide (Interviewee G1 2012). For Chinese employees in the UK, work is 100%
their life while their British colleagues are not keen on working outside office hours
TP Link’s management team has had to adjust its expectations in line with local
work practices. Therefore they do not expect non Chinese staff to work during
evenings, weekends or holidays. Moreover the work pace in the UK is slower than
in China which is also something that TP Link’s management has had to adapt to.
Finally the issue of visas for Chinese employees was highlighted as a challenge to
the company’s UK operations.
7.4.5. Investment effects
TP Link’s entry into the UK in 2010 changed the competitive landscape of the
industry. Before the office was set up the company’s UK revenue was
approximately USD 2 million. “Since then it has increased tenfold to exceed USD
24 million in 2012” (Interviewee G1 2012). TP Link’s UK market share has grown
at the expense of its competitors whose businesses are in decline. For example-- ------- ■ WWW w « w W  w. ^  J  ^
two years ago the Taiwanese company D-Link, a global leader, was quite
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successful in the UK. Since then its market share has decreased significantly.
Another smaller Taiwanese company, Edimax was also fairly successful two years
ago but has since lost most of its business (Interviewee G1 2012).
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ink ,s considering opportunities for product development with local partner 
organisations. It is currently in discussion with local design companies about 
product housing, colours and design improvements. Some of the design 
improvements are for the UK market while others wil, be targeting global markets 
ink is keen to make use of local companies to improve the design of its 
products. Meanwhile this has benefits for local design companies in terms of 
revenue generation and the opportunity to work on high end projects. The 
company is also generating additional business for local distributors and
increasing their revenue by “offering higher than average margins” (Interviewee 
G1 2012).
7.5. Hytera
7.5.1. Hytera overview
Hytera is a Chinese manufacturer of professional mobile radio communication 
equipment. The company was set up in Shenzhen in 1993 where its corporate 
headquarters are located. Though it was founded only 20 years ago, Hytera has 
rapidly developed into a leading professional mobile radio communication 
company at home and abroad. It is ranked second in terms of market share in 
China (Hytera 2013a). According to the 2010 Global Professional Mobile Radio 
Market Research Report released by IMS Research, Hytera’s market share ranks 
second in the global overall terminal market (Hytera 2013b). The company’s 
products can be found in over 80 countries and regions in the world (Hytera 
2013a). Hytera currently employs over 2,800 people in total (Hytera 2012).
The company's overall sales revenue has increased by 31.6% between 2009 and 
2011. International product sales have become an increasingly important source of 
revenue for Hytera In 2011 45.5% of the company's total revenue was generated 
by overseas sales (Hytera 2012). The steady growth of overall and overseas sales 
revenue is illustrated by the chart below:
Figure 39 - Overall and overseas revenue 2009-2011
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Hytera's range of professional radio communications systems includes three types 
of products: terminals, systems and applications These products are developed
using TETRA, DMR, PDT and MPT technologies (Hytera 2012). Hytera is the only 
Asian manufacturer to offer two mainstream digital product lines -  TETRA and
DMR. In China Hytera developed the PDT standard (Police Digital Trunking) for
the Chinese police. The implementation of PDT technology in China means that if
international players “want to do business in China they have to use our standard” 
(Interviewee H1 2012).
Figure 40 - Hytera’s product range
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Computer systems Software applications
Users of Hytera’s products can be categorised into three main groups: government 
organisations such as the armed forces, police, fire and rescue services; utility
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companies such as gas, petroleum, water and electricity; and commercial 
organ,sat,ons ,nclud,ng hospitality, construction, logistics and retail etc.
R&D is vital to Hytera’s long term development which is why it invests “12% of its
annual revenue in research and development” (Interviewee H1 2012). The
company employs over 800 engineers across three R&D centres (Hytera 2012,
2013a). Two of the centres are located in China and the third is located in
Germany. The Chinese R&D centres in Shenzhen and Harbin are mostly focused
on analogue DMR and DMR Tier three trunking systems. The Shenzhen R&D
centre ,s responsible for terminal products and conventional systems
development, while the Harbin R&D centre is focused on trunking systems and
solution development. Meanwhile the R&D centre in Germany is devoted to 
development of TETRA systems (Hytera 2012).
Hytera is a newcomer in professional mobile radio communications having only 
entered the market 20 years ago. Some of its main competitors such as EADS 
(European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) from Europe and Motorola 
from the US have been in the market for much longer and have therefore 
developed a leading edge in technological development. Motorola has been in the 
business for 85 years and they “lead the way in releasing new functions” 
(Interviewee H1 2012). Hytera’s continued investment in R&D means that it will 
soon catch up with the technological leaders in the industry.
In the meantime its strategy is to compete by focusing on customer value. The 
managing director of Hytera UK acknowledges that its products are not the 
cheapest nor are they the best in the market. Nevertheless Hytera has found a 
clever way of competing against rivals. Its unique selling point is that it strikes the 
right balance between product price and performance “We are not the cheapest 
we are not the best... but we have the balance” (Interviewee H1 2012).
7.5.2. Hytera’s entry into the UK
Hytera established a representative office in Burton on Trent in 2004 with two staff 
members sent from headquarters. Two years later the office moved to Milton 
Keynes because larger logistics and service facilities were needed. More recently
pany relocated to Slough in 2011 where it is currently based The office 
houses administrative, sales, finance, product marketing, service and customer 
training teams most which are employed locally. The company only has two 
staff members from Shenzhen The local,on in Slough was chosen because of its 
proximity to the M25 and easy aocess London airports Aside from logistics the
town is Withm commutable distance of London ensuring access to a large pool of 
skilled employees (Interviewee H1 2012)
The company chose to establish its own subsidiary because it makes it easier to
transfer Hytera’s company culture to the UK. Buying an existing business would
give rise to “cross-cultural problems and would take time to start running smoothly"
(Interviewee H1 2012). Having their own subsidiary from the outset ensured that
their company culture stayed intact even though 80% of Hytera’s employees are 
local (Interviewee H1 2012).
7.5.3. Investm ent motives
The company’s initial decision to set up a subsidiary in the UK was partly driven by 
the large market for professional telecommunications. Security in Britain is taken 
seriously so there is strong demand for mobile radio communication devices made 
by Hytera. The second reason is the nature of the UK market. “The UK market is 
very demanding. If we can do business in this country, we can use this country as 
a reference for other countries" (Interviewee H1 2012). In some ways the
company’s activities in Britain can be seen as an opportunity to develop skills and 
expertise which can then be applied and adapted to other developed markets.
Figure 41 - Hytera subsidiary in Slough
Source. (Hytera 2012)
7.5.4. Investm ent challenges
Hytera's business in the UK has grown fast between 2009 and 2012 In 2009 the
company had f,»e main direct dealers and by 2012 it was wodung with over 20
The company's UK expansion has not been without challenges however
(interviewee H1 2012, The firs, chaiienge is of a technical nature and relates to
encryption technologies used by the army and the police in the interests of public 
security in the EU.
These technologies are not allowed to be sold to non European organisations 
such as Hytera that are automatically excluded from integrating the technology 
into their products. The encryption is based on algorithms which Hytera had to find 
a way of purchasing. It overcame this barrier by acquiring Rohde and Schwarz 
Professional Mobile Radio GmbH in 2011, a German company specialising in 
professional mobile radio systems (Hytera 2011). Hytera gained the right to 
acquire the algorithms through ownership of this European company.
Secondly, as a new entrant in the UK mobile radio communications market, Hytera 
was unfamiliar to local customers and needed time to build up its credibility. This is 
quite difficult to do given that Hytera is competing with companies that have been 
in the market for much longer and have established their credibility.
7.5.5. Investm ent effects
The effects of Hytera s presence in the UK are observed across a range of 
partners, competitors and customers. Hytera’s business in the UK is operated 
through a network of local partners consisting of four groups: local distributors and 
dealers; application partners; system integrators and hire or cross-hire partners 
(Interviewee H1 2012). At present the company works with over 40 dealers in the 
UK, some of whom are the largest in the industry. For example Zycomm, Apex 
Radio Systems, Roadphone, Radio Links Communications, Global 
Communications, Radiocoms and others.
The role of application partners is to develop applications based on the platform 
provided by Hytera. Applications or programs are built to meet specific customer 
requirements. For example emergency calls, job dispatching for taxi companies
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and GPS tracking. Local application software development partners include 
companies such as Zomth, Trackranger and Purcell.
Hytera also works with partners known as system integrators who integrate 
terminals, base stations and applications for customers. They also provide training 
and after sales services while Hytera's role is to supply the equipment including 
base stations and terminals. Hytera also works with hire partners that provide
customers with professional communication devices. The hire partners provide the
service, while Hytera provides the equipment. In the end the profit is shared 
between the two organisations.
Based on the categorisation of partners and their roles it is clear that Hytera's 
influence occurs on several different levels The distributors and dealers had only 
worked with Motorola in the past but now they also work with Hytera’s products. 
They distribute a larger selection of products and work with larger volumes than in 
the past. Thus the first implication of Hytera’s presence is that it generates 
additional revenue for partners involved in product distribution.
The gains for partners however are not only financial. Professional mobile radio 
devices are not entirely standardised and a high degree of customisation is 
required before the product is delivered to customers. This creates scope for 
partners to participate in localised product development based on specific 
customer requirements. In particular application partners play an important part in 
developing software applications, while partners specialised in system integration
software
individual customer.
For example Hytera developed a software application for building management 
with Zonith, a GPS navigation system with Trackranger, as well as a job 
dispatching program with Zycomm. Thus the second implication is that Hytera’s 
presence stimulates high end work for partner organisations. As summed up by 
the words of the managing director of Hytera UK “We are not just doing a sales 
job. We are not just doing distribution here. We do R&D with our partners here. 
We do system integration" (Interviewee H1 2012).
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Comp ,t,on in the UK mobile radio communications sector has been unsettled as 
a result of Hytera's entry. Only nine years after entering the UK Hytera has 
positioned itself as the number two company in this market (Interviewee H1 2012) 
Th.s ,s a remarkable achievement for a company that was relatively unknown to 
customers when ,t started out in 2004. Hytera’s UK presence is initiating 
changes ,n the behaviour of its rivals. Competitors are adjusting their behaviour in 
order to remain competitive. They are making changes to their prices, service 
policies and are working more closely with customers (Interviewee H1 2012).
This ,s especially true of products using the DMR standard (Digital Mobile Radio), 
an open digital radio standard specified by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute. In the past Motorola was the only company manufacturing 
mobile radio communication devices based on this standard. However since 
Hytera's entry this market segment has become considerably more competitive. 
Today Motorola and Hytera are the only two companies in the world that 
manufacture DMR professional mobile radios.
UK customers are deriving a number of benefits from Hytera’s entry into the UK
professional mobile radio market. First of all they have more choice in terms of
product availability. Hytera’s extensive product range covers analogue, licence
free and digital radio products based on DMR and TETRA standards. Secondly,
because of Hytera’s strategic decision to supply products with high price to
performance ratios, customers are deriving more value out of these products than
from those offered by rival firms. Hytera’s products are not the best, nor are they
the most inexpensive but they are the most cost-effective delivering additional 
value to customers.
7.6. Vanceinfo
7.6.1. Vanceinfo overview
Vanceinfo was established in 1995 and its headquarters are located in Beijing. Six
years later the company began to internationalise its activities. In 2001 it opened
offices in Tokyo and Silicon Valley and established a subsidiary in Atlanta, Georgia
in the US in 2005. Having successfully grown the business, Vanceinfo was ranked
as the number one Chinese software outsourcing company for North America and
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Europe by IDO in 2007 (Pactprp ?m^h\ ir-. +u
w , 0 ' actera 2013b). In the same year it was listed on the New
Yofk Stock Exchange.
The company continued to internationalise by setting up its first European office in
London in 2009 followed by an Australian office in Melbourne in 2010. In 2012
Vanceinfo merged with its biggest competitor, hiSoft to form Pactera Technology
International Limited (Pactera 2013b). Research into Vanceinfo was undertaken
prior to the merger in November 2012 therefore presented data refers to events
preceding the merger. The company will be referred to as ‘Vanceinfo” for the 
purpose of this thesis.
Vanceinfo offers a variety of IT services from simple to more complex. Localisation 
is one of the simpler services offered. It is the translation of software into different 
languages but also different character sets and user interfaces. The company also 
provides research and development, software development, testing, application 
development and mobile development services (Interviewee 11 2012). Other 
higher value added services include enterprise resource management, business 
process outsourcing and data capture (Interviewee 11 2012)
The company has a global client base spanning a range of industries including 
financial services, technology, telecommunications, travel and transportation, 
energy, life sciences, manufacturing, retail and distribution (Pactera 2013a). 
Vanceinfo had approximately 23,000 employees in 2012 (Interviewee 11 2012).
7.6.2. Vanceinfo’s entry into the UK
Vanceinfo established an office in London in 2009 which is also the company’s 
European headquarters. The office works with clients across Europe, not just the 
UK. They have one employee in Finland and one person in France, and their 
activities are coordinated by the London office. The business model is primarily to 
provide services from China while the role of employees based in Europe is to 
liaise with clients. Thus the number of Vanceinfo staff in Europe is relatively small 
when compared to those located in China.
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7.6.3. Investm ent motives
1116 T 7 y S inVeS'menl dedSion market-driven I, decided ,o set
up a office because some of its existing clients were already there, but also
ecause it wanted to expand Us customer base" (Interviewee 11 2012) Many of
Vance,nfo's target customers are located in the UK including banks and other
companies. Its entry into the UK was also part of fulfilling its overall strategy to
become a global company. This is difficult to achieve "if you don’t have a presence
in Europe and the UK" (Interviewee 11 2012) The use of the English language and
ease of doing business in the UK influenced Vanceinfo’s decision to set up its 
European headquarters in London.
7.6.4. Investm ent challenges
Vance,nfo's first attempt to establish a UK presence was unsuccessful because 
they did not understand what was needed to launch into an international market 
(Interviewee 11 2012). They sent an individual from China with no sales training, 
no contacts and limited English capability. Consequently Vanceinfo did not 
achieve the desired outcome and needed to change its approach.
Visa requirements for Chinese nationals pose a real problem from a business 
point of view. Vanceinfo finds it difficult to get Chinese employees into the UK 
because of this. Their stays are usually short-term which hinders knowledge 
transfer from China to the UK. "There is often a need for employees to be present 
because of language and cultural barriers which make communication over the 
internet or telephone difficult” (Interviewee 11 2012). Even if employees from China 
are granted short stay visas for the UK, the next problem is that they cannot travel 
to Spain or France unless they are granted additional visas to enter these 
countries. Though these travel restrictions pose administrative challenges they 
also have more serious implications Namely they hinder “knowledge transfer from 
headquarters in China to the UK in terms of processes, technology, knowledge of 
the company and its company culture” (Interviewee 11 2012). This is causing the 
UK office to be isolated from its headquarters because employees from China are 
unable to travel freely.
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The language barrier is sometimes an issue especially since much of the 
information from headquarters is in Chinese. This is probably the biggest cultural 
issue because of the misunderstandings it causes There are also some 
organisational differences when it comes to decision-making or hierarchy 
Decisions are very consensus driven and take quite a long time, while hierarchy is 
respected more" (Interviewee 11 2012) Although the organisational differences 
can be challenging at times, they do not pose a serious threat because of 
Vancemfo’s overall westernised approach to management.
7.6.5. Investm ent effects
Presently Vanceinfo's total market effect in the UK “is very little” (Interviewee 11 
2012). The outsourcing market is large and there are some established players 
from mainly two regions, India and Eastern Europe (including Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania and Czech Republic). Competition from India is especially strong and it 
is dominated by large players such as Infosys, Wipro, Cognizant etc. These 
companies are very established in the UK outsourcing market and Vanceinfo’s 
objective as a newcomer is to make an impression.
It is currently working on making people aware that China is a valid IT outsourcing 
destination. Vanceinfo is also trying to break down existing stereotypes about 
Chinese companies e.g. low cost, poor quality products or services. In practice 
potential UK clients still have concerns about IP protection, English language skills 
and the political system in China. ‘These are the top three things constantly being 
brought up” (Interviewee 11 2012). Thus Vanceinfo needs to be able to compete 
with established players and to break down stereotypes about Chinese companies 
before it can have a noticeable effect on the UK IT outsourcing market.
7.7. Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined the cases of Changan, Weigao, Mindray, TP Link, 
Hytera and Vanceinfo in the UK. It provides an overview of each company and 
pays particular attention to their reasons for investment, the way in which they 
chose to enter the UK market and the effects of their investments. Chapter seven 
is the final 
findings.
study chapter and it is followed by a discussion of the research
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8. Discussion
Having presented evidence from the case studies in the previous four chapters 
is chapter discusses the research findings relating to the extent to which the 
investment motives and investment modes displayed by the Chinese MNEs
uenced the effects of their investments on British business partners. First the 
chapter introduces the conceptual framework underpinning this research. It then 
discusses the diversity of Chinese investment motives and their influence on 
investment modes. Next the chapter shows how these motives were achieved 
through analysis of investment modes and the challenges that were encountered 
Finally the effects of Chinese investment on British business partners are 
examined. These findings are discussed in the context of existing 
internationalisation theories and empirical studies.
8.1. Conceptual framework
This research is underpinned by a conceptual framework developed on the basis
of links that exist between the investment motives, modes and effects of Chinese 
multinationals.
The theoretical contribution of this research is that it provides a more complete
explanation of the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals than existing
theories. Unlike the others it takes into account the diversity that exists amongst
Chinese firms. This study explains the internationalisation behaviour of firms that
have developed sufficient strategic advantages to compete globally. But it is also
capable of explaining the internationalisation of firms that do not possess such 
advantages.
Whilst Dunning’s OLI theory provides a sound explanation of firm 
internationalisation, its limitation is that it does not account for the possibility of 
firms without ownership advantages internationalising. According to Dunning 
internationalisation occurs when firms have sufficient ownership advantages 
(Ownership), when the host country has locational advantages that cannot be 
found in the home country (Location), and when it is more economical for the 
company to enter overseas markets itself rather than engaging third party 
organisations (Internalisation) (Dunning 1993).
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Following Dunning's logic, i, any of me three factors of the OLI paradigm are
77 '  m  intema,i0nalisa,i° n -  “  occur Thus companies lacking ownership
a vantages are unlikely to internationalise. The necessity of haying such
adyantages is echoed by Rugman who refers to them as tirm-specific advantages
(Rugman 2007, The limitations of the OL, paradigm are exposed by this research
which shows that Chinese firms are in fact capable of internationalising despite 
their lack of ownership or firm-specific advantages.
other hand Mathews LLL framework offers a convincing explanation of firm 
international,sation based on the lack of ownership advantages. However the
problem with his explanation is that it does not consider firms that already possess 
strong competitive advantages. According to the LLL framework developed by 
Mathews, firms from emerging markets internationalise in order to link up with 
developed country multinationals. These relationships provide emerging market 
multinationals with learning opportunities so that they can develop their own 
competitive advantages (Mathews 2006b).
The underlying assumption of Mathews' thinking is that emerging market 
multinationals inherently lack strategic assets and that their entry into overseas 
markets is motivated by the acquisition of such assets. This point of view is 
reinforced by other researchers (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 2009, Luo, Tung 2007) who 
propose that emerging market multinationals are unlikely to have sufficient 
competitive advantages. The weakness of this approach is exposed by the 
findings of this study which shows that some Chinese multinationals possess 
strong competitive advantages which enable them to internationalise.
Despite their merits the OLI and LLL frameworks offer partial explanations of the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms. The former provides a sound explanation of 
firms which already have sufficient competitive advantages, while the latter offers 
a convincing account of firms without such advantages. The theoretical 
contribution of this research is that it is capable of explaining the 
internationalisation behaviour of both types of Chinese firms. This is achieved 
through the synthesis of the OLI and LLL frameworks to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of their internationalisation behaviour.
There is a close link between investment motivations and the type of entry mode
chosen when these companies internationalise. Empirical evidence suggests that
investment motivations play a significant role in determining the type of entry mode
selected by Chinese multinationals when investing overseas (Cui, Jiang 2009,
Deng 2007). Hence this research is based on the assumption that different
investment motivations are likely to lead to different entry mode choices, which in 
turn, influence the host country in different ways.
Many existing studies look into the investment effects of investing multinationals 
on host economies but most focus on western multinationals and their investment 
effects in developing economies. For example numerous studies examine the 
effects of FDI on domestic enterprises in China by investigating voluntary and 
involuntary diffusion of knowledge from foreign MNEs to local firms. The literature 
on involuntary knowledge transfer or spillovers shows that the presence of foreign 
MNEs affects productivity and market access in domestic firms (Buckley, Clegg &
Wang 2002, Chuang, Lin 1999, Guo, Veugelers 2006). Meanwhile the literature on 
voluntary knowledge transfer shows that valuable knowledge is transferred from 
foreign MNEs to domestic firms through technological (Fang et al. 2002) and 
supplier relationships (Duanmu, Fai 2007, Guerrieri, lammarino & Pietrobelli 2001, 
Ivarsson, Alvstam 2009, Ivarsson, Alvstam 2011).
Flowever when it comes to the availability of similar studies focusing on the effects 
of emerging market multinationals on advanced host economies, the situation is 
rather different. Few studies are available, especially those investigating the 
effects of Chinese FDI. Most of the studies examine the general economic 
implications of FDI from emerging markets. Existing research emphasises financial 
effects (Hanemann, Rosen 2012, Tiwari, Herstatt 2009, Charlie 2012), 
employment effects (Hanemann, Rosen 2012, Xu, Petersen & Wang 2012,
Nicolas 2012), competitive effects (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010) and consumer welfare 
(Pradhan 2007, Charlie 2012, Greene 2007). One study investigates the effects of 
Chinese investment in European Union (Clegg, Voss 2012) using aggregate data 
and is therefore able to draw only general conclusions.
Emerging literature is beginning to shape our understanding of the ways in which 
acquisitions by Chinese firms influence acquired companies in Europe. So far
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studies have explored the effects on French (Nicolas 2012) and German firms
(Knoerich 2010, Gentile-Ludecke 2013) but none have explored the effects on 
British businesses.
The lack of availability of studies on the effects of Chinese investment on 
advanced economies leads us to the second contribution of this thesis. It is to 
provide detailed insight into the investment effects of Chinese enterprises in the 
UK through the use of firm-level data from greenfield investments and acquisitions. 
In so doing this thesis contributes to the literature on the internationalisation of 
emerging multinationals and in particular the effects of their investments on 
advanced economies. This is achieved by examining the extent to which the
investment motives and investment modes of Chinese MNEs influence the effects 
of their investments on business partners in Britain.
The aim of this study is accomplished through the realisation of three research
objectives outlined in the introductory chapter which are to: examine the
investment motives of Chinese multinationals; to understand their investment
motives and the challenges encountered; and to identify the effects of these
investments on acquired firms, competitors, partner organisations and customers.
The next section discusses the findings relating to investment motives, in line with 
the first objective.
8.2. Investment motives
This section examines the investment motives of Chinese MNEs in the UK and 
discusses the findings in the context of existing empirical studies and theoretical 
approaches.
Despite the theoretical assumptions that MNEs invest abroad either to exploit 
(Dunning 1993, Rugman 2008a) or acquire (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 2009, Luo,
Tung 2007, Mathews 2006b) competitive advantages, empirical studies show that 
Chinese MNEs are not confined to either of these categories and display a range 
of asset-seeking and asset-exploiting investment motives. Some studies show that 
these enterprises are motivated by access to natural resources, strategic assets
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and international markets (Liu, Buck 2009, Teagarden, Cai 2009, Buckley et al.
2008) , while others highlight motivations such as efficiency gains (Athreye, Kapur
2009) and diversification (Deng 2003, 2004).
In spite of their diversity, the investment motives displayed by Chinese MNEs
appear to follow a geographical pattern. Researchers have found that they have
different motives when investing in developed and developing countries (Cheung,
Suny 2009). According to previous research Chinese investment activities in
developed countries are motivated by market access and strategic assets
(Kolstad, Wiig 2012, Makino, Lau & Yeh 2002), while those in developing countries
are motivated by access to natural resources (Kolstad, Wiig 2012) and efficiency 
gains (Makino, Lau & Yeh 2002).
When it comes to investing in Europe most researchers agree that Chinese MNEs 
are primarily motivated by access to markets and strategic assets (Knoerich 2012. 
Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010, Schuller-Zhou, Schuller & Brod 2012). Similar findings 
exist for their investment activities in the UK which emphasise access to markets 
and strategic assets as key drivers (Liu, Tian 2008, Cross, Voss 2007).
The evidence of this research shows that Chinese MNEs are not confined to either 
asset-seeking or asset-exploiting motives as existing internationalisation theories 
suggest. Instead the findings illustrate that their investments are motivated by a 
combination of the two. This fits in with existing empirical findings that Chinese 
MNEs in Europe and the UK are primarily motivated by access to markets and 
strategic assets.
Out of the nine MNEs included in this study, four lacked competitive assets and 
were therefore interested in acquiring them in the UK, while five had existing 
competitive assets which they were interested in exploiting. The figure below 
categorises the case studies according to their investment motives:
Table 12 - Case studies categorised according to investment motives
SAIC
CQME
Zhuzhou CSR Times 
Changan
• Mindray
• Hytera
• TP Link
• Weigao
• Vanceinfo
Source: author’s database
The asset-seeking group lacked competitive assets and the multinationals in this 
group were motivated to invest in the UK for the purpose of acquiring them. They 
were interested in obtaining strategic assets such as technology, know-how and 
brands. SAIC was attracted by well-known brands, vehicle blueprints and 
automotive design and development capabilities; CQME was drawn to 
manufacturing technology, innovation capabilities and brands; Zhuzhou CSR 
Times was interested in advanced semiconductor technology and strong R&D 
capability; while Changan was attracted to powertrain expertise.
The asset-exploiting group, on the other hand, already had competitive assets and 
the multinationals in this group were motivated to invest in the UK in order to 
exploit them. They were interested in accessing the UK market and increasing 
their sales. Mindray, Hytera, TP Link and Weigao already had a full range of state- 
of-the-art products they wished to distribute in the UK while Vanceinfo had the 
capability to offer its services to UK-based clients. These companies carried out a 
number of activities intended to increase their market share in the UK including 
new product development, product customisation, market research, experiential 
learning and reputation building.
This research illustrates the diversity of investment motives amongst Chinese 
multinationals. Enterprises lacking competitive advantages were interested in 
obtaining them, while enterprises that already had sufficient competitive 
advantages were interested in exploiting them. These findings contradict existing 
mainstream theories on internationalisation which assume that multinationals 
invest abroad to either explore or to exploit competitive advantages. Having
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discussed the diversity of investment motives displayed by Chinese MNEs, the 
next section examines how these motives were achieved.
8.3. Investment modes
This section provides an in-depth examination of investment modes employed by
Chinese MNEs in the UK. It discusses the relationship between investment
motives and investment modes and demonstrates how different investment modes 
were used to achieve the multinationals’ aims.
Existing studies suggest that investment mode selection in Chinese MNEs is
influenced by a number of factors. Some have found that the choice of entry mode
in Chinese MNEs is determined by a combination of external factors over which
the companies have no control, and internal factors which arise from the firms.
External factors identified include host country demand and host country
competition, while internal factors include the company’s asset-seeking strategy
and global strategic motivation (Cui, Jiang 2009). Others emphasise the influence
of country risk, cultural distance (Xu, Hu & Fan 2011) and investment motives 
(Deng 2007).
While existing studies identify a number of possible determinants, the evidence of 
this research suggests that investment mode selection in Chinese MNEs is largely 
influenced by investment motives. The asset-seeking multinationals selected 
primarily acquisitions, while asset-exploiting companies opted for greenfield 
investment. This finding supports Deng’s argument that investment motives play a 
significant role in investment mode selection amongst Chinese MNEs.
Existing literature identifies the investment modes used by Chinese MNEs. When 
investing overseas they tend to enter foreign markets mainly via greenfield 
investment and mergers and acquisitions (Child, Rodrigues 2005). When it comes 
to investments in Europe extant research shows that the same two investment 
modes are most frequently used (Klossek, Linke & Nippa 2012). However some 
researchers have found mergers and acquisitions to be the preferred investment 
mode over greenfield investments in this region (Hanemann, Rosen 2012, Clegg, 
Voss 2012). Studies focusing on the UK have similar findings in that mergers and 
acquisitions and greenfield investments are shown to be the most frequent modes
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of investment deployed by Chinese MNEs (Burghart, Rossi 2009). One study
shows that greenfield investments take precedence over mergers and acquisitions 
in the UK (Liu, Tian 2008).
Although existing research usefully identifies Chinese investment modes, its
shortcoming is that it does not explain how these investment modes are used to
achieve the MNEs’ aims. This research extends existing literature on Chinese
investment modes by explaining how Chinese multinationals used selected
investment modes to achieve their aims. Asset-seeking MNEs entered the UK
mainly through acquisitions, while asset-exploiting MNEs used greenfield 
investment.
Asset-seeking multinationals
This group of multinationals predominantly used acquisitions to enter the UK
market because it was the most effective way of accessing strategic assets such 
as brands, technology and know-how.
As part of the acquisition arrangement the Chinese MNEs gained access to 
brands and technologies. For example SAIC acquired the “MG brand” and designs 
for two vehicles from MG Rover; CQME obtained the “Holroyd” brand and 
advanced manufacturing technology from PTG; while Zhuzhou CSR Times 
acquired advanced semiconductor technology from Dynex.
The acquisition of existing businesses also enabled the Chinese MNEs to access
know-how. They achieved this through recruitment of local talents and
collaboration with British businesses and universities. SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou
CSR Times were all keen to tap into the knowledge of experienced local
employees. Initially, SAIC recruited approximately 60 former MG Rover engineers
with experience in vehicle design and development (Interviewee A2 2012). The
company continued to recruit and currently employs around 200 British engineers
who are supporting the design and development of new vehicles (Interviewee A4
2012). CQME’s acquisition of PTG secured access to hundreds of highly skilled
and experienced employees. According to figures from 2012 PTG had 220 local
employees that year (Bannan 2012). Zhuzhou CSR Times’ acquisition of Dynex
meant that it gained immediate access to 200 existing employees. Following the
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acquisition Dynex recruited a further 100 local engineers to support its R&D efforts 
(Interviewee C1 2012).
By acquiring British businesses Chinese MNEs were able to take advantage of 
relationships these businesses had developed with local universities over the 
years. For instance Dynex had established links with Lincoln College (Dynex 
Semiconductor 2012c) and had been involved in collaborative R&D projects with 
the universities of Durham and Warwick in the past (The Engineer 2007).
In addition the Chinese investors used their newly acquired business units in
Britain to develop new collaborations with other universities. For instance SAIC’s
UK technical centre has ongoing research projects with the universities of
Coventry, Birmingham, Warwick, Loughborough, Cranfield, Brunei, Imperial
College London and Cambridge (Interviewee A1 2012, Interviewee A5 2012,
Interviewee A3 2012). Meanwhile PTG has research and development
collaborations with the universities of Fluddersfield, John Moores and Cranfield 
(Interviewee B1 2012).
The acquisition of British businesses enabled the Chinese multinationals to access 
know-how from external organisations in the wider business environment. For 
example SAIC was interested in developing technology with specialised 
consultancies such as Ricardo, FEV and AVL (Interviewee A3 2012). It made use 
of Ricardo’s powertrain expertise to develop new energy components for the 
Chinese market. One of the recent outcomes of the SAIC-Ricardo partnership was 
the joint development of a hybrid gearbox (Interviewee A1 2012).
CQME gained know-how from external partners through its newly acquired British 
business unit, PTG. This was particularly relevant when it came to technology in 
which PTG did not have experience. An example of this is a three-way 
collaborative project between CF1MTI, PTG and an external British consultancy to 
develop a new machine for the Chinese market. The consultants were brought in 
because of their knowledge of Siemens software with which neither PTG nor 
CFiMTI engineers were familiar (Interviewee B1 2012).
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Zhuzhou CSR Times arrPQQoH
pertise embedded in the semiconductor sector 
through its ownership of Dynex. Dynex took part in two industry-university
collaborations involving British universities and businesses (Wilson 2007). The first
project was a partnership between two universities and two high technology
companies, Areva T&D and Semefab to develop ultra high power thyristor
switches. Meanwhile the second project was a partnership between two
universities and two high technology companies, Converteam and Dudley
Associates for the purpose of building high power density transistor modules.
For asset-seeking companies SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times, the 
acquisition of existing businesses was the most effective way of accessing brands, 
technology and know-how. Flowever, the fourth asset-seeking Chinese 
multinational, Changan, had a different approach towards accessing the assets it 
needed. Although the company had asset-seeking motives, it operated slightly 
differently from the other three investors. Namely Changan was not interested in 
obtaining established brands or technology developed by other organisations. Its 
primary aim was to tap into advanced know-how embedded in the UK automotive 
industry. So instead of acquiring an existing business like the others, Changan set 
up a greenfield site. It established a research and development centre through 
which it could develop partnerships with local organisations.
Similar to SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times, Changan accessed know-how 
through collaborations with British businesses and universities. Changan was 
attracted by the prospect of collaborating with leading edge automotive 
consultancies based in the Midlands region. Organisations such as Ricardo, Mahle 
and MIRA were of particular significance because of Changan’s interest in 
powertrain technologies. Changan is currently working with a locally-based 
company called GNW which specialises in making prototypes (Interviewee D1 
2011) .
Changan was quite proactive in forming links with British universities. As part of its
investment decision Changan undertook comprehensive research into universities
located in the Midlands region with strengths in automotive R&D. The company
was particularly interested in powertrain R&D capabilities held by the universities
of Birmingham, Nottingham and Loughborough (Interviewee D1 2011). Changan
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has established contact with Leicestpr Dorn,, ^ r i  r-Leicester, Derby and Coventry universities and is
planning to further expand its university collaborations.
The evidence provided shows how Chinese asset-seeking investors used mainly 
acquisitions, and in one case greenfield investment, to gain access to brands, 
technology and know-how needed to increase their competitiveness.
In contrast the following section shows how the asset-exploiting investors 
achieved their aims through greenfield investments.
Asset-exploiting multinationals
This group of multinationals entered the UK by setting up greenfield sites because
it was the most effective way of achieving their key aim -  to increase sales in this
market. Mindray, Hytera, TP Link, Weigao and Vanceinfo established offices to
carry out research, learning, reputation building, new product development and 
product customisation.
One of the advantages of having a UK subsidiary is that it enabled the companies 
to conduct market research using local resources. For example Weigao undertook 
market research in collaboration with Essex Business School to develop an 
understanding of Chinese business in the UK and Europe (Interviewee E1 
2012).The business school also provided research and consultancy services in 
order to assist Weigao with identifying and implementing a suitable 
internationalisation strategy. The use of local research organisations enabled the 
company to access local knowledge and experience which would not have been 
possible if Weigao had been undertaking market research in China.
Having a UK office enabled the companies to gain in-depth knowledge of the UK 
market. It provided an opportunity to serve sophisticated markets and highly 
demanding customers in their respective industries (Interviewee F1 2012, 
Interviewee H1 2012). For example Mindray had the opportunity to learn from the 
sophistication of the UK healthcare system and the high procurement standards of 
the NHS, while Hytera learned from the high expectations set by professional 
mobile radio users. These development opportunities not only improved the 
multinationals’ chances of increasing their sales in the UK, but also enhanced their 
prospects of succeeding in other developed markets.
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Another advantage of having a UK office was that it enabled the Chinese MNEs to 
strengthen their image as global players. Hytera perceived that the company's UK 
success would provide a valuable reference for doing well in other advanced 
markets (Interviewee H1 2012). While for Vanceinfo having a UK subsidiary was a 
question of image. In their view it is difficult to become a global company without 
having a presence in Europe or the UK (Interviewee 11 2012). Compared to their 
global rivals the Chinese MNEs are not well-known in advanced markets. In order 
to succeed in the UK and elsewhere it is important that they raise their brand 
profiles and develop reputations as multinationals with a global presence.
Greenfield sites made it possible for some of the investors to develop new 
products for the UK market. Weigao is one such example. It is currently 
collaborating with partners in the UK to develop new products for the local market 
(Interviewee E1 2012). Although it has considerable R&D capacity in China, 
Weigao is taking advantage of R&D partners in the UK who already have 
experience in developing single-use medical devices for the local market.
The multinationals are using their UK bases to offer customised products to the 
local customer base. The levels of customisation range from low to high across the 
organisations. For example TP Link uses its UK office to supply products with 
different plugs (Interviewee G1 2012) while Mindray delivers medical devices 
adjusted according to specific customer requirements (Interviewee F1 2012). 
Flaving a UK office allows Mindray’s experts to work closely with customers to 
understand their needs and deliver highly customised products and services. 
Similarly Vanceinfo is able to maintain contact with its clients on a regular basis 
(Interviewee 11 2012). Software development requires close collaboration with 
customers because each solution is highly customised and in many cases unique 
to certain clients.
Flytera is also able to offer customised solutions because it has a UK subsidiary.
Its products are customised in collaboration with local application developers and
system integrators (Interviewee H1 2012). Having a local base ensures that Hytera
is close to both its customers and partners. Similarly Weigao is undertaking
product customisation for the UK market in collaboration with local partners. Some
of their products especially catheters and orthopaedic equipment tend to differ in
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sizes depending on the market they are intended for. Weigao's UK subsidiary i
currently working with British partners to develop products according to local 
requirements (Interviewee E1 2012)
The evidence provided illustrates how Chinese asset-exploiting investors made of
use their greenfield sites to achieve their aims. Their UK bases enabled them to
undertake a series of activities designed to increase sales in the UK. These
activities included research, learning, reputation-building, product customisation 
and new product development.
Having investigated their investment motives and use of investment modes, the
following section examines the challenges encountered by Chinese multinationals 
as they pursued their objectives.
8.4. C hallenges encountered
So far this research has argued that the investment motives of Chinese MNEs 
determined their choice of investment modes. Thus asset-seeking investors 
selected mainly acquisitions, while asset-exploiting investors selected greenfield 
investment. This section identifies the challenges encountered by the Chinese 
investors as they pursued their investment objectives. It shows that the two types 
of investors encountered different investment challenges in the UK, with the 
exception of one challenge which was common to both.
The issue of UK immigration regulations affected both greenfield investors and 
those that acquired British companies, making it difficult for Chinese nationals to 
visit their UK subsidiaries. The procedure for obtaining UK visas was costly and 
time-consuming for Chinese nationals whose applications for business visits were 
not always approved.
The inability of Chinese nationals to travel freely to the UK for business purposes 
was disruptive for acquiring companies such as SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR 
Times. Their interest in accessing know-how from the UK was hampered because 
of the inability of Chinese employees to travel when required. This was especially
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immigration regulations also had a negative effect on greenfield investors sue
as TP Link and Vanceinfo that were not focused on the acquisition of strategic
assets. For Vanceinfo the travel restrictions for Chinese nationals made
knowledge transfer from the parent company to the UK subsidiary quite difficult
(Interviewee 11 2012). The difficulties in transferring technology, processes and
company culture led to the isolation of the UK subsidiary from its parent company 
in China.
Other challenges that emerged from the case studies were found to be specific to
either greenfield investments or acquisitions. Companies that acquired British
businesses encountered cultural and organisational challenges, while greenfield
investors faced issues relating to their newcomer status, local knowledge and 
technical standards.
8.4.1. Challenges arising from acquisitions
Multinationals that invested via acquisitions encountered cultural and 
organisational challenges. Existing literature suggests that cultural differences can 
have a negative effect on the international activities of MNEs. Research in the 
area of knowledge transfer shows how cultural differences can be an impediment 
to knowledge sharing across organisations. For example research on inter- 
organisational knowledge transfer in joint ventures finds that cultural differences 
between international JV partners may hinder knowledge sharing (Buckley, 
Casson 1996, Hanvanich et al. 2005, Lyles, Salk 1996). Some highlight that 
cultural differences negatively affect the longevity of strategic alliances (Parkhe 
1991), while others have found cultural distance to be a frequent cause of 
misunderstanding between individuals (Bresman, Birkinshaw & Nobel 1999).
Studies on intra-organisational knowledge transfer have been equally insightful in 
further highlighting the problems caused by cultural differences. One such study 
illustrates that knowledge transfer is likely to be constrained when subsidiaries
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relevant in situations where eyperts item the Chinese parent company need, 
be physically present In the UK in order to learn a new technique o, process.
with different cultural dynamics are involved. Conversely it showed that knowledge 
transfer ,s hkely to be successful if subsidiaries are culturally aligned (Lucas 2006).
existing literature highlights the various contexts in which cultural differences 
can be a hindrance, this research suggests that cultural differences can impede 
Chinese multinationals from accomplishing their investment objectives. MNEs 
investing via acquisitions encountered cultural challenges relating to face, trust 
and language which made collaboration between British and Chinese colleagues
difficult.
Face
The notion of face in Chinese culture was a source of misunderstanding between 
Chinese and British colleagues which sometimes made collaboration difficult. 
Though the concept of face forms an intrinsic part of Chinese business culture, it 
does not exist in British culture and is therefore a relatively unfamiliar concept to 
British employees. The issue of face usually surfaced when there was a work- 
related problem that Chinese employees were aware of and were reluctant to 
inform their British colleagues about for fear of losing face. Not understanding that
this was actually a question of saving face’, the British employees misinterpreted 
the actions of their Chinese colleagues.
For example this occurred at SAIC when Chinese engineers were reluctant to 
discuss a problem openly with their British colleagues (Interviewee A5 2012). 
From a Chinese point of view this would reveal the cause of the problem which 
could potentially result in loss of face. In a similar situation at CQME Chinese 
engineers had not completed a task on time and were unwilling to disclose this to 
their British colleagues in order to preserve face (Interviewee B1 2012). This 
incident caused embarrassment for the Chinese engineers and frustration for the 
British once the truth came to light.
Trust
Given the importance of trust in Chinese culture, building trust has been an 
important aspect of establishing strong relationships between Chinese and British 
colleagues. Evidence from SAIC shows that British engineers who travelled to 
China frequently and invested time in getting to know their Chinese colleagues 
were likely to develop trust and good relationships (guanxi) (Interviewee A2 2012).
They tended to be well inteorafpH intr» th*-. u
business and appeared to maintain ver
n T  “ ‘I'™ ™ 031'0'’ ” Ml lheir Cl,lnese co-workers once they were back in the 
n e ot er hand, British engineers who did not travel to China as much did
not have the opportunity build ,ms, and strong relationships with thei, Chinese
colleagues (Interviewee A2 2012) Having only „ „ rked together remotely they did
not know each other and there a i- h , ^  + . . .mere was a lack of trust which precluded open
communication and effective collaboration.
Language
Communication proved to be a challenge for Chinese investors in Britain because 
of the language differences between Chinese and British employees. Most British 
employees did not speak Chinese whilst their Chinese colleagues spoke English 
with varying degrees of proficiency. The lack of common language made everyday 
communication and collaboration challenging. For example when CQME 
engineers visited PTG their levels of engagement were low because of the 
language barrier (Interviewee B1 2012). The situation was similar at SAIC where 
British engineers made an effort to learn Chinese but their skills were insufficient 
for everyday communication (Interviewee A7 2012). When they worked on projects
with Chinese colleagues with weak English language skills communication was 
difficult.
Cultural issues such as face, trust and language were more likely to surface in 
acquisitions because of the nature of this investment model which involves the 
merging of two distinctly different organisations. Employees in companies such as 
Dynex and PTG were accustomed to British business culture and were compelled 
to adapt to Chinese business culture once they were taken over by multinationals 
from China. Cultural expectations differed significantly in the new environment 
compared to what they were previously used to.
Chinese greenfield investors, on the other hand, were unlikely to experience the 
same cultural challenges experienced by acquiring multinationals. Greenfield 
investors were not tasked with integrating two organisations. They developed their 
own subsidiaries in the UK and had the flexibility to recruit new employees who 
fitted in with their corporate and national culture. These companies did not acquire 
large groups of employees who may not be compatible with the values and
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practices of the parent companies. In short low levels of cultural divergence within
greenfield business units enabled these investors to minimise the effects of 
cultural challenges.
The cultural issues arising out of acquisitions may also have been influenced by 
the ownership structure of the investing MNEs. Namely SAIC, CQME and 
Zhuzhou CSR Times were all traditional state-owned enterprises. Their 
management practices and business cultures differ significantly from the British 
companies they acquired. Thus merging the two could have been difficult because 
of how different their corporate cultures are. In contrast the Chinese greenfield 
investors are smaller, private and more modern enterprises. Their employees are 
on average relatively young and flexible In fact their corporate culture was not 
very different from that of companies in Britain, which is why they were perhaps 
not affected by cultural differences as profoundly as the SOEs.
Aside from cultural challenges, MNEs investing via acquisitions encountered
organisational challenges relating to hierarchy, management practice and
bureaucracy which posed difficulties for the integration of Chinese and British 
organisations.
Hierarchy
British and Chinese employees had different expectations when it came to 
organisational hierarchy. Chinese organisations, especially state-owned 
enterprises like CQME and SAIC, were quite hierarchical and their employees 
were accustomed to seeking approval even for minor decisions. For example at 
SAIC the process of starting a new project took weeks because it needed to be 
approved at several higher levels (Interviewee A5 2012). Decision-making 
occurred at managerial levels whereby employees were expected to follow 
instructions and did not have much influence over decisions (Interviewee A4 2012, 
Interviewee A3 2012).
The expectation was very different in British organisations where hierarchy was 
not as significant. Employees were not expected to seek approval for every 
decision and were generally more empowered to make some decisions 
themselves. They were encouraged to voice their opinions and participate in
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decision making regardless of their position in the company’s organisational
structure. For example it would be acceptable for a British engineer to discuss a
new strategic idea directly with the CEO. These differences could be a major
source of frustration and misunderstanding in situations where Chinese investors
are new to managing British employees that are used to less rigid hierarchies and 
more empowerment in the decision-making process.
Management practice
Significant differences in management practice were found between Chinese and 
British organisations. Traditional Chinese management was based on the issuing 
of instiuctions without much employee participation. For example the Chinese 
management at CQME had instructed PTG to increase its sales by 10% without 
providing opportunities to discuss whether or how this could be achieved 
(Interviewee B1 2012). British employees were used to a more participative style 
where they expected to be involved in discussions on target-setting and their 
views to be taken into consideration.
In Chinese organisations strategic decisions were made centrally and there was 
hardly any task delegation. Senior Chinese managers had the final say and they 
expected their decisions to be followed relentlessly. In contrast, British employees 
were used to playing a more prominent role in decision-making and expected 
decisions to be made by consensus. They expected managers to delegate tasks 
to a greater extent than their Chinese colleagues did. Like hierarchical differences, 
differences in management practice could also lead to difficulties when Chinese 
managers take a traditional approach towards managing British employees. From 
a British point of view these differences can lead to employees feeling 
undervalued, disempowered and consequently detached from the organisation 
and its strategic objectives.
Bureaucracy
Large Chinese state-owned enterprises tended to be more bureaucratic than 
British organisations which proved to be a source of frustration for British 
employees They perceived vast amounts of paperwork and involved procedures 
to be unnecessary and felt their time could be used more constructively. For 
instance purchasing orders at SAIC involved lengthy procedures whereby
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engineers had to obtain multiple signatures before a purchase could be authorised
(interviewee A3 2012). The same procedure applied to a„ purchases regardless of
value which could be quite frustrating for employees ordering low value items This
was especially true for former MG Rover engineers who were previously
authorised to order low value components without seeking approval whilst under 
British management.
These organisational differences turned into challenges when British companies 
like SAIC and PTG were taken over by Chinese multinationals. Employees were 
compelled to adjust to a more hierarchical system which excluded them from 
decision-making processes. Management decisions were made centrally and were 
expected to be followed. In addition they were also required to partake more often 
in lengthy bureaucratic procedures than before. It is inevitable that significant 
organisational differences such as these would lead to differences in opinion 
between British employees and Chinese management.
This research has shown that challenges arising from Chinese international 
acquisitions are likely to be caused by cultural and organisational divergence. 
Cultural differences relating to language, trust and the concept of face hindered 
inter-personal collaboration between Chinese and British employees. 
Organisational differences relating to hierarchy, bureaucracy and management 
practice generated friction between British employees and Chinese management
Having investigated the challenges arising from Chinese international acquisitions 
the following section discusses the challenges experienced by greenfield 
investors.
8.4.2. Challenges arising from greenfield investments
Chinese greenfield investors encountered challenges relating to their status as 
newcomer organisations, local knowledge and technical standards which are 
discussed in this section.
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Newcomer status
Greenfield investors encountered challenges because of their status as 
newcomers ,n the UK market. They found the market difficult to penetrate because 
of well established competitors that already had a strong presence. Mindray faced 
tough competition in the medical device sector from companies like Philips 
Healthcare and General Electric Healthcare that had been in the market many 
years before Mindray's entry in 2006 (Interviewee F1 2012). Similarly Hytera faced 
high level competition in the professional mobile communications sector where it
competed with market leaders such as Motorola that had been building credibility 
over the last 84 years (Interviewee H1 2012).
These companies had difficulties in penetrating the market because potential 
customers were unfamiliar with their names, brands and products. For example 
the NHS was identified as a potential key customer for Mindray. However most of 
the NHS s procurement staff had not heard of Mindray or its medical devices. 
Therefore the company had to invest significant time and effort in familiarising the 
NHS with its products and services. Hytera’s entry into the professional mobile 
radio communications market was also challenged by the company’s lack of 
credibility in the local market (Interviewee H1 2012).
As newcomers, some of the Chinese multinationals were not trusted by local 
customers. The IT outsourcing market, for example, is dominated by companies 
from India and Eastern Europe that are considered to be reliable outsourcing 
destinations. Most customers did not have experience in working with Chinese 
companies and did not perceive China to be a valid IT outsourcing destination. 
Some potential clients were sceptical about the quality of products and services 
provided by Chinese companies. They had concerns over intellectual property 
right protection, English language capability and the political system in China 
(Interviewee 11 2012).
Local knowledge
Although the MNEs were successful in China and in other international markets 
they lacked UK-specific knowledge. Some were unfamiliar with local business 
practices. For instance, TP Link’s lack of knowledge of local accounting practices
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meant that tt had to engage a third party organisation to assist with its accoonts 
(Interviewee G1 2012).
Others lacked knowledge about British market conditions. One company was
unaware of the skills and competencies needed to enter the UK market and
consequently its first attempt was unsuccessful (Interviewee 11 2012). In the first
instance the company sent an executive from China with no sales training or local
contacts and limited English language capability. Having learned about local
market conditions from this experience the company’s second entry attempt was 
more successful.
Although it had successfully launched a subsidiary in Germany, TP Link found that 
it did not have enough knowledge of how distribution channels are managed in the 
hardware market (Interviewee G1 2012). The UK has one of the most mature IT 
markets in the world and its distribution channels have a different structure from 
those in the Far East and mainland Europe which 1 P Link had experience in.
Technical standards
Some of the companies were confronted with technical barriers which placed them 
at a disadvantage in the host market. Flytera encountered this problem when it 
entered the UK professional mobile radio market which uses European encryption 
standards (Interviewee H1 2012). This technology is widely used by national 
armies and police forces across Europe and its use is restricted to European 
organisations in the interests of public security. Hytera needed to use the 
encryption technology in its products in order to compete effectively but was not 
permitted to do so because of its non-European origin.
The evidence of this research shows that the same challenges were not 
encountered by all of the MNEs examined. Although one challenge was common 
to all of the investors, each type of investment had its own set of challenges to 
contend with. Acquiring MNEs were challenged by issues relating to the 
integration of distinctly different organisations. They experienced a range of 
cultural and organisational challenges. On the other hand, greenfield investors 
were challenged by issues arising from independent entry into a new market. They
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experienced issues relating to their 
technical standards
newcomer status, lack of local knowledge and
So far this research has demonstrated the diversity of investment motives and 
their influence on the multinationals’ choice of investment modes, whereas this 
section focuses on the effects of these investments. It shows that the effects of 
Chinese multinationals vary according to their investment motivations and 
investment modes. Thus companies motivated by access to strategic assets 
influenced different British business partners compared to market access-seeking 
ones.
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8.5.1. Asset-seeking investors
This group consisted of four companies SAIC, CQME, Zhuzhou CSR Times and 
Changan. They all invested in the UK to acquire new assets but their use of 
different investment modes meant that they had diverse effects on the British
The previous two sections on investment modes (8.3) and challenges encountered 
(8 4) have demonstrated that the MNEs not only used different investment modes 
to achieve their aims, but that each investment mode carried its own specific set of 
challenges. The next section of this thesis discusses the effects of the Chinese 
MNEs on British business partners and the factors which influenced them.
8.5. Effects on British business partners
Some have argued that effects of Chinese FDI in Europe are insignificant because 
aggregate investment levels from China are relatively low (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010, 
Clegg, Voss 2012). The same view has been put forward for individual European 
countries such as France (Nicolas 2012) and Germany (Xu, Petersen & Wang 
2012) where investments from China remain modest. Others observe that we have 
not yet had a chance to consider the implications of Chinese FDI in Europe 
because it is still a new phenomenon (Milelli, Hay & Shi 2010). Their view is that a 
longer time lapse may be required before the effects can be fully grasped. Despite 
these observations the results of this research show that Chinese multinationals 
are significantly influencing British business partners. Moreover most of the 
findings are supported by existing empirical evidence.
business sector. SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times chose to invest via
acquisitions and the effects of their investments were concentrated on acquired
companies and partner organisations they worked with. The acquired companies 
WGT6 affected in the following ways;
/Access to capital
Prior to receiving investment from Chinese companies MG Rover, PTG and Dynex
were in financial arrears to varying degrees. MG Rover was in the least favourable
position. It had experienced a decade of financial difficulty culminating in
liquidation before an investor could be found. PTG had a large debt and cash-flow
problems (Interviewee B3 2012). Its business was negatively affected by the
recession -  orders had decreased and the company was compelled to make
redundancies (Hibbert 2010). Meanwhile Dynex was facing a funding shortfall and
consequently was not able to upgrade its manufacturing facilities as required (Liu 
2013).
Once the companies received investment from China their financial positions 
improved significantly. MG Rover’s legacy company SMTC UK was created on the 
back of funding from SAIC. It was established as SAIC’s R&D arm and as such all 
its activities were funded by SAIC (Interviewee A1 2012). It is essentially a cost 
centre with no revenue generating capabilities of its own and is entirely financially 
dependent on its parent company. PTG’s financial troubles came to an end when it 
was acquired by CQME. The financial resources provided by the Chinese investor 
improved PTG’s operational performance and its finances (Interviewee B3 2012). 
Thanks to CQME’s strong links to the Chinese banking industry it was able to 
expand PTG's credit limit which improved its cash-flow situation. Similarly Dynex’s 
access to financial resources was improved by investment from Zhuzhou CSR 
Times which enabled the company to make improvements to its facilities 
(Interviewee C1 2012).
SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times received considerable investment from 
their Chinese parent companies. The investments in office buildings and 
manufacturing facilities reflect the Chinese investors intentions to develop their 
UK subsidiaries for the long-term. SAIC refurbished the main office building at
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SMTC's Longbridge site which houses most of its employees. It also expanded the 
assembly workshop and built a new design studio.
CQME has also been proactive about developing the facilities at PTG. The 
Chinese manufacturer has agreed to support PTG's relocation to a new site 
designed to enhance the company's facilities, production capacity and market 
image (Interviewee B1 2012). Similarly Zhuzhou CSR Times invested £30 million 
in Dynex to improve its facilities (Interviewee C1 2012). The Chinese parent 
company purchased the land and buildings used by Dynex and then built a new 
energy efficient building which was completed in 2012. It houses Dynex’s R&D 
team, financial team, executive offices and conference rooms. Zhuzhou CSR 
Times also invested £12.5 million to upgrade Dynex’s production line.
The positive financial effects on acquired British firms are consistent with existing 
research which suggests that firms from China and other emerging markets are an 
important source of capital for developed countries. Chinese acquisitions were 
instrumental to keeping French firms from going bankrupt (Nicolas 2012).
Meanwhile German companies were keen to be taken over by Chinese 
multinationals because of guaranteed access to capital (Gentile-Ludecke 2013). 
Capital injections from China (Hanemann, Rosen 2012) and India (Charlie 2012) 
were especially important to European countries during the economic crisis when 
FDI from traditional foreign investors was significantly reduced (Milelli, Hay & Shi 
2010). Evidence suggests that Indian companies located in Germany intend to 
make further investments in the short to medium term (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009).
Employment
As a result of the investment from their parent companies SMTC UK, PTG and 
Dynex were able to maintain, and in some cases, increase their employee 
numbers. Following the closure of MG Rover 600-700 development engineers 
were made redundant (Interviewee A2 2012). SAIC’s decision to develop an 
engineering centre in the UK led to the initial employment of 60 of them. As the 
business developed the number of employees increased to approximately 300 
(Interviewee A1 2012). Many of SMTC's employees have permanent contracts
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and SAIC is financing the company's pension scheme. A dedicated HR
department has also been set up to ensure that employees receive necessary 
support from their employer (Interviewee A4 2012).
PIG had been In a Precarious position prior to CQME’s investment. It was owned 
by venture capitalists who were primarily interested in generating short-term profits 
(Interviewee B3 2012). They were not interested in developing PTG for the long-
term which had implications for the company's employees. Their jobs depended 
on the decisions made by venture capitalists which meant that there was little job 
stability. However once CQME had acquired PTG, job stability increased 
substantially because of CQME’s long-term plans for the company. PTG managed 
to retain all 220 of its employees because of CQME's investment (Bannan 2012). 
Similarly Dynex retained all 200 of its employees when Zhuzhou CSR Times 
bought a majority share in the company. Since then Dynex has recruited 100 new 
employees based on growing business needs (Interviewee C1 2012). So far the 
companies acquired by Chinese investors have managed to preserve, and in 
some cases, even increase employee numbers. Given the ambitions and 
expansionist tendencies displayed by the Chinese giants and the strategic roles 
played by their UK subsidiaries, there is likely to be a need for further recruitment 
in both China and the UK.
While some extant empirical evidence suggests that employments effects in 
Europe are modest or varied, most research shows that they are in fact positive 
which supports the findings of this study. The effects in France were mixed 
because some Chinese investments led to plant closures and job losses while 
others resulted in new jobs and plant expansion (Nicolas 2012). Employment 
effects in Germany appear to be low relative to other foreign investors. Estimates 
suggest that Chinese companies employed approximately 6,600 employees in 
2010 while US companies employed approximately 741,000 during that year (Xu,
Petersen & Wang 2012).
On the other hand other evidence suggests that Chinese companies have
preserved and created new jobs in Europe. An estimated 428 Chinese greenfield
projects created 15,000 new jobs in Europe between 2000 and 2011. Geely’s
acquisition of Volvo preserved 16,000 jobs and led to the creation of new jobs as a
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resu't of its European-wide investment program Meanwhile Beijing No 1 Machine 
Too, turned around Waldrich Coburg, a German machinery maker increasing
2 O ^ToTs m T r  fr° m 500 t0 800 (Hanemann' Rose" 2012). Huawei created 
Shj 2Q1 Q) n ' S Ur° Pean subsid|aries, while COSCO created 800 (Milelli, Hay &
m other emerging markets such as India have also had positive 
employment effects in Europe. In Germany companies from India created more 
jobs than they lost (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009). Like the Chinese, Indian investors also 
preserved jobs and turned around troubled companies. For instance Tata’s 
takeover of Jaguar Land Rover first led to several thousand job losses but once 
the company's position improved 8,000 new jobs were created (Charlie 2012).
/Access to new markets
Being owned by large Chinese parent companies has provided SMTC UK, PTG 
and Dynex with access to the Chinese market and in some instances to other new 
markets. SMTC UK is dedicated to designing and developing new vehicles 
primarily for the Chinese market (Interviewee A2 2012, Interviewee A6 2012). The 
Chinese passenger car market is already very large, selling between 14-15 million 
cars in 2012 and it is likely to continue to grow. Although SMTC is based in the UK 
it is effectively part of the automotive growth model in China (Interviewee A2
2012). So far its engineers have been involved in three completely new products 
for the Chinese market (Interviewee A4 2012).
Since PTG was acquired by CQME there has been a noticeable drive towards 
expansion and sales (Interviewee B1 2012). From the beginning PTG was planned 
to have a leading {{449 Allcock,Andrew 2010>}role in the company’s expansion 
into new markets (Allcock 2010). Its close relationship with CQME is likely to open 
up new market opportunities in China. For instance PTG Heavy Industries is 
breaking into the Chinese market having recently designed and developed a 
Powerstir friction-stir-welding machine for a Chinese company (Machinery Market 
2013). It is also entering new markets such as Russia and the US.
Zhuzhou CSR Times’ strong position in the railway construction industry in China 
has secured Dynex’s route to this market (Interviewee C1 2012). There is fast-
growing demand for railway eauinmpnt in ™
key component high s p e e d ! „ 7 s  T  “  ^  ^  m° " eS 8,6 3
has become Dynex’s most sionif ' aCqUiS" ” n Zhu2hou CSR
, i . . .  hmese parent company has also plaved a
Chjna 0 Y ex s products to a range of high tech companies across
Hosting Chinese investment in the UK is beneficial from the point of view that it 
encourages UK investment in China (Hanemann, Rosen 2012) But it also 
facilitates the market entry of small and medium-sized European firms into China 
(Clegg, Voss 2012), For instance German firms are in favour of being taken oyer 
b , Chinese investors because of the prospect of expanding into the Chinese 
market with the support of the acquirer (Gentile-Ludecke 2013) The German 
companies can receive help in building relationships in China, understanding 
Chinese business culture, getting to know appropriate suppliers and resolving 
legal and administrative issues (Knoerich 2010).
R&D activity
The investments by SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times have enhanced R&D 
activity in acquired organisations. As a research and development centre, SMTC 
UK was established to generate intellectual property for SAIC. It carries out high 
end R&D work including vehicle design and development The centre covers the 
whole creative journey of a car, system or component from concept to reality. It 
also undertakes testing of whole vehicles, systems or components. SMTC UK 
performs rapid prototyping and styling and is involved in quality management, 
safety testing and programme management (Interviewee A8 2012). The centre’s 
design and development solutions are developed from a clean sheet of paper 
(Interviewee A2 2012).
SAIC’s investment in R&D facilities will increase the centre’s capacity for vehicle 
design and development. The UK design studio is currently being expanded. The 
value of the expansion is estimated at £1.5 million. The studio’s size will be 
doubled and it will be equipped with a new visualisation suite, improved modelling 
facilities and a CNC (computer numerical control) five axis milling machine. Its
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increased capacity will allow desianer<? tn l-
models a, a time <,„te,yiemee A5 2012) ° "  3 ma" " Um " #e
PTG lias continued develop high,y |nnovative products since ha 
acquired by the CQME Gmi m r „ ,  , 9 n
, nn h ,■ , ... P orexamPle PTG introduced the Holroyd Zenith
m 9 "derm 2011, the first of its kind to combine all three grinding
..  , “  ' den 2011). PTC,s a ,so developing a new gear grinding
machine ,or ,he Chinese market „ h ich makes commercia| qua% geafs for
passenger cars, vans and trucks (Interviewee B1 2012). CQME’s intentions to
develop PIG'S existing Rochdale site into a high end RSD centre (Marsh 2012)
suggest that PTG is likely to be heavily i „ , „ , „ ed i„ R&D projects in the prospective 
future.
Dynex's capacity to conduct high end R&D is likely to be increased as a result of 
investment from Zhuzhou CSR T,mes. The parent company invested £1.8 million
m a new R&D centre in Lincoln (Dynex Semiconductor 2012c) to meet growing 
demand for semiconductor products in China and other parts of the world. The
new products and technologies will be developed for railway transportation, wind 
power, smart grids and electric cars (Dynex Semiconductor 2012c). The significant 
investment indicates the parent company’s intent to increase Dynex’s capacity for 
high end research for the benefit of the entire organisation.
There is evidence of R&D intensification across Europe as a result of Chinese 
investment. Companies like Haier, ZTE and Huawei have developed extensive 
R&D networks in Europe. Other smaller companies such as Goldwind, Beijing 
No.1 and Shenyang Machine Tools have set up R&D centres in Germany 
(Schuller, Meuer & Schuler-Zhou 2012). Multinationals from other emerging 
economies such as India are also keen to conduct R&D activities in Europe. Indian 
companies in Germany are engaged in R&D activities such as product 
development and plan to strengthen this type of activity in the future. Many of them 
already have collaborations with customers, suppliers, research institutions and 
other firms (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009). Given their low cost advantage Indian 
companies can help developed country firms to reduce costs by increasing the 
availability of funds for R&D activities (Pradhan 2007).
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New skills and knowledge
By working closely wi.b Cb,„ese colleagues and
Chinese market SMTC UK p m  „  ,, ~ M or tne
Chinese business culture ano'he c  “  9aini" 9 8 ^  ° ' ' " * *  **>
Chinese engineers a „d ~
of the way in which Chinese nmanieo** . y
se organisations work. At the same time their
involvement in the develonmemt of
. ... w products is a good opportunity to learn
about the tastes and preferences of the Chinese market. Knowledge of both
Chinese business culture and the Chinese market is beneficial for the acquired 
companies whose business interests are now closely linked to China.
Similar evidence has emerged out of an empirical study of Chinese acquisitions in
Germany which suggests that significant knowledge is being transferred from
Chinese to German firms. In particular German companies are learning about
Chinese culture, the significance of relationship building and how to problem-solve
in the Chinese business environment (Knoerich 2010) In addition it has been
suggested that Chinese firms may be transferring entrepreneurial business models 
through their investments in the EU (Clegg, Voss 2012).
Interestingly there is some evidence of technological knowledge transfer from 
China to Britain. This is observed in the interaction between Chinese and British 
engineers at SAIC. SAIC is investing substantial funds, skills and expertise into 
new energy power train technologies in China. It has set up a New Energy Power 
Train (NEPT) centre driven by C02 emissions, electric vehicles and hybrid electric 
vehicles. Although British engineers based at SMTC UK had very limited 
experience of these technologies they supported the NEPT team in creating the 
vehicle environment. British engineers used conventional engineering skills while 
the Chinese engineers used their new energy power train skills (Interviewee A1 
2012). The experience of working with the NEPT team in China enabled British 
engineers to develop their knowledge of powertrain technologies.
Although some research suggests that Chinese firms are not yet in a position to 
transfer superior technology to the UK (Clegg, Voss 2012), there is evidence to 
suggest that some technology is already being transferred from emerging market 
to developed country firms. Namely a study of Indian multinationals in Germany
suggests that there is active m, u
Germany (Tiwari, Herstatt 2009) F ^  n0'°9y betW6en lndia and
Germany and now from the UK ind ' " T ' Z  ^  teChn° '° 9y transfer from
possess or are in the process of deve? ' emer9'" 9 ^  
to developed country firms ^  ° '° 9ieS Whlch could be be" ef^
Competitiveness
Dynex and PTG bavu become mom comped,;,e once ,bey were audited by 
Chinese multinationals. The examination o, SMTC's competitiveness is no, 
relevant at this point because „  is no, an independent business uni, and effective!, 
operates as SAICs RSD centre. The competitiveness o, Dynex and PTG has 
been enhanced because of some of the factors outlined above.
Access to capital has provided the companies with financial stability and the
opportunity to upgrade their offices and manufacturing facilities. With the support
of their new owners they expanded into China and other new markets. The
Chinese desire for new technologies and substantial investment in R&D facilities
led to increased R&D activity. The interaction with Chinese colleagues and
businesses enhanced their knowledge of Chinese business culture, while the
development of new products for China extended their knowledge of the Chinese 
market.
Together these changes have contributed towards increased competitiveness of 
British companies acquired by Chinese multinationals. Similar evidence has 
emerged from Germany and France suggesting that domestic companies became 
more competitive once they were acquired by Chinese multinationals (Nicolas 
2012, Knoerich 2010).
Identity and autonomy
Companies such as PTG and Dynex remained relatively independent of their
Chinese parent companies. CQME made a concerted effort to keep PTG
independent because it wanted to preserve the company’s market image as a
British company. It pursues its business interests with little interference from
CQME. Few changes were made at Dynex for the same reasons. Both companies
have a largely British workforce with few Chinese managers based in the UK. For
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• 9 poin of Vlew because, in both cases the
motivated by technology and knowledge. Both assets are
created by and embedded in Pvte«n« = , are
. . .  P niployees and therefore represented the
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The situation with MG Reverts legacy is slightly different in that the company was 
initially set up as SAIC’s outpost Thus the British-based technical centre is more 
integrated with its parent company compared to PTG and Dynek. II has only four 
senior Chinese managers who lead the finance, HR, engineering and IT 
departments while the engineering workforce is predominantly British The levels 
of autonomy are "different at different levels" (Intewiewee A2 2012) but overall it 
seems that strategic direction comes from China while there is relatively more 
freedom when it comes to day to day activities.
Findings with regard to the autonomy and independence of British companies are 
supported by evidence from Germany. Namely German companies acquired by 
the Chinese were granted high levels of autonomy and independence (Knoerich 
2010, Gentile-Ludecke 2013). The majority of employees were German including 
the managers who had full autonomy over day to day operations. The Chinese 
parent companies had significantly more involvement in strategic matters.
SAIC, CQME and Zhuzhou CSR Times also influenced the business activities of a 
range of British partner organisations. Their desire to develop new technologies 
led to the establishment of collaborative relationships with British universities and 
specialised consultancies. The Chinese multinationals generated new demand for 
knowledge-intensive services which were provided by these local organisations. 
PTG, for example, has research and development collaborations with the 
universities of Huddersfield, John Moores and Cranfield (Interviewee B1 2012). 
PTG also collaborates with local consultancies when it needs particular expertise 
that cannot be found within the organisation. For instance external consultants
were brought in when PTG was developing a new machine but did have 
experience cedain spttware that was needed tor the proiec, (interviewee B,
s UK technical centre has ongoing research projects with the universities of
Coventry, Birmingham, Warwick, Loughborough, Cranfield, Brunei, Impenai
College London and Cambridge (Interviewee At 2012, Interviewee A5 2012
interviewee A3 2012) The company is also interested in developing technology
With specialised consultancies such as Ricardo, FEV and AVL (Interviewee A3
2012), It collaborated with Ricardo on new energy powertrain technologies 
(Interviewee A1 2012).
Dynex has links with several British universities including Nottingham,
Loughborough and Warwick amongst others (Dynex Semiconductor 2012c). It has
strong links with Lincoln College and is currently building a relationship with the
newly established Engineering School at the University of Lincoln (Dynex
Semiconductor 2012c). In the past Dynex has been involved in collaborative R&D
projects with the universities of Durham and Warwick (The Engineer 2007) The
company also collaborates with local knowledge-intensive consultancies. It took
part in two industry-university collaborations involving British universities and 
businesses (Wilson 2007).
Similar to the other three Chinese multinationals, Changan invested in the UK to 
acquire new assets. However, its effect on British businesses was not the same 
because it employed a different investment mode. Unlike the other multinationals 
that used acquisitions, Changan set up a greenfield site The effects of this type of 
investment were concentrated on partner organisations. Changan’s investment 
had an effect on partner organisations including service providers, universities and 
automotive consultancies. Its presence represented a new source of revenue for 
local service providers. Changan engaged local companies to provide services 
that were not available at the Nottingham R&D centre because of limited facilities. 
The company used MIRA’s testing facilities and GNW’s prototyping services 
amongst others (Interviewee D1 2011).
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angan established relationships with local universities for the purpose of
w iT theU n SPeC'tflC teChn0l° 9'es' '* was in«erested in forming R&D collaborations 
with he University of Birmingham because of its expertise in powertrain research
e University of Nottingham because of its skills in engine development and 
oug borough University for its competencies in engine testing (Interviewee D1 
■ Although ,t already had some university links, Changan was keen to extend 
i s co aborations to other universities in the region such as Leicester, Derby and
Coventry. Changan formed links with British automotive consultancies also for the 
purpose of joint technological development. Reputable companies such as 
Ricardo, Cosworth and Mahle were of particular interest (Interviewee D1 2011).
Changan s tendency to establish technological collaborations with local 
universities and consultancies was beneficial because it stimulated high end, 
knowledge intensive projects within these organisations. This contributed towards 
the buoyancy of the British automotive R&D sector, ensuring that it stays at the 
leading edge of automotive technology through continuous knowledge generation.
This section demonstrates that not all asset-seeking investors had the same 
effects because of the different investment modes that were utilised. Both 
greenfield investors and those invested via acquisitions contributed towards the 
intensification of research and development activities in external partner 
organisations. However companies that invested via acquisition also had profound 
effects on the companies they acquired. The effects were largely positive and led 
to the development and growth of the target companies. Having examined the 
effects caused by asset-seeking investors, the following section discusses the 
effects of asset-exploiting investors.
8.5.2. Asset-exploiting investorsw m  m  ^ ~  ^  M  m  W W W  ^  a  w  w  w  w  ^  V
group consisted of five companies Mindray, Hytera, TP Link, Weigao
" T m  i i I f  i o  I c* I rt f  K  ^  I I W +/~\ n v n l m f  n v i o f  i * - \ c * c * 4
and
Vanceinfo. These multinationals invested in the UK to exploit existing assets and 
the effects of their investments were concentrated on competitors, customers and 
partner organisations.
229
Competitors
The arrival of Ch.nese multinational led to the intensification of competition in 
some sectors. For instance Hytera’s entry into the DMR market meant that
Motorola was no longer the sole manufacturer of these devices. Hytera heightened 
competition ,n the professional mobile radio sector when ,t became the second
3 7 "  the W° rld t0 SUPP'y devices usin9 DMR standard (Interviewee H1 
2d2_ Th'S market mche had been less competitive in the past because Motorola 
was the only supplier of DMR devices. In the medical device sector Mindray had 
put ,ts competitors under pressure. This was reflected in some of their annual 
reports which described Hytera as a “big threat" (Interviewee F1 2012).
The Chinese computer network equipment company, TP Link had also intensified 
competition in its sector The company's remarkably rapid growth in the UK
caused its competitors’ market share to decline. TP Link’s UK revenue grew
approximately 10 fold in the last three years at the expense of competitors such as
D-Link and Edimax (Interviewee G1 2012). Two years ago D-Link, the Taiwanese
network equipment supplier had been a strong player in the UK but today its
presence is insignificant Edimax, another Taiwanese company in this sector was
doing quite well in the past but is currently generating hardly any business at all 
(Interviewee G1 2012).
The increasingly competitive environment created by Chinese companies caused 
its competitors to change their behaviour in a number of ways. Pressure from 
Hytera compelled its competitors to change their service policies, prices and to 
work more closely with customers (Interviewee H1 2012). In the medical device 
market Mindray’s competitors have also had to amend their pricing policies and to 
carefully consider potential price increases (Interviewee F1 2012). In the past they 
would readily increase their prices but are no longer in this privileged position. 
Instead the companies have to compete on the basis of price by either matching or 
lowering their prices below Mindray’s. The competitors have also introduced new 
products in order to compete with Mindray’s offerings. For instance one competitor 
acquired a company in China, rebranded the products and introduced them into 
the European market (Interviewee F1 2012).
The competitive effects caused by the entry of Chinese multinationals have both a 
positive and a negative side Th*
rival firm s to  h b 'S ^ Inlensified competition compels
7 s ‘°  be m° re their prices. Caring babe, services or
innova ing more. On the other hand competitive pressure can also lead to the
downfall o. incumbent firms or even tndustries (Mile®, Ha, s Shi 2010, These
effects can be observed after TP Link's entry into the UK whereb, two relatively 
successful competitors suffered significant loss of market share.
Customers
The entry of Chinese companies has provided UK customers with enhanced
value, choice, innovation and customisation. These companies are providing
customers with enhanced value by supplying high quality products and services
that are competitively priced. For instance customers in the professional mobile
radio industry can purchase Hytera’s devices that have the highest price to
performance ratio in the market (Interviewee H1 2012). The company does not
offer the most technologically advanced products or the least expensive. Its
market strategy is to provide the best possible products within a particular price 
range which directly benefits customers.
Mindray has also enhanced value for customers in the healthcare sector. Prior to 
the company’s investment customers could choose between two to three suppliers 
all of which offered products at high prices. They offered to repair existing medical 
devices whereas Mindray offered to replace them for a slightly higher fee 
(Interviewee F1 2012). Mindray’s offer represented better value for customers 
because they could have new machines for a similar price. This is especially 
relevant for the NFIS which is actively pursuing a cost-cutting strategy while 
maintaining or improving levels of service. By purchasing medical machines from 
Mindray, the NFIS can lower its costs without compromising on service because 
the devices are just as reliable as rival products.
TP Link has also brought additional value to customers in the computer networking
equipment market. The company provides reliable, easy to use products at
affordable prices. The products represent good value because customers are
paying half the price for better products and services (Interviewee G1 2012).
Unsurprisingly TP Link is already ranked number two in terms of UK market share
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'n *he ; ma" ° ff,Ce 3nd h0me segment. It is fast catching up with Netgear the
current marker leader (Interviewee G1 2012). 'th Netgear, the
The" PreS6nCe iS a,S0 beneficial from the point of view of choice whereby 
cus omers are now ,n a position to choose from a larger pool of suppliers. In the 
past customers ,n the medical device market only had two to three suppliers to 
choose from. The,r products were priced higher than Mindray's and once the 
customer opted for one supplier it would be difficult to switch to a different one 
because of staff trammg issues and the existence of a large number of machines 
made by the initial supplier (Interviewee F1 2012). Since Mindray's products have 
become available to UK customers they now have a new supplier to choose from.
Instead of paying high prices for repairs they can choose to spend slightly more to 
have their machines replaced In the same sector, Weigao is developing new 
products and services for the UK market (Interviewee E1 2012). When the 
products are launched customers will be able to choose from a wider range of 
suppliers when considering where to purchase single use medical equipment.
Since the arrival of MNEs from China, customers have had access to innovative 
products that were previously unavailable For instance Mindray is supplying 
British hospitals with new products that are designed better than their competitors' 
Mindray has developed products that customers have wanted for a long time but 
have not been available prior to the company’s entry into the UK market 
(Interviewee F1 2012). The customers were surprised when the products were 
introduced and were prepared to purchase them even though they already had 
machines made by other suppliers.
In some segments the companies offered higher levels of product customisation 
compared to their competitors. Unlike its competitors, Mindray offers its customers 
a very high level of product customisation. It works together with hospitals to 
assess their specific requirements and creates proposals based on this. The 
company is quite flexible when it comes to meeting specific user requirements and 
their machines are designed to allow for further adjustments (Interviewee F1 
2012). Mindray has the capacity to make a wide range of adjustments such as 
changes to the device interface for example. An extensive database containing 
customer requirements enables the company to make these adjustments within a
“ I T 0"  (,nle™eWee M 20,2)- ° Wi" 9 “ indray s ' »  « »  UK
oroducls h 'h 0rS are 'n 3 P° Siti0n t0 b8nefit fr° m highly cust°^ ised
are not being offered by any other medical device suppliers.
The presence of firms from emerging markets can improve consumer welfare 
through lower paces, product diversity and innovation. These benefits apply to 
products but also to services. Some Chinese firms have already established a
^ Presence in Europe in the telecommunications sector (Hanemann, Rosen 
2012). For instance Huawei and ZTE have reduced investment costs in Europe 
which have been passed down to consumers. Similarly companies from India have 
contributed towards product diversity in advanced economies through the supply 
of lower cost substitute products (Pradhan 2007). For example Indian 
pharmaceutical companies manufacture generic medicines for a fraction of the 
cost of patented ones (Charlie 2012), In the US competition from emerging market
firms is lowering the costs of generic medicines and providing US consumers with 
additional choice (Greene 2007).
Partner organisations
The multinationals influenced distributors, knowledge intensive partner 
organisations and suppliers in Britain. First, their presence generated additional 
revenue for local distributors. For instance Hytera, TP Link and Weigao distributed 
their products via local distributors that benefitted from having new products in 
their portfolios. TP Link provided its distributors with higher margins (Interviewee
G1 2012) compared to other suppliers, making the collaboration even more 
profitable from the distributors’ point of view.
Second, the multinationals created high-end opportunities for local knowledge 
intensive partner organisations. Some of the partners assisted the Chinese MNEs 
in delivering high-value, knowledge intensive products and services e.g. Hytera’s 
application partners and system integrators. Application partners develop 
applications or programs based on customer requirements. For instance they may 
develop applications for GPS tracking, emergency calls or building management 
(Interviewee H1 2012). Hytera provides the platform, while the application partners 
are responsible for developing programs which perform user-specific functions. 
System integrators combine the equipment with the applications to deliver
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integrated professional mobile recto solution to customers. They also pro„de staff 
training and after sales supped (tntewiewee H1 2012,. Tberr ,ob is ,o i tegrate
'  s it e  I  S,a,“ S and aPPliCa“ 0nS -  end users ale trained
to use the products and that any emerging issues are resolved
Meanwhile other padners engaged in the development of new products fo, the 
Chinese multinationals. An example of this is Weigao's single use medical 
equipment which cannot be standardised across infernational markets. For 
instance odhopaedic equipment for the Chinese market differs from equipment
the UK So Weigao is collaborating with local organisations to develop new
products according to local specifications e g. size and design (Interviewee E1 
2012) .
Finally, some suppliers are utilising their relationships with Chinese multinationals 
to promote their products in new markets. This is illustrated by Mindray’s suppliers 
whose products are being launched in Brazil and China. Modules made by 
specialised suppliers are key components of Mindray’s medical devices. Mindray 
collaborates with numerous suppliers whose modules are then integrated into the 
machines. Some of the module suppliers are not well known in markets such as 
China and Brazil in which Mindray is well-established (Interviewee F1 2012) With
Mindray’s help the suppliers’ products are being promoted and their brands are 
being developed in these markets.
For example a German supplier makes modules which measure cardiac output i.e 
the volume of blood pumped with every heartbeat (Interviewee F1 2012).The new 
parameter is incorporated into Mindray’s devices which are being sold in China 
This provides the company with an opportunity to promote the modules along with 
disposable accessories which can be sold to Chinese customers.
8.6. Concluding remarks
The evidence presented by this research illustrates that Chinese multinationals 
influenced British business partners in different ways. This variation was caused 
by differences in investment motives and investment modes between the 
multinationals. The strategic asset-seeking MNEs that set up greenfield sites or
acquired existing companies contributed towards the intensification of research 
and development activities in partner organisations. MNEs invested via 
acquisitions also made substantial improvements to the companies they acquired 
and contributed towards their further growth. These findings are summarised in the
table below:
Table 13 - Chinese asset-seeking investors
Company Investment motives Investment Investment effects
SAIC MG brand, vehicle 
blueprints and development 
know-how
modes
Acquisition
CQME PTG’s reputation, advanced Acquisition 
technology and innovative 
capability
Zhuzhou Dynex’s semiconductor Acquisition
CSR Times technology and strong R&D
capability
Changan Expertise in automotive 
engineering especially 
powertrain
subsidiary
Source: Author’s database
- Access to Chinese fast-
growing automotive 
market
- Development of in-house 
R&D centre
- Debt reduction and 
improved cash-flow
- Establishment of R&D 
partnerships with local 
universities
- Upgraded manufacturing 
facilities
- Development of in-house 
R&D centre
Wholly-owned - Establishment of R&D
partnerships with local 
consultancies and 
universities
Meanwhile the effects caused by asset-exploiting multinationals were oriented 
towards research and development to a lesser extent. The presence of MNEs that 
sought to exploit their assets via greenfield investment proved beneficial to British 
customers. These companies raised competitiveness levels in their respective 
sectors. In addition they generated high value, knowledge intensive business 
opportunities for their partners in the UK and in some cases overseas. The effects 
of these investors were more market focused than the previous group because
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their UK activities were largely market-driven. These findings are summarised in
the table below:
Table 14 Chinese asset-exploiting investors
Company
Weigao
Mindray
TP Link
Hytera
Vanceinfo
Investment motives
Access medical equipment 
market, new product 
development
Access medical device 
market as part of global 
expansion strategy
Access computer networking 
market, product localisation
Access professional 
telecommunications market, 
experiential learning
Proximity to existing 
customers, expansion of 
customer base
Investment 
modes
Wholly-owned 
subsidiary
Wholly-owned 
subsidiary
Wholly-owned
subsidiary
Wholly-owned
subsidiary
Wholly-owned 
subsidiary
Investment effects
- Potential to raise 
competitiveness in 
medical equipment market
- Establishment of R&D 
partnerships
- Competitive pressure on 
Siemens, Philips and 
General Electric
- Consumer benefits 
(choice, customisation, 
innovation)
- Supplier entry into new 
markets such as China 
and Brazil
- Intensified competition 
causing decline of rival 
firms
- Establishment of 
partnerships with local 
design companies
- Threat to Motorola’s 
market position
- Opportunities for 
application partners and 
system integrators 
Insignificant
Source: Author’s database
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9. Conclusion
16 7 eV'° US ChaP'er Presen,ed the ,indi"9s ° f in relation to the
investment motives, modes and effects Chinese multinationals in the UK The
resu s were analysed ,n the context of existing theories and empirrcal studres The
Closing chapter this thesis begins by discussing the relevance the study in
relation to practical developments and academic research This is followed by a
restatement of the study's aim and objectives Next the study's contribution is
emphasised which is followed by a discussion of the implications
9.1. Relevance
The steady rise in outward investment from China over the last decade means that
the presence of Chinese multinationals in foreign countries has never been
greater. Although the majority of Chinese outward investment is concentrated
around Asia, companies from China are increasingly venturing into advanced
economic regions such as the US and the European Union. Large economies
such as Germany, France and the UK host the largest proportion of Chinese
multinationals in Europe. Although Chinese investment has drawn significant
media attention, academic research has not kept up with the flurry of investment 
activity.
Outward FDI from China has received comparatively less scholarly attention than 
FDI undertaken by Western multinationals in China. Although the number of 
studies on Chinese outward investment is growing, the availability of research in 
this area is still relatively limited. In particular few studies concentrate on the 
effects of Chinese investment on advanced host countries. This aspect of Chinese 
investment is becoming increasingly relevant as more multinationals choose to 
locate their international activities in Europe. There is a growing need for 
advanced host economies to improve their understanding of Chinese 
multinationals, especially the effects these companies are having on host country 
business sectors.
Further knowledge of Chinese investment effects is particularly useful for British-
based businesses that are competing against or partnering with Chinese
multinationals, or may do so in future. It also serves to better inform policymakers
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decisions on what position to take in relation to Chinese multinationals in the UK 
e influx of Chinese multinationals in Europe together with the lack of academic 
research on their effects has created a need for more research in this area.
Existing studies on Chinese outward investment focus on the behaviour of 
Chinese multinationals. They emphasise the multinationals' perspective by 
investigating their investment motivations and strategies for example. Whilst this 
study examines the investment motives and modes of Chinese multinationals, it 
also includes the host country perspective. This is achieved by investigating the 
effects of Chinese investment on business partners in Britain.
9.2. Aim and objectives
The aim of this study was to understand the extent to which the investment 
motives and investment modes displayed by Chinese MNEs influence the effects 
of their investments on British business partners. This aim was achieved through 
three research objectives. The first objective was to examine the investment 
motives of Chinese multinationals. The second was to understand their investment 
modes and the challenges they encountered. The third was to identify the effects 
of Chinese multinationals on British business partners. By accomplishing the 
research aim and objectives this thesis has made two key contributions — the first 
relates to investment motives while the second relates to investment effects
9.3. Contribution
This section highlights the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions. It shows 
how findings on Chinese competitive advantages and investment motives 
contribute towards existing internationalisation theories. In addition it demonstrates 
how the conclusions regarding Chinese investment effects contribute towards 
existing empirical literature.
Competitive advantages and investment motives
Detailed examination of the Chinese MNEs shows that they differ with regard to 
competitive advantages and investment motives. Some of the companies lacked
competitive advantages and invested in Britain to acquire them, while others 
already had such advantages and intended to exploit them.
This finding exposes the contextual limitations of leading internationalisation
theories which argue that firms internationalise either to exploit or to acquire
competitive advantages. The first view proposes that firms need to have
ownership advantages (Dunning 1993) or firm-specific advantages (Rugman
2007) in order to internationalise. Meanwhile the second view argues that
companies from emerging economies lack such advantages and internationalise
with the intention of gaining them (Guillen, Garcia-Canal 2009, Luo, Tung 2007, 
Mathews 2006b)
The conclusions of this research suggest that the companies examined display 
elements of both perspectives. Some of the Chinese multinationals 
internationalised on the basis of existing ownership advantages while others did 
not. The problem with the first view is that it does not account for the 
internationalisation behaviour of Chinese multinationals that lack competitive 
advantages of the conventional kind. Instead it provides a useful explanation of the 
investment behaviour of TP Link, Weigao, Vanceinfo, Hytera and Mindray. all of 
which already possessed competitive advantages.
The second view suffers from similar deficiencies when it comes to the 
internationalisation of Chinese multinationals. It was developed to explain the 
internationalisation behaviour of emerging market multinationals without taking into 
account companies that possess competitive advantages. This perspective is 
therefore limited to explaining the internationalisation behaviour of firms that lack 
such advantages e.g. SAIC, Changan, Zhuzhou CSR Times and CQME.
The inherent diversity of Chinese multinationals suggests that it may be necessary 
to extend the two perspectives to provide more holistic explanations of the 
internationalisation of emerging market firms. The first view could be modified to 
account for emerging market firms that lack ownership advantages, while the 
second view could be adapted to include those that already have them. 
Alternatively a new theory could be devised taking into consideration the diversity 
of Chinese multinationals. The theory could offer an explanation for the
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international investment activities of emerging market firms that have existing 
competitive advantages and also those that do not.
Investment effects
The results of this research suggest that the effects were dependent on the
investment motives of the Chinese multinationals and their selection of investment
modes. The detailed examination of their investment effects contributes to
empirical literature on the effects of emerging market multinationals' investment
activities on advanced host economies. The findings are summarised in the 
following matrix:
Figure 42 -  Investment effects matrix
0
O
E
CD
E
C/)
CD
Investment motive
Strategic asset-seeking
o$
-Improvements and 
growth in acquired firms 
-R&D intensification in 
external partners
Strategic asset-exploiting
No companies in this 
category
1
0
0
0
-R&D intensification in 
external partners
-Customer benefits 
-Competitive effects 
-Business generation for 
external partners
Source: interview data
Companies with strategic asset-seeking motives that invested via M&A (quadrant 
one) and greenfield investment (quadrant two) intensified R&D activities in British 
partner organisations. The technological focus of these investors resulted in 
numerous collaborations with British R&D organisations such as universities and 
consultancies. Thus the presence of Chinese MNEs contributed towards the 
buoyancy of the R&D industry in Britain. In addition to the effects on external 
partners, strategic asset-seeking companies that invested via M&A (quadrant one) 
had profound effects on the companies they acquired. The acquired companies
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experienced largely positive effects once they were taken over by Chinese 
mu ina lona s They were able to access new capital needed to service their debts 
to fund large investment projects The takeovers ensured job preservation and 
new ,ob creation ,n acquired organisations. They were also able to access the
Chinese market using the support and guidance of the Chinese parent companies,
Tho acquired companies intensified thpiruensmea their R&D activities as a result of their new
owners' drive towards technological development.
They also learned about Chinese bus,ness culture and the Chinese market which 
would enable them to compete more effectively in China. There is some
preliminary evidence of technological transfer from China to Britain which suggests 
that Chinese firms are rapidly catching up with Western technologies. The 
competitive position of the acquired firms improved because they could access 
new sources of capital, their R&D efforts intensified and they had improved the 
knowledge and skills needed to access the Chinese market. These benefits were 
achieved through minimal intervention by the Chinese investors who made a 
concerted effort to preserve the identity and autonomy of the acquired companies.
On the other hand, companies with market-access seeking motives that invested 
via greenfield investment (quadrant three) had rather different effects compared to 
the previous group. They mostly affected competitors, customers and partner 
organisations in Britain. Chinese multinationals intensified competition in their 
respective markets which compelled local rivals to be more efficient in terms of 
pricing and service agreements. However the entry of Chinese multinationals also 
had a downside which was to threaten the survival of some of its competitors. 
Their presence improved consumer welfare by providing additional choice, value, 
innovation and customisation. The investors affected a range of British partner 
organisations. For instance they generated additional revenue for local distributors 
and high value-added opportunities for British partner organisations. The Chinese 
multinationals also assisted local suppliers in promoting their products in new 
overseas markets such as China and Brazil.
On the whole the effects demonstrated by this group of investors were more 
market-focused than the previous group. Aside from the benefits for customers 
and the acceleration of competitiveness in their sectors, these companies also
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generated considerable high value-added, knowledge intensive opportunities for
bUSmeSS PartnerS at home and abroad. Compared to the previous 
group, the effects were less R&D intensive because of their overall focus on
market-based activities rather than technological development. Nevertheless the
presence of this type of investor was shown to be equally beneficial.
Based on the evidence provided, this research has contributed to both the
theoretical and empirical literature by examining the investment behaviour of
Chinese multinationals in Britain. From a theoretical point of view it contributes to
existing internationalisation theories by demonstrating that some emerging market
firms possess significant competitive advantages while others do not. Existing
literature on the investment effects of emerging market multinationals in advanced
economies is sparse and often provides us with superficial understanding of this
relatively new phenomenon. The empirical contribution of this study is that it
provides a detailed understanding of how firms from emerging markets can
influence business partners in advanced host economies. In doing so it finds that
different investment motives and modes result in diverse effects on business 
partners in the host country.
The conceptual model that was first presented at the end of the literature review 
has now been updated to show the key contribution to knowledge that this study 
makes. The column ‘theoretical basis’ shows that the investment behaviour of 
Chinese firms in the UK can be explained using two different theoretical 
approaches which are manifested through two investment motivations. The arrows 
inserted between columns highlight the interaction between investment motives, 
modes and effects which was not considered by previous research. The model 
shows that different investment motives and investment modes lead to different 
investment effects on the host country. Finally the fourth column ‘host country 
effects’ details some new investment effects found in the UK which were not 
captured by previous studies.
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Figure 43 - Conceptual model of Chinese iinvestment in the UK
Theoretical
basis
Investment
motives
Investment
modes
Host country
effects
Internationalisation of Chinese firms in the UK
Source: Author’s interpretation of the literature
9.4. Implications
Having examined the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, this 
section discusses the implications of its findings.
9.4.1. Competitive advantages and investment motives
The findings regarding Chinese competitive advantages and investment motives 
have significant implications for UK investment promotion agencies (IPAs). The 
results of this research provide local IPAs with helpful knowledge about Chinese 
investors. The understanding that Chinese multinationals have different 
competitive advantages and therefore different reasons for investing allows IPAs 
to promote the UK as an investment destination to potential Chinese investors 
more effectively. They could develop a differentiated approach towards attracting 
Chinese investment on this basis. For example IPAs could focus on promoting
9 S6tS SUCh aS brands' technology and know-how to potential Chinese 
investors look,ng to upgrade their competitive advantages. Alternatively IPAs could
ig light local and regional market opportunities to Chinese investors that are
9 expl0lt ex|sting competitive advantages. Findings relating to the diversity 
of Chinese investors suggest that IPAs should tailor their investment promotion 
activities according to different types of investors instead of taking a uniform
approach.
The finding that some Chinese multinationals have developed considerable
competitive advantages similar to those held by advanced economy multinationals
has implications for the domination of multinationals from developed countries.
Historically multinationals from advanced economies dominated global investment
activities because of superior competitive advantages they held. Although these
multinationals still lead the way in terms of cross-border investment there are signs 
that this is beginning to change.
The results of this research show that approximately half of the companies 
examined already possessed advantages that enabled them to compete in 
overseas markets. In terms of competitive advantages these Chinese 
multinationals are similar to multinationals from advanced economies. This may be 
an indication that some Chinese multinationals have caught up or are close to 
catching up with their developed country rivals.
Meanwhile there are still some developing country multinationals that lack strong 
competitive advantages and are unable to compete effectively against global 
leaders. Half of the companies examined for the purpose of this study belonged to 
this category. It is possible that once their competitive advantages have been 
strengthened, these multinationals will not be very different to multinationals that 
currently dominate global investment activity. This may not only be the case with 
Chinese multinationals but may also apply to multinationals from other developing 
countries.
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9.4.2. Effects on British business partners
The research findings suggest that although they are diverse, the effects of 
Chinese investment on Bntish business partners are largely positive This
P ts a key finding foi UK policymakers who could develop a differentiated
approach to encourage both asset-seeking and asset-expioiting investment from 
China.
At present the UK government does not specifically encourage Chinese
acquisitions. Given the benefits that acquired British firms derive from this type of
investment, perhaps UK policymakers should consider encouraging Chinese
asset-seeking to acquire troubled companies in Britain. The government could
provide a free service that helps Chinese companies to identify possible
acquisition targets and assists them throughout the acquisition process The costs
of running such a service would be offset by the benefits to acquired businesses 
and local partner organisations.
Similarly UK policymakers would have good reason to encourage Chinese asset- 
exploiting companies to set up greenfield sites in the UK. Given the benefits 
brought about by this type of investment, perhaps the government could consider 
providing a separate service for Chinese greenfield investors. The service could 
assist potential investors with locating suitable greenfield sites. It could also
provide guidance with regards to local business regulations and practices with 
which they may be unfamiliar.
The findings of this research relating to some of the effects of Chinese investment 
also have implications for British partner organisations. These organisations 
acquired significant advantages from partnering with different types of Chinese 
investors. Some of the partners collaborated on new research and development 
projects initiated by Chinese investors. Some distributed new products made by 
Chinese companies. Others acted as their suppliers or collaborators in joint 
delivery of knowledge-intensive products and services.
The benefits of partnering with Chinese multinationals illustrated by this research 
should encourage British businesses to be proactive in forging relationships with 
these investors. British organisations could have the opportunity to generate
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partnering with Chinese m n ltin a r^T  eX“ P" ° nS ° " ech™cal tea'"i"£l. However, 
L o n  r  , multinationals in the future may provide further
opportunities for technical learning as their techhologica, competencies evolve
9.5. Study limitations
This section discusses three main limitations of the study which relate to 
general,sab,I,ty, subjectivity and data access. The question of generalised,lity was 
previously addressed as a limitation of the case study method whereas, here, it is 
discussed in a more general sense. This study develops our knowledge of the 
investment behaviour of a particular group of Chinese multinationals. Given its 
narrow focus there are limitations with regards to the generalisability of its
|  m
conclusions.
This research builds our understanding of the factors which motivate Chinese 
companies to invest in the UK It details the investment modes they use to do this 
and considers the implications for the host country. The study achieves its aim of 
building a more complete picture of the activities of Chinese multinationals in the 
UK. This is particularly useful for policy-makers, investment promotion agencies 
and British firms wishing to form relationships with Chinese multinationals. 
However the conclusions are not necessarily applicable to other contexts. For 
example we cannot assume that Chinese multinationals investing in other 
advanced economies would behave in the same way. Despite limitations regarding 
generalisability, the findings of this study can serve as a basis for reasonable 
assumptions or hypothesis generation in further research.
The issue of subjectivity as a potential limitation pertains to the researcher and to 
the study participants. Although every effort was made to ensure credibility and 
validity throughout the research process the question of subjectivity needs to be 
addressed as a potential limitation.
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"  h7  a'e CU'" ,ral dlBere™ -  between the researcher a„d the interviewees 
The study pad,c,pants were Bntish o, Chinese while the researcher was of a
different background. These differences increase the likelihood of 
misinterpretations. For instance the interviewee may misunderstand the question
and then provide an answer based on what they thought was being asked
A related limitation is that ot the native language spoken by the interviewer and the
interviewees This limitation was applicable when native Chinese speakers were
interviewed in English Although the interviewees were fluent in English and there
were no significant communication problems, there is a possibility that some fine
details were overlooked owing to language differences between the interviewer 
and the interviewee.
Second, the interview data could have been affected by the interviewees’
perception of the researcher as an outsider. The interviewees may have been
cautious about disclosing certain information to an academic researcher. Perhaps
they had concerns about the way in which the data could be used and this may 
have affected their responses.
Finally, as with any interview-based research, there is a chance that study 
participants may provide inaccurate information. This could happen unintentionally 
if, for example, the interviewee can only partially recall an experience they are 
describing. On the other hand interviewees may deliberately provide incorrect 
information by exaggerating events or describing them in a way that creates a 
positive impression about them and their organisation. The issues around 
subjectivity of interview research were mitigated through data triangulation 
whereby data was sourced from a number of different interviewees and from other 
non-interview sources such as company documents, trade publications etc.
Gaining direct access to the case study firms was exceedingly challenging as most 
of them were unwilling to participate. The companies that did participate did so to 
varying degrees. Some of the firms agreed to extensive interviewing of up to 10 
hours while others could spare no more than one or two hours. The issue of varied 
interview access to Chinese firms was overcome by the inclusion of interviews 
with other organisations and the use of secondary data. Interviews were arranged
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with individuals from qovernment (& n i iis-n _
fe a Mahle and r  '9' UKT ^  EMDA) 3nd partner or9anisatio"s
(e g. Mahle and Cosworth). The informal,on gathered through interviews was
supplamented by secondary data from a range of sources including company
we sites, specialised publications and media portals amongst others.
Given the difficulties of accessing the Chinese companies, the use of interview
data alone would have posed serious challenges to answering the research
question. The addition of interviews from external organisations as well as
information from secondary sources ensured that there was sufficient data to
answer the central research question comprehensively. Each of the case study
companies included in this research plays a vital role in improving our
understanding of Chinese investment behaviour and the effects it has on local 
business partners.
The first three case study firms SAIC, COME and Zhuzhou CSR Times showcase 
the investment behaviour of Chinese strategic asset-seeking firms. They improve 
the companies they acquire and intensify R&D activities in partner organisations. 
Meanwhile the remaining six case study firms show that Chinese companies can 
also be market-seeking and that the effects of their investments are different to the 
previous group. In spite of its limitations this research provides us with a better 
understanding of Chinese investors in the UK. It allows us to appreciate the 
diversity of their investment motivations, the types of investments they undertake 
and consequently the different effects they have on British partner organisations.
9.6. Further research
The findings of this study open up a range of research directions with regards to 
the investment behaviour of Chinese and other emerging market multinationals in 
the UK and other advanced host economies.
This study has extended our knowledge of Chinese investment behaviour and its 
implications in particular sectors in the UK including automotive, manufacturing, IT, 
telecommunications and medical equipment. The question is whether Chinese 
firms invested in other sectors in the UK display the same behavioural patterns.
The next step would be to develop a quad,I,alive study using a represen,a,i,e
P ic , covers all of the sectors in which Chinese firms invest The findings
o e present study could be used to generate hypotheses which would be tested 
using a larger sample.
The investment behaviour and its implications discussed in this research apply to 
Chinese multinationals. It would be interesting to explore the investment activities 
of multinationals from other emerging markets e.g. India. A new study could be 
designed to see how Indian investors compare with Chinese investors in relation 
to investment motives, modes and effects. The study could focus on whether 
investments undertaken by Indian multinationals are more or less beneficial to the
UK economy compared to Chinese investments. The findings could be used to 
guide policies which govern FDI from emerging economies.
While the present research looks into Chinese FDI in the form of greenfield 
investment and acquisitions because of the prevalence of these two investment 
forms, a new study could be devised to examine other investment types. It could 
explore Chinese joint venture arrangements and strategic alliances in the UK and 
compare the results with the findings of this study. It would be especially useful to
investigate the extent to which these forms of investment are beneficial to UK firms 
that are party to these arrangements.
Further research directions opened up by this study are not geographically 
confined to the UK. Flaving investigated the investment activities of Chinese 
multinationals in the UK, it would be valuable to do the same in other advanced 
host economies e.g. US, Japan or other EU countries. It would be particularly 
interesting to look into their reasons for investing, the ways in which this is being 
done and to identify implications for local economies. Similar to the UK the findings 
would help policy-makers to develop appropriate policies towards Chinese 
investors. This new research would be a positive step towards building a 
comprehensive picture of Chinese investment activities in advanced host
economies.
9.7. Closing remarks
The Intensification of outward investment by Chinese and other emerging market 
multinationals has ied an increased presence o, these „rms in advanced 
economres. However our understanding of their investment activities is limited 
ecause academic research has not kept up with practical developments in the 
field This study represents a step towards improving our knowledge by examining 
the investment behavrour of Chinese multinationals in Britain In doing so it builds 
a more complete overall picture of Chinese FDI in advanced economies.
The value of this research to academics consists of theoretical and empirical
aspects. From a theoretical point of view it highlights the fact that existing theories
do not fully explain the internationalisation of Chinese firms and therefore need to
be synthesised. Meanwhile, from an empirical point of view, this study finds that
Chinese investment effects are determined by the type of investment used and the 
factors which motivate the initial investment decision.
This research is also valuable to practitioners in government and in the private 
sector. For policy-makers the finding that Chinese investment is largely beneficial 
regardless of the type of investment undertaken is a useful basis for fine-tuning 
FDI policy. Meanwhile the potential benefits of partnering with Chinese 
multinationals uncovered by this research are of strategic significance to British 
firms. Companies looking for investors may be more inclined to select Chinese 
partners, while those looking to enter the Chinese market may wish to link up with 
Chinese firms instead of going it alone.
The results of this study contribute theoretically and empirically towards existing 
academic knowledge on Chinese outward investment. They also identify potential 
opportunities that are available to business practitioners as a result of Chinese FDI 
in the UK. The findings suggest that policy-makers should be more proactive in 
attracting Chinese investors while local businesses have much to gain from 
partnering with them.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 -  Invitation letter
THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTHAMPTON
Northampton Business School
Subject: PhD research prnjprt 
Dear Sir/Madam
Lboutarh ? n ir? f StUdena 31 thS UniversitV of Northampton and my doctoral thesis is
their reasons for investment, the ways in which these investments^/vere
undertaken and the implications for British business partners. The study is being
undertaken for academic purposes only and does no? seek to obtain any
commercially sensitive information. The research adheres to strict ethical 
guidelines set out by the University.
This research project takes a multiple case study approach and will be based on a 
number of Chinese multinationals in the UK as well as their British partners I 
would therefore like to invite your organisation to kindly participate in this research. 
If you decide to take part, 1 hr interviews with employees at different levels 
including managers and operative staff will be arranged. I would be grateful if 10 
individuals from your organisation could be interviewed.
My research project is supervised by a team of lecturers and professors from 
Northampton Business School. The first supervisor is Dr Shaowei He 
(shaowei.he@northampton.ac.uk). If you would like to find out more about this 
project or if you have any questions please feel free to contact either of us.
I would be grateful if you could let me know if you are interested in taking part in 
this research. In the meantime I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest 
convenience.
With kind regards
Jelena Vukicevic 
Northampton Business School 
Park Campus 
Boughton Green Road 
Northampton 
NN27AL
Tel: 01604 89 25 27
Email: jelena.vukicevic@northampton.ac.uk
Appendix 2 — Consent form
Northampton Business School
THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTHAMPTON
Consent form
I acknowledge that I have read and understood the research project summary.
I acknowledge that I have read and understood the project aims and objectives
I understand that the researcher will ensure that the interview data remains 
anonymous.
I understand that reports and publications may be written about this research and 
that no personal information will be disclosed in public without my prior consent.
I give permission for my views to be used in publications from the study and I 
understand that they will not be used for any other purpose.
I have read and understood all of the above points and wish to take part in the 
study.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
withdrawn at any time. my consent may be
be disclosed.
I understand that the interview will be confidential and no personal information will
Name:
Signed:
Date:
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Appendix 3 -  Interview guide for Chinese
multinationals
THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTHAMPTON
Northampton Business School
UK activities
1. What are your activities in the UK?
M otivations
2.
3. W pLdId VT  ° rganisation decide to set up a UK subsidiary? Were any challenges encountered? y
4.
Market entry strategy
Your company chose to enter the UK market by setting up a wholly 
owned subsidiary. Why was this strategy chosen?
5.
Host country effects
What are the effects of your company’s presence on UK customers 
suppliers, competitors and collaborators?
C ross-cultura l collaboration
6. To what extent is the workforce local in your UK office?
7. Are there any cross-cultural challenges in working with the British?
R&D activities
8. Where are your R&D activities located?
9. How innovative is your company?
10. Please can you give examples of new products / processes?
Role o f governm ent
11. What is your relationship with the Chinese government?
Strategic outlook
12. You aspire to become one of the top 3 companies in your sector. How 
do you plan to achieve this?
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Appendix 4 -  Interview guide for British
partner organisations
THE UNIVERSITY OF
Northampton Business School
NORTHAMPTON
1 What is your view on Chinese investment 
2. Why do you think that Chinese companies
subsidiaries in the UK?
in the UK?
are choosing to locate their
3. What sort of activities are they undertaking?
4. What are the benefits?
5. How does this kind of investment impact UK businesses?
6. Are UK businesses benefitting from Chinese investment?
7. If so, in what way?
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Appendix 5 -  Interview guide for government organise,ions/IPAs
1.
2 .
TH E U N IV ER S IT Y  OF
NORTHAMPTON
Northampton Business School
Role of your organisation
S S S S S r - inVOl''ed Wi,h Chl—
3.
Motivations
tliinMhans3?16^ ' ' 19 EU destination for Chinese investment. Why do you
4. What attracts them to invest in the UK?
5.
6 . 
7 .
Challenges
What concerns do they have?
What are the perceived barriers?
What could be done to attract more investment from China?
8
Host country effects
What are the effects on UK businesses? (e.g. competitors, suppliers, 
customers, collaborators)
What are they learning from Chinese companies?
10. In what way are they benefitting?
11. What are the effects on the UK economy?
9
Home country effects
12. What are the effects on the investing Chinese firm?
13. And on HQ back home in China?
14. What are the effects on the Chinese economy?
Long-term outlook
15. How do you see the future of Chinese investment in the UK?
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